



EUROPEAN JOURNAL *of* TRANSFORMATION STUDIES

2016

Vol. 4, No. 1

EUROPE OUR HOUSE

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF TRANSFORMATION STUDIES

2016

Vol. 4, no. 1

Guest editor

Dr. Jaroslav Mihálik

University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava, Slovakia



© by Europe Our House, Tbilisi

e-ISSN 2298-0997

Editor-in-Chief

Prof. Arkadiusz Modrzejewski

University of Gdańsk, Poland

modrzejewski@ug.edu.pl

Co-editors

Tamar Gamkrelidze, MA

Europea Our House, Tbilisi, Georgia
tamuna@hotmail.co.uk

Dr. Tatiana Tökölyová

*University College of International and
Public Affairs in Bratislava, Slovakia*
tokolyova.ba@gmail.com

Executive editor

Dr. Paweł Nieczuła-Ostrowski

Pomeranian University in Szczecin, Poland

Copy editor

Magda Warzocha, MA

Medical University of Gdańsk, Poland

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Prof. Jakub Potulski, University of Gdańsk, Poland – **Chairperson**

- Prof. Tadeusz Dmochowski, University of Gdańsk, Poland
Prof. Marwan Al-Absi, University of Constantine the Philosopher in Nitra, Slovakia
Prof. Slavomír Gálík, University of ss. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava, Slovakia
Prof. Wojciech Forysinski, Eastern Mediterranean University, Famagusta, Northern Cyprus
Prof. Danuta Plecka, Nicola Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland
Prof. Anatoliy Kruglashov, Chernivtsi National University, Ukraine
Prof. Malkhaz Matsaberidze, Ivane Javakashvili Tbilisi State University, Georgia
Prof. Ruizan Mekvabidze, Gori State Teaching University, Georgia
Prof. Lucia Mokrá, Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia
Prof. Andras Bozoki, Central European University in Budapest, Hungary
Prof. Tereza-Brindușa Palade, National University of Political and Public Administration in Bucharest, Romania
Prof. Dana Petranová, University of ss. Cyril and Methodius in Trnava, Slovakia
Prof. Elif Çolakoğlu, Atatürk University in Erzurum, Turkey
Prof. Petr Jemelka, Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic
Prof. Valeriu Mosneaga, Moldova State University in Chișinău, Republic of Moldova
Prof. Alex Skovikov, Moscow University for the Humanities, Russia
Prof. Andrei Tararu, National University of Political Science and Public Administration in Bucharest, Romania
Prof. Tetyana Nagornyk, Donetsk National University, Ukraine
Prof. Alexandre Kukhianidze, Tbilisi State University, Georgia
Prof. Nana Akhalaia, Gori State Teaching University, Georgia
Prof. Jana Reschová, Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic
Prof. Jolanta Urbanovič, Mykolo Romerio University in Vilnius, Lithuania
Prof. Josef Dolista, CEVRO Institut College in Prague, Czech Republic
Prof. Teodora Kaleyńska, Veliko Turnovo University, Bulgaria
Prof. Daniela La Foresta, University of Naples Federico II, Italy
Prof. Polina Golovátina-Mora, Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, Columbia
Prof. Marek Hrubec, Center of Global Studies, Academy of Science of the Czech Republic and Charles University in Prague
Dr. Justyna Schulz, University of Bremen, Germany
Dr. Sabina Gálíková Tolnaiová, University of Constantine the Philosopher in Nitra, Slovakia
Dr. Živka Deleva, University of Erfurt, Germany
Dr. Ágnes Horváth, Eszterházy Karoly College in Eger, Hungary
Dr. Sanja Zlatanović, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Belgrade, Serbia

CONTENTS

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ISSUES

Michal Greguška & Jaroslav Mihálik

Czechoslovak Federation in Comparative Perspective: Steps for Heterogeneous Societies

5

Marta Grymska

Far Right Political Parties in Contemporary Ukraine: The Aftermath of the Revolution of Dignity

26

Krystyna Gomółka

Implementation of Inogate Programme in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia

34

Patrycja Rutkowska

The Efficiency of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia during the Russian-Georgian Conflict in 2008

42

GLOBAL AND SYMBOLIC PERSPECTIVE OF POLITICS

Marek Rewizorski

The Market, Non-State Actors and the Formation of Global Governance

52

Grzegorz Piwnicki

The Sphere of Politics with Myth and Stereotype in the Background

66

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ISSUES

CZECHOSLOVAK FEDERATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: STEPS FOR HETEROGENEOUS SOCIETIES

Michal Greguška

*University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius,
Faculty of Social Sciences, Dept. of Political Science and European Studies, 4/A,
Bučianska St., 917 01 Trnava, Slovakia.
michal.greguska@ucm.sk*

&

Jaroslav Mihálik

*University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius,
Faculty of Social Sciences, Dept. of Political Science and European Studies, 4/A,
Bučianska St., 917 01 Trnava, Slovakia.
jaroslav.mihalik@ucm.sk*

Abstract

This paper stems from the complexity of the Czechoslovak federation and its subsequent dissolution in 1993 as an output of separatist tendencies and moods of the political leaders. Such case study serves as a grounded model for further investigation of current trends of separatism and calls for autonomy in heterogeneous societies, as illustrated in comparative perspective of Spain and Belgium. We argue on multiple levels, finding the common grounds of separatism, federalism and autonomous regions compared to centralist policy making of the institutional framework. Based on this we have developed the criterial distinction of neuralgic points for each of the researched countries which then serves for final interpretation and analysis. The methodological approach is thus constructed around the case tracking method combined with the comparative framework analysis of the models of state-regional autonomy with the prospects of possible steps for heterogeneous societies.

Key words: *Czechoslovak federation, heterogeneous society, separatism, Spain, Belgium*

THE ROLE MODEL OF SEPARATISM AND DISSOLUTION – THE CASE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic adopted an important document in the framework of the so-called reform process "Czechoslovak Spring"¹ in its legislature on October 27, 1968. It was the Constitutional Act. 143/1968 Coll. on the Czechoslovak Federation (hereinafter "the Constitutional Act"), accepting the governing relations within a heterogeneous society. Its real content application had proved ineffective due to the impact of the August invasion by Warsaw Pact troops and the subsequent mandatory application of the normalization policy. The achievements of the Constitutional Act have been progressively restricted and its content, and the idea have not been achieved until 1989 and the events known as the Velvet revolution [Svatuška 2003]. Within the transition process and democratization many centrifugal forces that were in the past decade ingrained came to the surface. These trends have resulted in a turbulent period and ultimately led to the division of the common state and the emergence of two successor states- the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

As already indicated, the Constitutional Act anchored the new circumstances in the relations of Czechs and Slovaks, which were based on well-established principles of the federation. The main attention was devoted mainly to the text definition of the scope of both republics and their competences, but also the determination of parity and non-majorization at the federal constitutional institutions. Structure, content and the reference of the constitutional text can be viewed as a fully democratic with the preservation of elements of federalism. Although the fulfilment of such ideas had never taken place and, through interference, modification and amendment of the Constitution in the years 1969-1971, the situation *de facto*, although not *de jure* returned to the original forms of centralization. The analysis of the Constitutional Act is based over the fundamental theoretical and methodological approaches and knowledge. The constitutional amendment of 1960 consisted of 8 parts and 151 articles. The wording of the articles and the main starting points of the law reflected one of the basic requirements of time - Slovak national emancipation. This is documented in the first part of the Constitutional Act where the framework of the provisions reads that "*both Republics mutually respect each other's sovereignty and the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic;² as well as the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic respects the sovereignty of nation states*" (Constitutional Act on Czechoslovak Federation 1968). Based on this article a triple sovereignty had emerged. Derived from that, another important aspect arose – the constitutionally implied principle of dual citizenship according to which "*a citizen of either of the two republics is also a citizen of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic*" (Constitutional Act on Czechoslovak Federation 1968).

¹ Czechoslovak Spring or Prague Spring is the term describing the events in Czechoslovakia during spring months of 1968 when the reform government led by the first secretary of the Communist Party Alexander Dubček had adopted series of reform measures leading to liberalization of the regime and sort of democratization. This process is inevitably related to the Warsaw Pact army invasion to Czechoslovakia in August 21 1968.

² Compare to Constitutional Act 143/1968 on Czechoslovak Federation where the equivalent Czech and Slovak Federal Republic is constituted

The entire second part of the Constitutional Act divides powers between the federation and the republics, and puts a clear definition of the federal, republican and shared responsibilities. Through the following parts the legislative, executive and judicial powers are divided innovatively and in a democratic way, but mainly there is a closer specification of the highest state authorities of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic (in Part VII) and hence the replacement of the asymmetry. The republics disposed their own legislative bodies and their representatives were situated in the newly-constituted upper house (House of Nations) on the basis of parity and in accordance with the principle of non-majorization. The position and competences of the upper house were in an equivalent position to the lower chamber which also constitutes one of the key elements of the federal systems. Certainly, an important moment was the creation of three governments - Czechoslovak, Czech and Slovak.

The Constitutional Act quite rightly included in its content the most important conflict areas in the environment of Czech-Slovak relations in the legal and constitutional line. These are therefore subject to create a balanced state bodies and setting relations with federal institutions. However, a very important line had been played by the general social environment that lived far from the decision-making process of the constitutional institutions, while their attention was directed especially on the Slovak side for anchoring the foundations of national emancipation to the form of separatism, which is fully manifested in the process of democratization after 1989. Separatism, in its theoretical basis similar to other dogmas of political science, promotes specific interests of a narrow range of groups or individuals, while the dominant part of the nation becomes a hostage of those interests. Usually, scholars focus on normative rather than positive arguments related to theoretical and legal foundations of the rights of groups to secede [Buchheit, 1978; Horowitz, 2003]. There is also a widespread range of determinants and issues related to economic, cultural and political aspects of separatism. It cannot be evaluated differently in case of separatist (in its extreme variation) tendencies of Slovaks during the period of the Czechoslovak Republic, appearing alongside of the real and justified requirements of federalization. After 1989, the negotiations of the government of national understanding³ resulted in the qualified requirements of the Slovak side towards the real application of the federal values adopted by Constitutional law in 1968. However, the difficult realization and a common reluctance on the Czech side contributed to the escalation of sentiment in the Slovak society, which began to manifest itself in an open separatism and questioning the functionality of Czechoslovakia. This rhetoric is familiar with many political actors and the epitome of nationalism and separatism became the Slovak National Party (SNS) and its representatives. This statement confirms the fact that in the parliamentary elections in 1992, the party solely manifested the independence of the Slovak Republic. After the elections, the wave extended to a wider range of the political spectrum and secessionist rhetoric is then typical for the representatives of Slovakia dominating the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH). In a very stuff political environment and the threat of tension escalation the winning political parties

³ The name of federal governments led by Marián Čalfa in 1989-1990 and 1990-1992

ultimately adopted a compromise on the division of common state and the emergence of two successor countries.

Slovak separatism in Czechoslovakia in its radical form only appeared sporadically and was not a subject to long-term consolidation. Its effects are mainly associated with the action of Andrej Hlinka and his party in the 30's of the 20th century within the existence of the Slovak State in the years 1939-1945 and finally, after 1989 in the context of transformational change. Support for these activities, as documented by various sources and claims, reaches back into exile environment and many foreign organizations and foundations of Slovaks financially and morally contributed in supporting the autonomist sentiments. Focusing on the period after 1989 the major part had been played by the already mentioned Slovak National Party. It renewed its activity in the Czech-Slovak party system in 1990 and immediately signed up for the program following up on the idea of historical SNS acting in the years 1871-1938. In the elections of 1990, the party took fourth place and won 10.96% in the House of the People, 11.44% in the House of Nations and 13.94% in the Slovak National Council and the location in the parliamentary opposition. Following the elections in 1992 SNS repeated the fourth place with a 9.39% gain in the House of the People, 9.35% in the House of Nations and 7.93% in the Slovak National Council, but this time within the Slovak coalition government led by Vladimír Mečiar and the HZDS [Rychlik, 2012: 149, 300]. A very important research criterion is reflected through assumption that Czech political leaders had sought the federal mandates while Slovak political representation preferred the republican principle of political mandating.

As mentioned above, SNS was the only political platform prior to 1992 elections openly demonstrating its position to future relations between Czechs and Slovaks in one state: "*In the constitutional arrangement our opinions and intentions are clear - a declaration of state independence of the Slovak Republic and involvement in European cooperation under our own name. By the adoption of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and international security guarantees of the independent Slovak Republic we aim to finish the Slovak nationality*" [Slovak National Party Electoral Program 1992]. The nature of the selected article corresponds to the real political practice of SNS leaders in the legislative field, political rhetoric and the overall approach to the issue of maintaining a common federation. After 1992 elections HZDS also moved towards this approach, thus creating a common Slovak government and the implementation of many steps leading to the disintegration of Czechoslovakia was only logical result of the situation. the events took a direct way, under the supervision of government most MPs progressively adopted important and symbolic documents such as the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Slovak Republic in July, the Constitution of the Slovak Republic in September and representatives of the Slovak government coalition jointly took vote for the adoption of federal constitutional law on the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in November 1992.

One of the basic attributes of destructive direction was also the overall geopolitical context of the early 90's in Europe. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries in the eastern parts of the European continent occurred in a situation reminiscent of the end of World War II conditions. However, this time states regaining independence from the yoke of the Warsaw Pact consistently sought establishing of the democratic mechanisms, leading to their immediate inclusion among potential

candidates for membership in relevant international organizations such as the EU or NATO. Unfortunately, this effort quite logically led in some cases to nationalist and separatist tendencies which we have witnessed not only in Czechoslovakia but specifically in the case of Yugoslavia or other former states of Soviet Union. Europe was actually on the verge of its political existence, and very advantageously used the official end of the Cold War for its integration intentions. Although the West intervened only moderately and simply, for the long-term perception the EU had created an image of organization that is worth to be part of, and on this basis the voters in each country resorted to prefer pro-European political parties over the past two decades. The main mission of Europe was to maintain a peaceful situation on the continent, as it sometimes has failed, but in the case of Czechoslovakia be able to count at least the victory of prioritizing personal ambitions of the central protagonists of Czechoslovakia split, bringing the whole process vigor in addition to non-conflict, even without the need for official verification through referendums.

Referendum, in this case, can be seen as a legitimate mean of simple validation of intended policy actions. The history has already been used in similar contexts of international concern, such as the fate of Swedish-Norwegian Union, but also in the same period during the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. In Czechoslovakia, it came to a definitive decision not to accept the referendums in dividing Federation in the process of adoption of the constitutional act on the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. The law was adopted by the republican as well as federal representative bodies, while specifically "*the Slovak National Council rejected the referendum as a condition of validity*" [Gronský, 2007: 561]. Its adoption was done in an environment of current Constitutional Act 327/1991 Coll. on the referendum, but despite the long criticism it had not collided with the application. The text states that "*the referendum may be submitted to citizens of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to decide on the core issues of the constitutional arrangements of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic*", or that "*on the proposal for withdrawal of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic can be decided only by referendum*" [Gronský, 2007: 309]. Significant data for this case is the optional possibility of a referendum on fundamental issues of constitutional arrangement, i.e. the split of Czechoslovakia, which did not allow any of the republics to opt-out but to become a successor state. For a different wording of the article with regard to an obligatory referendum related to changes of state borders would be a critique of the political protagonists certainly more justified. In this case, however, the mentioned issue gets in more moral level, which is, however, in terms of representative democracy and free mandate only a symbolic tool. Thus, let's consider the other arguments for traditional democratic referendum supplement, especially for the typical Western European liberal societies, and take with reserve several attempts to implement that in terms of transforming country, which may seem awkward. As interpreted by Pithart, the non-use of referendum in such break points of the common states established the sources of distrust in society to parliamentary democracy institutions [Pithart, 2015: 417]. Yet more problematic is the referendum eligibility and its legally binding form in current perspective of the sovereign Slovak Republic after 1993 [Greguška-Ružarovský, 2014].

The root of the problem in the context of the development of ideas of coexistence of heterogeneous societies, Czechoslovakia included, are the difficulties in capitalizing

one of the components of the system which is of particular historical, cultural and political reasons to feel non-fulfillment of their desires and expectations. It encourages the possibility of infecting the society with local nationalism which with sufficient amount of historical and political pillars, may turn into an open separatism and lead to destructive efforts.

Table 1: Critical junctures and neuralgic points implied from the functioning of the Czechoslovak federation

	Criteria		Czechoslovakia
Constitutional system	Position of the nations		Triple sovereignty
	Citizenship		dual
	Republican institutions symmetry		yes (from 1968)
	Republican legislative bodies		yes (from 1968)
	Republican governments		yes (from 1968)
	Upper house of the "federation"	Representation	yes (from 1968)
		Non-majorization	yes (from 1968)
		Relation to lower house	equal
Approaches to separatism	Political parties		SNS (from 1990)
	Electoral programs		SNS (1992)
	Elections	1990 (SNS)	House of the People 10,96%, House of Nations 11,44%, Slovak National Council 13,94%
		1992 (SNS)	House of the People 9,39%, House of Nations 9,35%, Slovak National Council 7,93%
	Government participation		SNS (Slovak government, 1992-1994)
Favorable geopolitical situation			Partially yes
Referendum	Obligatory		no
	Realization		no

This argument had been perfectly confirmed in the case of Czechoslovakia, where in a very short time the society has adopted a vision of autonomy, despite the general credibility of the brand attached to the Czechoslovakia. Newly restored party system did not possess enough power and will in a very important time to suppress extremist influence in any case, however, the composition of the parliament truly reflects the awkward mood in society. In addition to political influence, which we have mentioned above, a significant role was played by media and its irreplaceable role which contributed to the spread of particular expressions and statements related to extremism. Historically, unfortunately interpreted more often by politicians rather than historians, the politics have built up efforts to return to the roots of Slovak emancipation, sometimes stepping back to the times of Great Moravia. We must acknowledge though that in the period 1918-1992 within Czechoslovakia an idea of excellence and stiffness of the Slovaks in the process of "Czechoslovakization" had grown. Undemocratic regime in the years 1948-1989, however, significantly distorted

ways of looking and thorough assessment of the development of relations between the two nations. Its past presence is ultimately reflected in the decisions taken in each part of the process of transition.

The sum of all these findings at the end of the evaluation report on the state of federalism in Czechoslovakia offers space for defining the criteria relevant for the determination of the key elements and features needed for handling the process of comparison and not least also help determine whether the case of Czechoslovakia as a heterogeneous federation is not comparable due to its own specifications. The individual criteria are divided into several groups and thus reflect the need to draw attention to a broader spectrum than just the political and constitutional system of the examined environment. Rather, it is to be seen as wider social and geopolitical conditions in which constitutional institutions adopting the legislation operate.

THE MODELS AND FORMS OF SEPARATISM IN WIDER EUROPEAN CONTEXT: BELGIUM AND SPAIN

The current situation and the environment on the European continent are even more determined by actions of the EU institutions than it was in early 90s of 20th century. This assumption is also important in relation to the individual Member States that sense the position of a sort of "caretaker" of legislative action in fulfilling the mission of Europe consisting of strong regions.

Nation states, i.e. Member States also share the sense of nationhood which practically binds them through the notions of collective identity, shared culture and values, languages, collective memory and also myths of origin, society membership and sense of common destiny [Schmidt, 2004]. From this assumption, the European Union lacks such measures of identity, therefore bringing up the construct of wider influence over the identity, agenda setting and policy making in the nation Member States [Weiler 1995]. The vast literature on the europeanisation topic indices that such process is limited only to new accessing countries and thus not being part of the „old“ Member States of the EU.

Despite the ambiguous definition of the concept of europeanisation, authors [Radaelli, 2003; Börzel, 2005] generalize and generally accept the context of europeanisation as the EU's influence on national policy or domestic impact resulting from EU membership. This definition, however, to a large extent can be applied just to the new Member States and acceding countries in the light of the fact that the political conditions and EU conditionality for the integration of new countries were practically incorporated to late 80s, when the strategic goals of democratization and integration of the European Union were extended to the geographical territory of Central and Eastern Europe.

The dynamics of study and research on europeanisation has brought new insights, previously unrecognized explanations and arguments on three key theses: understanding and analysis of the impact of international politics at the domestic level to operationalize international management system on domestic policy (in terms of research framework) and define the relationship between transnational political agenda and system changes at the level of national policies [Radaelli, 2004]. Giuliani (2003) to this effect argues that europeanisation is not an option and solution

(explanans, phenomenon that explains the dependent variable), but on the contrary, it is a research problem (explanandum, that is an issue that should be studied and explained). Europeanisation also does not provide any solutions to theoretical and empirical concepts. The concept of Europeanisation in light of the diverse variables should be used, in particular to identify the problem that should be solved rather than explaining the source of the problem.

These processes are sometimes faced with the reluctance of acceptance by nation states, reflecting particularly complicated historical context of ethnic development in their territory. The result is a patchwork of different models of constitutional arrangement and differences between regions, not only in Europe but also from the national perspective. The forefront of a public interest is composed of the cases of non-homogeneous societies in which generally one of the components experiences long-term (or continuous) dissatisfaction with their role in the existing state unit, which is a sign identical with the mood of Slovaks within Czechoslovakia. Today, these and similar moods appear in Belgium (the Flemish and Walloons confrontation), Spain (within autonomist efforts of the Catalans), the UK (with the attempts of Scots' independence), but also in Italy and France. For comparison it seems Belgian and Spanish cases serve as best from the following reasons:

- Belgium is a federation, Spain unitary state of regional character with elements of a federation, but in the long term this model as a whole is rather ignored
- Constitutional specifications and measures toward regions and nations
- Symmetry or rather asymmetry of the regional authorities and their share on nation-wide political mechanisms
- Separatism in the party system and share of such subjects on regional and national policy
- In Belgium the initiative toward country disintegration is vivid specifically in Flanders politically associated with the party programs and the party leaders; in Spain such dominant position is devoted to *Convergència i Unió* (CiU) political platform
- Dilemmas in the referendum issues related to its legally binding norm from the separatist perspective

Federal system in Belgium has evolved throughout the long post-war period, and gained its ultimate momentum especially in the late '60s. Gradually, there have been taken legislative and constitutional acts towards decentralization and the formation of regions and communities on territorial and language principle, which culminated in the adoption of a new federal constitution in force since 1993. The long-term initiator of this effort is part of the Flemish population, which refers to sort of limiting their own development at the expense of Walloons (same feeling particularly distressed Czech society against the Slovak population in the early 90's). The Belgium thus constitutes Flanders, Wallonia and the Brussels region and consists of the Flemish, French and German population. The system thus interacts with three components that must emphasize the consensual policy making with elements of consociational democracy. Deep democratic traditions, however, allow the implementation of this policy competition within the defined legislative borders and have more self-sustainable rather than self-destructive character.

Another significant centrifugal point within the Belgian relations is the symbol of the capital Brussels, which, in addition to the role of the center of the European integration, indirectly implements the role of the Belgian constitutional institutions. Yet Brussels illustrates, at least symbolically through its yellow flag color the important role in relations of the "Flemish Black Lion" and "Walloon Red Rooster" in the Belgian flag.

Spain is advocated in this research as a model which is not officially known as a federation but carries many of the features, such as the existence of strong regional units. The roots of Spanish separatism is deeper than in the case of Belgium, but today's quasi federal environment finally began to establish itself after the fall of the regime of Francisco Franco at the end of the 70's. The newly adopted democratic constitution secured the regions an important position, which was assumed by an asymmetric definition with the status of the country all among them. Among the most competent we may introduce Catalonia, as well as the Basque Country, Galicia and Andalusia. Separatism in the early days of this comprehensive reform had developed in its violent form, the intensity of policy actions and decisions spread much later. Current events are concentrated in Catalonia, which held independence referendum on its territory in 2014, but it has been announced as invalid and unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court. Spain is divided into 17 autonomous communities and two autonomous cities. Cultural and competence differences among them are very significant. Madrid, the capital city plays rather opposite role compared to Brussels and its tendency to centralism implies mostly negative attitude in the regional parts of Spain (that effect, which could be continually advocated in Czechoslovakia toward centrally oriented Prague).

The specific status and powers of the regions and communities in Belgium is derived from six state reforms that have been implemented in the country since 1970 and have included the adoption of the Constitution in 1993. It is the basic document for the formulation of new different constitutional reforms taking place at the federal level on the initiative of regional political parties. The specificity of Belgian federalism also lies in the absence of written constitutions in the level of regions and communities, which allows the transfer of regional policy, legislation and interests into federal level. The Constitution only minimally refers to the definitions of nation which is exceptional in art. 193 which frames the Belgian nation only in conjunction with state symbols. Flanders is therefore deemed as region or community based on the constitutional text and Flemish community do not possess the status of a nation which would, in terms of cultural and ethnic aspects, be problematic compared to the Slovaks and Catalonians. Belgian citizenship is also unique and individual community components do not differentiate. Similar is the case of the Catalans in spite of the dominant Spanish nation with a unique Spanish nationality (citizenship) throughout the country. Ethnic and cultural disparity and alienation of Flemish and Walloons was already highlighted by Duverger, with the proximity of the Czechs and Slovaks appearing much stronger. Despite, regarding the question of coexistence in the common state before its division he was considerably skeptical.

The Belgian Constitution defines the competences covered by federal and regional authorities; however, the symmetry of regional authorities is quite problematic. An

important factor for the full inclusion of all communities is indeed fulfilled but partial asymmetry causes uneven representation due to their possibility of self-governing regulatory structures of their bodies. In such system, the creation of regional legislation involves the Flemish Parliament (accumulative competence of the region and the community), the Walloon Parliament, then the Parliament of the French Community, the Parliament of German-speaking Community and the Parliament of Brussels - Capital Region whose structure and mandate acquisition is the most complicated in the context of bilingualism over its territory. At these five levels then interact executives headed by the Prime Minister of the region, unfolding its mandate from the majority in the regional parliament.

At the federal level the representatives of the regions are represented in the upper chamber. In the sixth state reform in 2011, which was aimed at the election of 2014 and the unification of federal, regional and European elections to a single date as well as the corresponding harmonization of terms, it had to reduce the number of members of the Senate from 71 to 60, with 50 members elected indirectly from five regional parliaments on the basis of allocation coefficients, the remaining 10 are then co-opted.

Overall, the ban on majorization is thus practically irrelevant since there are 5 levels of authorities and the political decisions are usually driven by the creation of a consensual proposal. Relations to the lower chamber are determined through the existence of three different "speeds" of the legislative process, basically speaking, the important decisions (eg. Constitutional revision laws on the structure of the state of the cooperation agreement between the Federation and the regions and communities and many others) must be approved in the Senate. On the other hand, a departure from the direct election of senators and other principles such as no salaries for performing their duties or the lack of legislative initiative weakens the public perception of the institution, including the impact on the everyday political practice and thus approaching it to the position of the British House of Lords. Based on this constitutional analysis we may express the proposition that the strength and competence of regional legislatures overwhelmed the function of the upper house, as a paradox, composed of the same representatives in both institutions.

Yet more problematic may seem the symmetry of the stratification of Spanish autonomous communities. Based on the principles of restoration of historic reminiscences after 1978, some traditional autonomous communities gained very specific status and position within the territorial division of the monarchy and established such a system based on the asymmetry of the territorial units toward the state. Exposing of a specific example we get a significant contrast between the Catalan separatism and Castilian (Madrid) unitarism. This contradictory perception and approach in the issue of coexistence of heterogeneous community is the main indicator of the Spanish national issues related to the state arrangement. Constitution of 1978 in its eighth part carefully defined the status of autonomous communities and also specified the eligibility of individual statutes, which in the form of a formal agreement set out the relationship between them and Madrid, but also the basic principles of autonomous activity. Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, which has many features typical for the federal units' constitutions, was created in 1979 and has gone through several revisions, including the latest in 2006. It clearly defines

and determines the Catalan nation and recalls Catalan citizens, but not derived from an official citizenship [Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, 2006]. Institutional symmetry at the level of autonomous communities is in principle respected and individual self-government levels have their own legislative bodies, but also the executive branch, which is headed by presidents. At the national level, however, the regional interests are not (following the example of Belgium and in general all other federations) quite coherently presented on the floor of the Upper House. The method of creating the personnel of the Spanish Senate is in fact quite specific – out of 266 seats 208 are elected directly and 58 through the appointment by each regional council. Moreover, the term of office of both chambers and the date of the elections is harmonized, so the public preferences are reflected very consistently in the composition of both chambers. The assigned coefficients for senators are derived from the number of inhabitants and together with the applied electoral system favor rather nation-wide political parties at the expense of the regional parties. Practically, there is no discussion regarding implementation of some regional interests in the context of a share in the creating of the Spanish legislation and the majorization of legislation from Madrid is quite obvious. This thesis is also confirmed by Říčová [2009:180] who claims the controversy of the original idea of the upper house creation since it ought to represent the political interests of the elites from Franco's regime. The proposal to create transparent Senate with autonomous representation of regions had not been successful, albeit kind of hyper representation of regions was practically achieved through compensation of low level powers compared to lower chamber. Such variation can be observed in legislative competences of the upper house which are rarely used.

The predefined framework of relations of the supreme constitutional institutions and the degree of interdependence with the authorities of the autonomous communities determines the party system in the country, which, after the transition to democracy has established itself as a strong bipartism model. Still, there is an important role of strong regional political parties whose influence is devoted through the ability to unify the interests and electoral support especially on regional level eliminating all secondary and insignificant cleavage lines and draw attention to one thing - the relationship of center and periphery. The importance and potential of regional political parties at the national level can therefore be considered negligible and priority, effort and personal orientation of the party structures is directed to the anchor position of the authorities of the autonomous communities. Catalonia serves as a perfect example of these claims, and Catalan party system in its present form began to transform only after the fall of the Franco regime. Currently, there are only Catalan political parties and movements represented in parliament together with the regional fractions of two continuously strongest Spanish political parties *Partido Popular* (Peoples' Party) and *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party). For the definition criteria necessary to incorporate Catalan political parties into separatist and autonomist movements we may demonstrate the events from January 2013. The Catalan parliament approved the Declaration of State Sovereignty with the support of 85 votes from three political parties - *Convergència i Unió* (Convergence and Union), *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (Republican Left of Catalonia) and *Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds-Esquerra Unida i Alternativa* (Initiative for Catalonia Greens-United and Alternative Left).

The events in Catalonia took the direct approach on a regional referendum which took place in November 2014. In connection with its preparation, the result and subsequent obstruction by the Spanish Government and the Constitutional Court, the Catalan party system had started to transform and Catalan president Artur Mas called for early elections on September 2015, which were also related to perform another plebiscite on the question of autonomy of Catalonia. Gradually, nearly 40 years of a CiU alliance existence came to its extinction, while dominant CDC proceeded to cooperation in electoral coalition with ERC under a common name *Junts pel Sí* (JxSí, Together for "Yes") and won the elections with a sufficient margin. To create a functional government, however, it had to be invited into a coalition with programmatically close *Candidatura d'Unitat Popular* (CUP, Civic Union Candidates). The conflict solution was achieved through the acceptance to alter the presidential office and thus the position of president is consensually held by Carles Puigdemont from CDC since January 2016. Another political platforms that signed the declaration of sovereignty were merely marginalized – UDC, competing alone and did not pass through 3% threshold to parliament and coalition ICV-EUiA had candidated in the electoral coalition *Catalunya Sí que es Pot* (CSQP, Yes, we can), which practically symbolized the regional initiative of the famous Spanish movement *Podemos* (We can).

Although the various Catalan political parties, movements and organizations had to different degrees and intensity declared its programming vision of the future of Catalonia, which are largely focused on independence for the region, we may consider in terms of historical stability, program clarity and political relevance and dominance in regional party system for further investigation of a unique legal entity CDC, which creates the ideal conditions for comparison. Relevant position of CDC within the Catalan multiparty system is visible since the first elections in 1980, and since 2006 became their regular winners within the coalition. In the last elections conducted in September 2015 the coalition acquired 39.59% of the popular votes. As indicated above, like other Catalan entities also CDC falls short in terms of the Spanish electoral system of redistribution of votes to mandates of their significant share. Since 2010 the party is also a regular participant in the regional government and its dominant element, as evidenced by both individual electoral victory, but also a stable position of its Chairman Artur Mas as president of Catalonia, whose continuity was interrupted only in 2016.

In Belgium, the basic characteristic elements of Belgian party system started to evolve in the 19th century, enabling the cleavage lines through continuous creation and establishment of various political families that is a typical phenomenon for the rest of Continental Western Europe. A significant milestone in this development, however, constitute the events associated with cleavage of the party system on the principle of regional (particularly linguistic) disparities that led to the creation of a separate Flemish and Walloon party system, but with maintaining respect for the elements of consociational democracy as identified by Arend Lijphart [1999].⁴ Alongside of the

⁴ Acceptance of motivational elements to its creation and respect for the principles of consensual policymaking and characteristics of its application for cooperation and communication at the national level and in the federal government, including the method of its creation.

yearly existence of smaller regional political parties in the late '60s also the remaining dominant Belgian political parties began to cleave on the linguistic principle, which subsequently participated in the creation of the first directly elected regional assemblies since 1974 and entered as another important area for anchoring and establishment of their party structures and status.

This phenomenon allows us to follow a unique element compared to previous cases that causes a tendency at federal level orientation of party structures, which by definition presupposes the existence of heterogeneous elements. The Constitution then determines their interaction and cooperation. Individual regional entities consider federal authorities as a priority in relation with the implementation of their election programs and thus achieving success at this level. This whole phenomenon was indirectly constitutionally anchored in 2011 when, according to the sixth state reform the federal and regional elections were scheduled in one date (including the process of indirect creation of Belgian Senate). Signs and indicators of Flemish separatism are in a long term perspective visible in the political manifestos and programs, especially the two political entities - *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie* (N-VA New Flemish Alliance) and the *Vlaams Belang* (VB, Flemish interest). While the first mentioned party yearn for even higher autonomy and convergence with confederate principles of constitutional arrangement and independent membership in the European Union (similar to Slovak KDH, partly also HZDS), the objectives of others are clearly separatist and leading to the acquisition of full autonomy and declaration of the Flemish Republic (characteristics reminiscent of SNS in Slovakia and Catalan CDC).

Otherwise, there is no foundation of the cleavage in Belgium apart of the previous countries studied, based on which we could clearly specify and set out active political subjects and their relationship to the question of maintaining the federation. The only methodological bases therefore constitute manifestos of investigated political parties confirming earlier claims (*Vlaams Belang* electoral program, 2014).

For further comparison it is methodologically correct to deal only with the *Vlaams Belang* party. In relation to specific conditions of Belgian federalism and efforts to implement the principles of consociational democracy it is rather inevitable to address the essential share of the strongest Flemish party *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie* and centrifugal moods in the society, manifested, for example as a failure of Lijphart's forming concepts in the context of national government creation, which resulted in the case of parliamentary elections in 2010 and 541 days of inability to form Belgian government (Greguška, 2011). On the other hand, *Vlaams Belang* does not record significant long-term contribution to the management of public affairs, even in a regional sense. Their popularity began to grow in the late 90s but has never experienced the level to play a greater role in creating the Belgian executive branch. The complexity of the constitutional and legislative arrangement in individual countries surveyed addresses the question of the referendum as one of the biggest challenges of this study. It also reflects the arguments set out in examining the case of Czechoslovakia that referendum tends to exert over the final decision in the whole process more symbolically than as a real way of delegating decision-making powers in important constitutional issue on the population. This may also be demonstrated in the Spanish case, when the Catalonian referendum on independence was claimed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in September 2014 as we already

explored. The major concern was vested in the articulation of art. 149 – part 32 of Spanish Constitution which defines the ultimate state competences as exclusive in cases on decisions about referendums nation-wide (The Spanish Constitution, 1978). The November Catalonian plebiscite thus cannot be considered referendum despite people had the chance to express their will toward the issue of Catalonian independence through the legally not binding voting which results were clearly against preserving the status quo of the state integrity. The ultimate decision of the Constitutional court clearly determined the referendum as a matter of nation-wide political institutions and authorities thus considering the logics of similar integrity destructing referendums to be announced as null and void.

Under the conditions of the Kingdom of Belgium, the situation is no less interesting. The Constitution does not clearly stipulate the conditions for the use of the referendum and only in recent years there have been some regulatory adjustments relating to the application of the regional and municipal levels. With the exception of 1950 it has not been so far experienced, and there is no legal precondition for carrying it out on nation-wide level. For these reasons, referendum cannot be considered a relevant democratic tool in connection to the country separatism and in the context of both, legislative and party structures.

STEPS FOR HETEROGENEOUS SOCIETIES – A COMPARATIVE DISCOURSE

Specified criteria for comparison are derived from the basic premises of absorbing the institutional, constitutional and legislative context. Other important variable attributes constitute indicators of party and regional separatism and factors reflecting the general geopolitical context and the "attractiveness" of existing conditions for tending toward splitting heterogeneous states. We already have formulated individual findings above by declaring a structure that brings the possibility of the final confrontation, but on the necessity of simplifying the approach of categorizing the findings outputs. The basic sources of knowledge constructing other theses were mainly constitutional and other legislative documents regulating the relations within the studied systems. Their structure and wording allowed us to characterize the primary legal environment and create conditions for the analysis of the status and powers of constitutional bodies and institutions.

Attribute of national status within compared entities was based on the presence, definition and implementation of national principles and specifics of the constitutional text of each country. The current form of the Belgian Constitution continues along ideological and revolutionary value aspect of the text adopted in 1831, which maintained (in the then period) logical justification for advocating the Belgian interests compared to Dutch influence.

While the cleavage line in the postwar period began to manifest more strongly, these national trends are not, as opposed to institutional, strongly integrated into the reform process. Flemish population has still not recorded the reference of its existence; the legal status is derived only through the Belgian citizenship. Spain's democratic constitution of 1978 in its wording restored the historical significance and status for its regions while accepting their uniqueness and peculiarities. The regions dispose the recognition of nations on its own territory but in the context of Spanish

nation dominance it has rather regional character since Catalans as a matter of our research do not possess own citizenship.

The most heterogeneously oriented in this direction seems to be the wording of the Czech-Slovak Constitution of 1968, which determined the position of the nations on the principles of triple sovereignty involving dual nationality-citizenship. We have to balance the legal aspect of existence through the logical reasons for the presence of a non-democratic regime and the monopoly of one central political party by the absence of real application tools, which had frozen the use of these multi-national elements only at a symbolic level. From the constitutional point of view, however, it can be concluded that the acceptance of the presence of heterogeneous elements through the recognition of national sovereignty by the Centre was in Czechoslovakia at the most developed level among the countries surveyed. Criterion of the availability of the constitutions in the individual government units is not a full-fledged degree observed in either case, which in simplified terms, move off the observed countries from the application of the federalist principles in which this criterion is generally assumed and expected.

Each of these cases has yet own history and causes of the absence of such a constitutional document. Catalonia has autonomous status, which puts it closer to the criteria of acceptance most significantly. Apart from that in a long-term context, the non-respect of Madrid toward the decentralization tendencies it is not expected any reform of such status, which would require radical interventions in the text of the provisions of the Spanish Constitution. The research anomalies are also constituted in the case of Belgium. Despite many elements typical for federal and confederal systems the absence of constitutional documents at the sub-national level is crucial, with the main causes derived from historical circumstances and political practices [Popelier, 2012]. The text of the Slovak Constitution has been in terms of democratic and transitive periods of Czechoslovakia a long-term and frequent object of interest, also owing to the fact that its final adoption took place only before the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and therefore its acceptance can be attributed rather to the process of finalizing the disintegration of the country and preparing for the emergence of successor states.

These outputs indicate further relevant element in the development of relations in the cleavage of center - periphery and in the context of the country disintegration the national constitutions played merely a symbolic role. Such results indicate that in the heterogeneous communities the presence of clearly defined regional cleavage the adoption of individual constitutions may be a dangerous precedence, particularly in the context of a direct reflection on the potential constitution of the newly established (disintegrated or successor) state.

The symmetry of legislative and executive bodies also showed substantial differences, resulting mainly from the specific realities of individual political systems as well as an examination of the relationship of state centers toward its peripherals. The complicated structure of the Belgian federal differentiations in spite of superficial similarities exhibits many features that lack the simplicity of the dual division of the Czech and Slovak authorities. Institutional symmetry of each of the Spanish autonomous communities appears to be applied and respected, particular problems are then derived from the competence asymmetry towards the center. Harmony can be observed in respect to the presence of the legislative and executive bodies in

territorial units, but in connection with the current trend we consider the common ground and the same criteria are applied today in countries with far more homogeneous composition of the population. The studied variables thus enable us to highlight the hidden complexity of creating the national linkages and absolute symmetry does not automatically create a stable environment, as documented in the case of Czechoslovakia. Far more important is the phenomenon of adaptation to the most diverse operating system specifics mechanisms at national level which, in conjunction with the consensus tendencies in policy, is visible only in the case of Belgium. The nation-wide level decision-making and the possibility of intervention of territorial units are ideally observable through the activity and position of the upper houses of the respective parliaments.

In formulating conclusions in the context of the knowledge theory derives precisely from the wording of the previous passage, namely the pedant efforts to ensure the absolute equilibrium of competencies between two nations in the upper house of the Czech and Slovak Federal Assembly practically led to the disablement. Based on the assumption that in bicameralism the upper chamber represents the requirements of territorial units, a recurring memento raises questions in particular about how the upper houses should be created and what should be their role in the legislative process. For example, the settings of the Czechoslovak bicameralism had failed in the very beginning of its democratic application. Despite the self-destructive consequences it provided a foundation for further study and offered arrangements for systems with similar problems in their territory.

The nature and structure of the party system and the importance of individual regional actors provide an equally important source of knowledge when examining napnelism within heterogeneous societies. On a closer analysis, we argued mainly with the non-existence of Czechoslovak and Belgian party systems and party structures orientation that was specified through the behavior of studied political entities at various levels of elections. The different elements of behavior were demonstrated especially at Flemish and Wallonia's political parties, which have concentrated personnel structures primarily to nation-wide representative bodies and government functions from the above identified reasons. Apart from a number of secondary causes, we considered a priority aspect of the efforts to address the Belgian and regional issues at this level of governance, in the context of the persistence of confidence in the ability of Belgian institutions to provide the required program priorities for the represented region. The orientation of regional quality personnel to nation-wide forum also allows addressing the important issues and focusing the society attention onto the federal institutions.

Thus, we have pointed the issues of party separatism out of the background of selected parties from each region. A partial development preferences and coalition potential of individual subjects were identified as well. Catalan autonomist coalition preferences increase is also evidence of the implementation of several artfully combining forces across the political spectrum in order to achieve the same objective. In the case of Slovakia and Flanders an important concomitant of declining preferences is dominantly the presence of other (and also more relevant) entities which are more moderate and, perhaps, in a society friendly manner made for a very similar purpose (HZDS and N-VA). However, while in the Slovak political system a mutual combination of these forces and the establishment of republican governments

were of a major importance and link towards Czechoslovakia; the Belgian level stabilized on different pillars and values, this scenario is unlikely to happen.

Table 2: Critical junctures and neuralgic points compared across the selected cases (Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Spain)

	Criteria	Czechoslovakia	Belgium	Spain
Constitutional system	Position of the nations	triple sovereignty	none	regional
	Constitutions of territorial units	<i>de iure</i> yes, <i>de facto</i> not	no	partially
	State citizenship	dual	Belgian	Spanish
	Symmetry of territorial units institutions	yes	partially	partially
	Republican legislative bodies	yes	yes	yes
	Republican governments	yes	yes	yes
	Upper house	Representation Non-majorization Legislative initiative Relation to lower house	yes yes yes symmetric	partially partially no asymmetric
	Party structure orientation	republican	federal	regional
	Declaration of sovereignty	yes (1992 – HZDS, SNS, SDE)	no	yes (2013 – CiU, ERC, ICV-EUiA)
	Electoral programs	SNS	VB	CDC
Party approaches to separatism	Representation in parliament	1990 - 13,94% 1992 - 7,93%	2010 - 7,80% 2014 - 3,67%	2012 - 30,71% ⁵ 2015 - 39,54% ⁶
	Government participation	yes (from 1992)	no	yes (from 2010)
	Favorable geopolitical situation	partially	no	no
	Obligatory	no	no	no
	Realization	no	no	partially
Referendum				

To conclude and draw attention to some remaining conditions affecting the unity of heterogeneous countries we have acceded to compare the geopolitical environment and the possibilities offered by the institute of referendum in the given system. Geopolitical conditions, as mentioned above, are now quite complicated for the escalation of separatist sentiment than it was during the early '90s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This situation contributes in particular, the presence of

⁵ Electoral gain for coalition CiU

⁶ Electoral gain for JxSí

transnational element - the European Union and deducted issues of its position on a possible successor state after the collapse of one of its member countries. This fact, to a large extent, determines the popular attitude especially in the examined regions and leaves the reflection on independence rather in a romantic position. The very demanding criteria of eligibility is related to the use of referendums that in any of the surveyed countries has no real legislative backbone and some form of usage was recorded only in Catalonia, where a potential legal basis of the results of the vote was rejected by the Spanish Constitutional Court.

The most relevant arguments and findings are illustrated in the table 2.

CONCLUSION

In 1992, the Czechoslovak Federative Republic introduced the world an interesting way of state self-destruction which was driven in a rather peaceful way, with the absence of army forces, armed conflict and a relatively smooth process on both sides of the former federation. The prompt response in adopting the sovereign constitutions followed by the legislative framework on the cultural and property heritage as well as the imminent process of European and transnational integration only confirmed the smoothness of the division.

The non-existent country subsequently became the object of interest of experts of social science disciplines, but also many politicians and statesmen with the vision of the dissolution as a possible scenario for heterogeneous societies in which one of its constituents came to acquire the right to self-determination and an independent state. Among the current, more or less compared systems, we chose to explore the case of Belgium and Spain through autonomist tendencies in the Flemish and Catalan society. Assuming from the selected criteria we have researched the outcomes defining the particular measures for currently existing heterogeneous societies.

One of the most important attributes can be observed the sensitive behavior of the central authorities, institutions and their representatives, who are mostly responsible for non-conflictual development of coexistence of the segments of the population within its internationally recognized borders. The balance between measures in this regard is crucial and excessive straightforwardness in dealing with problems can act as a double-edged sword - on the one hand it can result in ill-conceived and radical transfer of responsibilities to national entities and in loss of functionality of central institutions, as we had the opportunity to observe in the case of Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, rigid centralism and state reluctance to meet the segmental requirements results in a deepening of separatist tendencies and psychological escalation of the conflict driven by a desire of tasting the forbidden fruit that we are currently experiencing from the Catalans towards Spain.

The behavior and thinking of Belgian constitutional institutions provide the case of *modus vivendi* by seeking to apply the principles of consociational democracy in connection with the acceptance of the role of fair arbiter in relation of Flemish and Walloons creating an environment of harmony between these segments. The relevant common feature of all the cases studied, the centrifugal moods in society related to (non)solution of economic problems and emerging nationalistic tendencies are an

expression of pursuing increasing intensity of centrifuge. While Flams and Catalans see the current constitutional and legal conditions as a kind of brake of its further economic development and progress, the Slovak part of the population perceived this factor rather from a position of "scapegoat" of the transformational changes whose impacts are disproportionately deeper and socially much wider. It remains undisputed fact that multilevel governance models applied in different countries should be subject to more periodical audit and control. Also, constant impulses coming from individual local authorities must be conscientiously and sensibly evaluated by central authorities. Lower levels of governance are more prone to dramatic socio-economic changes from logical reasons; hence the need for protection not only from the state but also supranational institutions is necessary. A regular institutional and legislative upgrade should not be any exceptional tool in order to reformulate and transform inefficiently managed entities and their administration to more intelligent and meaningfully operated regions. Yet the adaptability to new conditions for inward investment, or on the contrary to adverse economic and social circumstances should be the major reason for regular maintenance of the vertical division of power in the state.

The problem of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia is vested in culmination of many years of cleavages within the common state, which had relied on the constitutional coexistence of the Czech and Slovak nation since 1968. As it is clear from the works and observations of many political scientists and historians, dual state is more prone to dissolve from the long term perspective and inability to accept consensual solutions in policy and this assumption is fully reflected in the transition to a democratic regime. An important memento and major political tools for heterogeneous society must therefore be driven by the previous conflict resolution, which require the continued interest of central institutions in providing the satisfaction of individual segments as well as regular and continuous evaluation and adoption of legislative measures which adapt the process to the actual conditions. Among the surveyed countries the stabilizing assumptions are met mainly in Belgium, while Spain is characterized by a more spontaneity and emotionality in problem solutions.

REFERENCES

Börzel T. A. (2005), *Europeanization: How the European Union Interacts with its Member States*. In Bulmer S. – Lequesne Ch. The Member States of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005

Buchheit L. C. (1978), *Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Constitutional Act 143/1968 on Czechoslovak Federation, online: http://www.psp.cz/docs/texts/constitution_1968.html [15 March 2016]

Giuliani M. (2003), *Europeanisation in Comparative Perspective: Institutional Fit and National Adaptation*. In Featherstone K. - Radaelli C.M., *The Politics of Europeanization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003

Greguška M. (2011), *Politické aspekty belgického roku bezvládia*, in Bocora, J., Lukáč, M., Pajtinka, V. (eds.), *Ekonomické, politické a právne otázky medzinárodných vzťahov*. Bratislava: Ekonóm, 2011

Greguška M., Ružarovský J. (2014), *Rozhodovacia činnosť Ústavného súdu SR vo vzťahu k Národnej rade SR*, in Reschová J., Imrovič M.(eds.) *Dotyky politológie a ústavného práva*. Trnava: Spoločnosť pre verejnú správu pri Slovenskej akadémii vied, FSV UCM Trnava, 2014

Gronský, J. (2007), *Komentované dokumenty k ústavním dějinám Československa 1960 – 1989*. Praha: Karolinum

Horowitz D. L. (2003), *The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede*, in “Journal of Democracy”, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2003

Lijphart A. (1999), *Patterns of democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Maastricht Decision’. Jean Monnet Working Paper Series 6/95 (Cambridge: Harvard Law School).

Pithart P. (2015), Po Devätaosmdesátém. Praha: Academia

Popelier P. (2012), *The need for sub-national constitutions in federal theory and practice. The Belgian case*, in Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 4 No. 2, 2012

Radaelli C. M. (2003), *The Europeanization of Public Policy*. In Featherstone K. - Radaelli C.M. *The Politics of Europeanization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003

Radaelli C. M. (2004), *Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?* In European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 8, No. 16, 2004

Říčková B. et al. (2009), *Západoevropské politické systémy*. Praha: Oeconomica

Rychlík J. (2012), *Rozdelení Československa 1989-1992*. Praha: Vyšehrad

Schmidt V. A. (2004), *The European Union: Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State?* In “Journal of Common Market Studies”, Volume 42, Issue 5, 2004

Slovak National Party Electoral Program 1992, online:
http://www.sns.sk/engine/assets/uploads/2010/03/program_1992.pdf [15 March 2016]

Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia 2006. Generalitat de Catalunya, online:
<https://www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/estatut/preambul.htm> [15 March 2016]

Svatuška M. (2003), *Vzťahy medzi Čechmi a Slovákmi v období ich spoločnej štátnosti*, in “Slovak Journal of Political Sciences”, No. 1, Vol. 2, 2003

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 ratified by the Spanish people in the referendum, online:

http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/2325/file/Spain_Const_1978_eng.pdf [15 March 2016]

Vlaams Belang Electoral Program 2014, online:
<http://www.vlaamsbelang.org/files/20140318ProgrammaVerkiezingen2014.pdf> [15 March 2016]

Weiler J. H.H. (1995), '*The State 'über alles': Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision*'. Jean Monnet Working Paper Series 6/95 (Cambridge: Harvard Law School).

FAR RIGHT POLITICAL PARTIES IN CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE: THE AFTERMATH OF THE REVOLUTION OF DIGNITY

Marta Grymska

*Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv
Faculty of Philosophy
Department of Public Administration
60 Volodymyrska str., Kyiv, Ukraine
grymska.mi@ukr.net*

Abstract

The Revolution of Dignity, annexation of Crimea and outbreak of military conflict in the Eastern Ukraine led to overall increase of the level of patriotism and support of ideas, typical for far right political parties. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the party system has changed significantly (approximately one-third of all Ukrainian parties have been registered in or after February 2014), a few clearly identify themselves as the far right. Moreover, their electoral results are low and they remain marginal. It leads to a belief that the far right ideology will not gain much support in contemporary Ukraine.

Key words: *Ukraine, political parties, ideology, far right political parties.*

INTRODUCTION

The history of contemporary far right political parties in Ukraine starts from the end of the 20th century. Soviet one-party system had ceased to exist even before the country gained independence in 1991 and new political parties began to emerge in a rather alarming rate. Currently the number of parties is more than 300 [Single Registry of Civil Society Entities]. All major events in the country give an impetus for significant transformation of Ukrainian party system. Mostly, such changes occur, when the ruling party loses popularity and is forced to rebrand itself in order to maintain electoral support. The best illustration of this is the establishment of several parties after the Party of Regions (the party of the former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych) lost any prospects of winning.

At the same time, newly formed political parties rarely choose far right ideology as the basis for their positions. The most favored self-labels include 'liberal' or 'centrist'. Even though their real ideologies, taken from their programs and rhetoric, can significantly differ from the proclaimed ones, again, far right ideology is not in favor. The far right parties, formed in the first years of independence, such as the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, remain rather marginal.

The Revolution of Dignity, annexation of Crimea peninsula and military conflict in the Eastern Ukraine led some experts to believe that the situation will change and the far right ideology will gain more popularity. With the overall increase of patriotism and the feeling of belonging, far right political parties did actually return to the political life. Several new parties have been established since and the process is still ongoing (for instance, one of the far right parties, mentioned in this study, the Right Sector recently experienced a split). Their electoral support is still rather low and there is little potential for further growth. Therefore, it is believed that the far right political parties will not gain long-lasting popularity, enough for active participation in the agenda setting and decision-making in Ukraine.

METHODS

Since there is a significant difference between stated and actual ideology and values of any political party in Ukraine, all parties that emerged after the Revolution of Dignity (after February 2014) have been analyzed. The data has been gathered on the web site of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine that publishes a list of registered parties. The content of their program documents (value and electoral programs) has been analyzed in order to determine whether they could be considered far right, according to the criteria, discussed in the Cas Mudde's seminal work "Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe" [Mudde 2007].

One of the main problems in this regard is that it is impossible to take into consideration constant rebranding of the political parties. Since the electoral laws (in practically all versions, adopted since gaining independence) have certain requirements on the 'age' of political parties, demanding from them to either exist for a defined period of time before elections or being registered before a particular date, some politicians, forming a new political party, prefer to buy and reorganize an existing one. For instance, far right political party "The Right Sector", discussed in this article, emerged during the Revolution of Dignity but it was decided to change the name of already existing "UNA-UNSO" party. As a result, on the official list of parties The Right Sector is recorded as a party, established in 1997. Due to a large overall number of political parties in Ukraine (over 300), it is impossible to study the history of every single one in order to identify such cases. Thus only the parties, listed as registered on or after February 2014 are analyzed in this study. Taking into consideration that since that time about 1/3 of overall number of Ukrainian parties has been registered, it is interesting to find out whether they choose far right ideology as their own [Single Registry of Civil Society Entities].

Further, electoral history of the parties, identified as far right, has been studied. The data has been collected from the database of the Central Election Commission. The results of all elections, which occurred after February 2014, has been taken into consideration. They include presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 as well as local elections in 2015. Any special elections during this period were ignored as the information, available for analysis, is limited.


In order to make conclusion on the prospects of far right political parties, the public opinion has been studied. In this regard, the results of several most authoritative polls have been analyzed and compared with the outcomes of the elections for each

party. When available, several election results for the same party have been compared.

MAIN FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

According to the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, 115 political parties were registered in the period from February 2014 until December 2015. The prevailing majority of them do not have a web site, page in social networks, blog or any other form of mass communication. As a result, the only information available for analysis is from the electoral programs if they take part in any elections. Among the parties, chosen for this study, 53 did not take part in any elections and did not publish any information that could be accessed and studied.

Figure 1. Political parties in Ukraine, registered after February 2014



Source. The overall list of parties has been taken from the Single Registry of Civil Society Entities. The rest of data is from author's own research.

Consequently, 46 out of 115 political parties, established in Ukraine after February 2014, have been analyzed in depth. Three parties caught the attention as the instances of far right ideology have been found in their programs and other documents. They were taken into analysis in order to determine, whether they could be considered far right. The party on the edge of being far right is the "5.10" party. It has a clear anti-tax theme (the party demands full reorganization of Ukrainian tax system, leaving only two taxes – 5% sales tax and 10% social security tax). From this regard, the party is similar to some far right political parties that began their development by working on this topic. At the same time, no incidents of nativism and authoritarianism have been found in party documents thus this party was not taken into consideration [The 5.10 Party Program].

The other party that is somewhat on the margins is the party "Pravo narodu" (Right of the People). The party has a very small program, consisting of five bullet points paragraph, one to two sentences each. It limits the possibility to analyze the ideology in full, nevertheless, certain conclusions can still be made. The party refers to religion

as a basis for morality and all decisions. It accepts only Ukrainians by nationality and spirit, regardless of citizenship. More details can be found in the vision for Ukraine for 2020, also published on the website. It has several ideas, typical for far right political parties, such as a requirement to pass the Ukrainian language and history exam in order to receive any state help or subsidy. All investments by social security funds must be made only to Ukrainian enterprises [Theses on the Strategy of Development of Ukraine till 2020]. At the same time, the instances of nativism, mentioned above, are the only ones in several party documents, therefore, it would be impossible to classify the party as definite far right.

As a result, the only far right political parties, registered after the Revolution of Dignity, is the UNA-UNSO (Ukrainian-National Assembly – Ukrainian National Self-Defense). However, in reality the party is not ‘new’. The original UNA-UNSO party was registered in the beginning of 90s and renamed after the Revolution of Dignity to The Right Sector. But such decision was not supported by the most prominent UNA-UNSO leaders that left the party and reestablished the UNA-UNSO brand in 2015. Since the history of two parties is much interconnected, thus, it needs further research and explanation. UNA-UNSO was formed even before collapse of the USSR. The party, called Ukrainian National Assembly, was established in 1990. The party held several very radical and unusual for Soviet society activities such as a torch walk on the street of Lviv. During Soviet coup d'état attempt in 1991 the party formed a paramilitary wing Ukrainian National Self-Defense (from that time the party became known as UNA-UNSO). The wing was not very active in Ukraine but it took part in several military conflicts abroad, for instance in Moldova and Transnistria [Umland]. Main activities of UNA-UNSO included street manifestations and actions, often turning into fights with the opponents and police forces. The party was present in the media and rather known among Ukrainian voters but did not get much electoral support. In 1994, only one candidate was elected to the parliament in a single-mandate district. Moreover, the party was banned the following year and had to struggle to return its legal status. In order to do this and to increase the support, the party changed its image and the most radical politicians left it. But such strategy also did not prove successful and, in 1998 (the party was allowed to participate in the elections by that time) no candidate elected in the single-mandate districts and the party list received only 0,39% of the votes [Umland].

Despite low electoral support, UNA-UNSO remained rather active in various anti-government initiatives and street protests. For instance, its members took part in so called “Ukraine without Kuchma” (Leonid Kuchma was at that time the President of Ukraine and, in 2000-2001, many different organizations and opinion leaders joined forces in a mass street protest for regime change) and Orange Revolution (protest against electoral fraud and Central Election Commission announcement of Viktor Yanukovych’s victory in 2004). However, such activities still did not bring electoral popularity and much wanted voted. On the contrary, the results were getting even worse. In 2002, only 0,04% of voters supported the UNA-UNSO party. In order to improve the situation in 2006, the party tried to form coalitions with other ideologically close parties but unsuccessfully. The bloc was not formed and the party took part in parliamentary elections independently, gaining only 0,06% of votes and choosing not to run in early elections in 2007 [Umland]. In 2012, one more attempt to translate the recognition into votes again failed with the party getting only 0,08%.

A new stage in party history started in late 2013 with the outbreak of the Revolution of Dignity. The party was very active in the street protests, often organizing some events and leading them. Its representatives joined a group of various nationalist and far right organizations during the Euromaidan. Later the group received a name "Right Sector" and was led by Dmytro Yarosh. After Yanukovych's escape and gradual phasing out of the revolutionary events, the party members within the Right Sector group took part in a series of radical protests in different regions of Ukraine against local authorities, corruption etc. Representatives of the group also formed volunteer battalions and participated in the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Deepening of cooperation between the members of the Right Sector group and the members of UNA-UNSO led to reorganization of this group into a political party. It was formed on the basis of existing UNA-UNSO structure but took the name "The Right Sector" ["Right Sector" Established a Political Party].

At the same time, some of the members of Ukrainian National Assembly did not agree with such decision and left the party. Former leader Yuriy Shukhevych took part in the parliamentary elections in 2014 within the Oleg Lyashko Radical Party list. At the beginning of 2015, UNA-UNSO party was reestablished and registered officially by the Ministry of Justice in August 2015 [Single Registry of Civil Society Entities]. As stated before, regardless the fact that The Right Sector has 1997 as the year of official registration, this party should be included in the list of new parties that emerged after the Revolution of Dignity and analyzed from the ideological point of view. The party program had been published on the party website at least from summer 2015, when it was noted as such during this study. The documents starts from party's perspective on the national state and national identity. It is stated that, despite gaining independence in a long and bloody struggle, Ukrainians still face many internal and external threats that should be dealt with in order to preserve the nation. Three main issues are mentioned in this regard. First of all, Ukrainian elite lacks a clear vision of the nation-building, following short-lived electoral whims instead of following a certain long-term strategy. Secondly, Ukrainian 'national idea' still did not become a basis for government decision-making while establishment of Ukrainian nation-state should be the main political task. All other problems – political, economic, social, legal, educational, cultural etc. – can be solved only after this matter is. And, thirdly, the nation did not become the main actor of the decision-making process. The public lacks clear and efficient mechanisms of governmental control. Therefore the party believes that development of Ukrainian nation-state, based on the implementation of the national idea, must be its main task [A Program: The Right Sector].

Instances of far right ideology can be found in many statements within this and other party documents. For example, the main slogan of the Right Sector is 'God! Ukraine! Freedom!'. Ukraine, its people and interests are above all. Following the ideas of many other far right parties in Europe, the Right Sector states that freedom is impossible if the nation is oppressed. The power should belong to the representatives of the nation that must personally believe in Ukrainian national idea. Members of all other national groups that live in Ukraine must acknowledge that Ukrainian nation is the true master of the territory and state and respect its language, history and laws [A Program: The Right Sector].

Far right ideology is also present in economic views and perspectives on culture national defense. The party believes that the nation state should focus on defending the economic interests of the nation. Big business in Ukraine is not only foreign but also anti-Ukrainian by its essence. The government supports import as opposed to development of national products. Ukrainian info sphere is also dominated by foreign products that often spread anti-Ukrainian ideas [A Program: The Right Sector].

It is very dangerous, according to the Right Sector, to mix up the notions of the national security, security of the nation and state security. The security of Ukraine can be guaranteed only by Ukrainian nation, united in own independent state on the basis of national idea. If the enemies of the nation and state are not identified and punished by the government, the government itself turns into an enemy [A Program: The Right Sector].

The second party, mentioned in this study, is newly established UNA-UNSO party. Since it meets the requirements, set in this research, it must also be studied in depth. The analysis of its program, presented on the party website, demonstrated a clear connection with the far right ideology and values. The party's slogan is "Ukraine for Ukrainians" and its duty is implementation of Ukrainian national idea as the idea of development of the nation-state. It is stated in the program that party defines itself as nationalist with as the communism, cosmopolitanism and liberalism as its main enemies. No progress can be made, according to the party, until Ukrainians start to fully identify themselves as a nation [Political Program of UNA-UNSO Party].

Presenting its economy views, the party states as a big problem the fact that political, economic, and financial resources in Ukraine do not belong to Ukrainians. As a result, national economy is not working for pursuing Ukrainian national interests. On the contrary, it is used against the nation. The party offers as an alternative development of the national-social state. Its main feature is that the economy will be aimed at prosperity of the nation and economic security of the state. The government should preserve control over strategic economic sectors and, if any strategically important enterprise has been already privatized, it should be returned to the state [Political Program of UNA-UNSO Party].

Typically for the far right political parties, the UNA-UNSO talks about tax reform as an instrument to support national manufacture and stimulate further development of Ukrainian business. All unwarranted tax breaks for international and foreign companies should be abolished. All strategic enterprises should be nationalized. Similarly to the Right Sector, the party also differentiates the national security and the state security, arguing that only Ukrainian nation can successfully guarantee the security of Ukraine. In economy, the idea of national-social state is promoted. The priority should be given to the problems of the members of the nation [Political Program of UNA-UNSO Party].

Therefore, the instances of far right ideology can be found in the programs of two out of 115 political parties, established in or after February 2014. Regardless of the fact that nativism ideas gained more popularity among Ukrainians (according to various polls), a very small number of political parties started to identify themselves as far right. Most parties choose to position themselves differently. It can be explained by many factors with low electoral support as one of the main. Despite the increase of the patriotism level, few Ukrainians actually vote for the far right political parties and the situation did not change after the Revolution of Dignity (see Table 1).

Table 1. Election results (national parliament) for the far right political parties in Ukraine

Year	UNA-UNSO		Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists		Svoboda**		The Right Sector	
	Party list, % of votes (number of mandates)	Single-mandate districts*, mandates	Party list, % of votes (number of mandates)	Single-mandate districts*, mandates	Party list, % of votes (number of mandates)	Single-mandate districts*, mandates	Party list, % of votes (number of mandates)	Single-mandate districts*, mandates
1998	0,39% (0)	0	2,71%*** (0)	3	0.16%**** (0)	1	---	---
2002	0.04% (0)	1	23,57%**** (1)	1	---	---	---	---
2006	0.06% (0)	n/a	13.95%**** (3)	n/a	0.36% (0)	n/a	---	n/a
2007	---	n/a	---	n/a	0.76% (0)	n/a	---	n/a
2012	0.08% (0)	0	1,11%**** (0)	0	10.44% (25)	12	---	---
2014	---	---	0,05% (0)	1	4.71% (0)	6	1,80% (0)	1

Notes

- * Here both the candidates, nominated by the party, and the self-nominated candidates that listed their party membership are included
- ** Till 2004 – Social-National Party of Ukraine
- *** Within electoral coalition “The National Front”
- **** The result is for the electoral bloc of “Our Ukraine” that included the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists representatives
- ***** Within electoral bloc “Less Words”

Source. Elections. The Website of Central Election Commission, [online, in Ukrainian] Available at <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/> [Accessed December 15, 2015].

The situation did not change much after October 2015 local elections. The representatives of the far right political parties received rather low support, which distinguishes them from the far right parties of many European countries. Typically, the far right parties in EU tend to increase their support during so called ‘second order’ elections such as local and regional. However, it did not come true for Ukrainian local parties, including the ones that appeared after the Revolution of Dignity. Only two members of the Rights Sector has been elected as local deputies which is not even 0,01% of all local councilors in Ukraine. No representatives of UNA-UNSO has been elected [Elections. The Website of Central Election Commission].

CONCLUSIONS

Despite the fact that radicalization of electoral preferences in Ukraine after the Revolution of Dignity and outbreak of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine has been predicted by many, the results of this study prove the opposite. Only an insignificant number of newly established political parties clearly positioned themselves as the far right and they remain rather marginal. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the far right ideology is not becoming more popular in Ukraine at the moment.

REFERENCES

A Program: The Right Sector, [online, in Ukrainian] Available at <http://pravyysektor.info/programa.html> [Accessed December 01, 2015].

Elections. The Website of Central Election Commission, [online, in Ukrainian] Available at <http://www.cvk.gov.ua/> [Accessed December 15, 2015].

Mudde C. (2007), Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe, Cambridge University Press New York, USA.

Political Program of UNA-UNSO Party, [online, in Ukrainian] Available at <http://unso.in.ua/sites/default/files/pictures/news/2015/Decem/programma.pdf> [Accessed January 3, 2016].

"Right Sector" Established a Political Party, [online, in Ukrainian] Available at http://dt.ua/POLITICS/pravyi-sektor-stvoriv-politichnu-partiyu-140221_.html [Accessed July 17, 2015].

Single Registry of Civil Society Entities, [online, in Ukrainian] Available at: <http://rgf.informjust.ua/home/index> [Accessed December 21, 2015].

The 5.10 Party Program, [online, in Ukrainian] Available at: <http://510.ua/about/program/> [Accessed December 21, 2015].

Theses on the Strategy of Development of Ukraine till 2020, [online, in Ukrainian] Available at: <http://pravonarodu.org.ua/tezi-do-strategiyi-rozvitku-ukrayini-do-2020-roku/> [Accessed December 21, 2015].

Umland A., National-Extremism that Did Not Happen? [online, in Ukrainian] Available at http://www.shekhortsov.org/articles/Anton-Shekhortsov_Andreas-Umland-National_Extremism_that_Failed.pdf [Accessed July 15, 2015].

IMPLEMENTATION OF INOGATE PROGRAMME IN ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN AND GEORGIA

Krystyna Gomółka

*Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy,
Faculty of Management and Economics,
Gdansk University of Technology
Ul. G. Narutowicza 11/12, 80-233 Gdańsk, Poland
Krystyna.Gomolka@zie.pg.gda.pl*

Abstract

INOGATE Programme is one of the instruments designed for the implementation of the energy policy developed by the EU and the countries of the East European, Caucasus and Central Asian regions. Its objectives include the formation of a common energy market, increasing the security of supply, diversification, transit and supporting the development of energy efficiency and renewable energy sources. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were implementing projects in the framework of the programme between 2009 and 2014 in selected thematic areas, at a different pace and with emphasis on different thematic areas. Armenia focused on the introduction of energy passports for houses, Georgia – on the development of an energy efficiency plan and Azerbaijan – on the establishment of procedures increasing the security of petroleum, gas and energy transit. Of the three countries, Georgia made the most significant and Azerbaijan – the least progress; this was due to the policy pursued by this country which, in common with Armenia, aimed a less strong relationship with the EU.

Key words: INOGATE Programme, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, EU, energy policy

INTRODUCTION

The instruments of energy policy in the Caspian Sea and Black Sea regions include the Baku Initiative as well as the INOGATE and TRACEA Programmes. Launched in 1996, INOGATE is one of the longest-running energy cooperation programmes between the European Union and 11 countries situated in: Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova), Caucasus (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). The Programme also operates within the framework of the Eastern Partnership initiative. Its objectives are: technical support of the restoration of the post-Soviet pipeline network and ensuring integration with Western pipelines. The goals to be fulfilled reflect the commitments of the EU: formation of a common energy market taking account of the specific character of the partner countries, increasing the security of supply,

diversification, transit, supporting the development of energy efficiency and renewable energy sources and participation in energy-related investments [Czech 2013]. INOGATE offers extensive technical support in the form of seminars and conferences serving the exchange of know-how, promotes dialogue between countries, contributes to the establishment of contact between the EU, partner countries and other countries and to dissemination of information about INOGATE energy policy [Kaczmarski 2010: 124]. The EU is represented in the Programme structures by the European Commission, whereas the representatives of other participants are the relevant ministers responsible for energy. The three South Caucasus countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – have been active participants in the programme since 1996, represented in its structures by selected delegates. Armenia is represented by the head of department of foreign relations in the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of the Republic of Armenia. In Azerbaijan this function is performed by the head of administration in the Ministry of Industry and Energy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, whereas in Georgia – by the chief adviser to the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources. Of the three countries, only Azerbaijan has petroleum and gas deposits and 90% of the energy produced by this state is generated by thermal power plants. Owing to the lack of fossil fuel deposits, Armenian economy is based on nuclear energy and hydroelectric power stations, which generate ca. 40% of the total energy [Nieczuja-Ostrowski 2014: 14]. Georgia has no such resources, either. 37.1% of electric energy in this country is generated from fossil fuels and 62.9% by hydroelectric power stations. There are no nuclear power stations in Georgia; alternative sources of energy are not used here, either [Energy Sector of Georgia 2013].

INOGATE Programme has been engaged in the analysis and evaluation of the infrastructure for gas extraction and transport in the partner countries since 1996. Considerable emphasis is placed on the construction of modern oil, gas and electrical energy networks. In 2004, during the first ministry conference on energy cooperation, four priority areas of cooperation between the EU and partner countries were defined: energy market convergence based on EU market principles, increasing the security of energy supplies, support for sustainable energy and energy efficiency development, as well as participation in investments related to energy [Adamiec 2010: 123]. To achieve its objectives, INOGATE began to prepare a work plan in 2007 and a year later it started to introduce international energy standards in the participant countries. Since 2009 INOGATE has been supporting EU initiatives with respect to sustainable energy and technology harmonisation, placing emphasis on the development of renewable energy use and energy efficiency. The purpose of this article is to analyse and evaluate the progress of the INOGATE Programme in the three Caucasus region countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia until the end of 2014.

INOGATE INSTITUTIONS AND THEMATIC AREAS

A range of institutions in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are involved in the implementation of INOGATE Programme. A list of these institutions is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Institutions participating in the implementation of INOGATE Programme in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia

Armenia	Azerbaijan	Georgia
1. Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 2. Public Services Regulatory Commission 3. EU Delegation 4. National Statistical Office 5. Renewable Resources and Energy Efficiency Fund 6. Electric Networks Company 7. Yerevan State University of Architecture and Construction 8. German-Armenian Fund 9. Climate Change Information Centre	1. Ministry of Industry and Energy 2. EU Delegation 3. Tariff Council 4. Ministry of Economic Development 5. Association of Engineers and Specialists 6. SOCAR 7. EBRD Delegation 8. State Committee for Standardisation, Metrology and Patents	1. Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 2. EU Delegation 3. Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation 4. Georgian National Energy and Water Supply Regulatory Commission 5. Electrical Power System Commercial Operator 6. Georgian Gas Transport Company 7. Georgian National Agency for Standards and Metrology 8. Georgian Electro System 9. EBRD Delegation 10. Energy Efficiency Centre

Source: own work based on INOGATE GEORGIA, INOGATE ARMENIA, INOGATE AZERBAIJAN, <http://www.microsofttranslator.com/bv.aspx?from=en&to=pl&a=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.inogate.org%2Fcountries%2F4%3Flang%3Den> [22.10.2015]

The data in Table 1 indicate that Georgia has the greatest and Azerbaijan – the smallest number of institutions participating in INOGATE Programme. There is a European Union Delegation in all the three countries but only Azerbaijan and Georgia have EBRD Delegations that take part in the Programme activities [INOGATE & Azerbaijan; INOGATE & Georgia 2015].

The activities in the framework of INOGATE Programme are grouped in the following thematic areas:

1/ Energy policy, encompassing the issues of global warming and liquid fuel depletion. The INOGATE Programme closely cooperates with the countries' ministries and agencies responsible for the implementation of energy policy. Organisations in these countries may apply for assistance in the transformation of legislation, development of action plans and support of work on the use of renewable energy sources.

2/ Energy markets reflecting the dependence of INOGATE partner countries on imported oil, gas and energy. It is necessary to create an integrated energy market and make efforts aimed at stabilisation of prices. There are also plans to create a common renewable energy market [Antón 2014: 75]. INOGATE supports cross-border energy cooperation as well as collaboration with other countries from East European, Caucasus and Central Asia regions.

3/ Energy security, largely depending on transport efficiency and systematic supplies of gas and oil. The losses in fuel transfer in the region of Caucasus and Central Asia have been estimated at 20–25%. They are due to fuel theft, inaccurate metering and default in payments [Zasztowt 2008: 275–276]. In order to reduce these losses, the partner countries undertook the construction of new pipelines and collection of outstanding payments.

4/ Energy tariffs, established while taking into account the size of imports and as well as quality and security of supplies. The Programme aims to reduce the differences in the methodologies used by the partner countries to set their tariffs.

5/ Energy investments contributing to the economic development of the individual countries. The INOGATE Programme provides for co-funding of the most important projects in this sector.

6/ Energy efficiency improvement measures undertaken by the individual countries in order to reduce energy consumption. It is one of INOGATE's goals to prepare the legal framework for these measures and create favourable conditions for their implementation. INOGATE organises training and specialist courses devoted to energy consumption in residential buildings and the industry sector.

7/ Energy statistics, showing the progress in the implementation of energy policy. Since 2012 INOGATE with Eurostat and International Energy Agency developed 11 action plans for partner countries and helped some of the states to prepare energy balances in compliance with EU standards.

8/ Energy standards which, if adopted by the partner countries, would facilitate access to markets, increase competitiveness, protect consumers, improve efficiency and reduce risk. In 2008 the process of translation of EU standards into the languages of the participants in the INOGATE Programme was commenced, as well as organisation of seminars presenting the EU standardisation systems.

9/ Renewable energy, which would enable reduction in greenhouse gas emission and contribute to better protection of the natural environment.

While participating in INOGATE, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia completed a number of projects with the use of Programme funds. Armenia was the beneficiary of 33 projects out of the 70 implemented in the framework of INOGATE. They were initiated in 2006 during a working meeting between the EU and countries from the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions. Subsequent meetings of the group with the participation of Armenia were devoted to efficient management of the generation of and demand for renewable energy. Representatives of Armenia attended a training course organised in Budapest in November 2009, elaborating the legal regulations in the transformation period, and a seminar on the methodology of harmonisation of legislation in the energy sector of the partner countries in Tashkent in June 2010. A month later, in July 2010, these representatives took part in workshops on energy market regulations. In November 2010 a meeting was held in Minsk, presenting the adopted legislation related to renewable energy issues. In November 2010, at a conference held in Kiev, countries of Eastern Europe and Caucasus regions made an attempt to prepare harmonisation of the oil and gas market in that area. Mayors of the largest cities of Eastern Europe and Caucasus region, including Armenian cities, also attended a meeting devoted to efficient energy use in December 2010. A workshop in January 2011, concerned with the preparation of energy passports for buildings, concluded with a study visit of delegates from Eastern Europe and Caucasus region to Brussels. The work plan prepared for 2012 provided for improvement of knowledge of practical energy policy solutions in EU countries and numerous study visits in countries using renewable energy: Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Great Britain. In September 2012 a workshop on energy communication was held in the capital city of Armenia. In June 2013 an agreement between INOGATE and Armenia was signed, obliging the country to take measures aimed at harmonisation of legal acts with respect to energy policy and statistics [INOGATE & Armenia 2015]. The seminars and meetings held during 2014 were devoted to EU funding opportunities for projects within the individual thematic areas.

Georgia, the beneficiary of 36 out of 70 projects implemented, remained the leader in energy sector transformation. Since 2006, it participated in meetings, workshops and training related to seven out of eight thematic platforms. Georgia did not focus on the same issues as Armenia. Highest importance was placed on the broadly defined energy security, including the security of supply, which was discussed at meetings in Tbilisi in 2007, Brussels in 2008 and Astana in 2009, as well as during communication workshops attended by mayors of Georgian cities in Tbilisi in 2010. Georgia was a more frequent participant in training sessions on electrical energy market regulation in partner countries and financing of energy-related projects; it also became familiar with the Energy Roadmap of European Union countries. In June 2013, in common with Armenia, Georgia signed the agreement documenting mutual arrangements and obligating it to take measures aimed at harmonisation of legal acts with respect to energy policy and statistics. Subsequent meetings and seminars enabled Georgia to better prepare for drawing on EU's legislative and practical experience. Since 2009, after the initiation of the Eastern Partnership, the cooperation between Georgia and INOGATE increased [INOGATE & Georgia 2015].

Azerbaijan benefited from 33 out of 70 projects implemented in the framework of INOGATE. Similarly as Armenia and Georgia, it became involved in the joint efforts in March 2006 and participated in certain thematic areas of the Programme. The issue of particular importance for this oil and gas producer was regional cooperation in fuel supply, increasing investment in the fuel sector, particularly with respect to innovative technologies reducing gas losses during transport. Azerbaijan participated in a seminar on renewable energy sources. In practice, during the meeting of mayors, only one city – Icherisheher – agreed to reduce CO₂ emissions over a period of several years. The key issue from the viewpoint of Azerbaijan was the gas and oil tariffs, which had a direct impact on the country's GDP. In June 2013 Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia signed the agreement obliging the countries to take measures aimed at harmonisation of legal acts with respect to energy policy and statistics [INOGATE & Azerbaijan 2015].

All the projects implemented by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the framework of INOGATE were soft projects. They were intended to acquaint the respective national institutions with EU achievements in the energy sector and to prepare them for necessary reforms.

IMPACT OF THE INOGATE PROGRAMME ON THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IN THE THREE COUNTRIES

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were implementing projects in selected thematic areas at a different pace and with emphasis on different thematic areas. Although their cooperation with INOGATE started in 1996, the project implementation phase was between 2009 and 2014. A list of projects implemented in selected thematic areas in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia is shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Projects implemented in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the framework of INOGATE

Thematic area	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Georgia
Energy policy	Assistance to the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resource with the aim of introducing energy passports for residential buildings	Assistance to the Ministry of Industry and Energy for the purpose of creating an energy efficiency plan	Attaining a higher level of energy security, higher technical and economic efficiency, cooperation between the Georgian Electro System and INOGATE with the aim of introducing procedures enhancing oil, gas and electrical energy transfer security
Energy markets	Introduction of laws regulating the charges for connection to the power grid	Facilitating the parties' access to the energy sector and acquainting the partners with energy regulations	Work on aligning Georgian legislation with aquis communautaire
Energy tariffs	Analysis and calculation of energy tariffs	Assistance to the Tariff Council with the aim of improving legislation to reduce losses in the energy and gas sectors	Review of electrical energy and gas tariffs according to EU requirements
Energy statistics	Development of a plan of energy consumption and energy quality for 2012–2014 by the National Statistical Office	Development of an energy consumption plan for 2012–2014 based on previous calculations	Preparation of an energy consumption plan for 2012–2014 A survey conducted in the enterprise and household sectors
Renewable energy	Preparation of a study concerning the use of renewable energy in buildings	Development, by the national operator, of a roadmap of demand until 2020	--
Energy efficiency	Research undertaken by Yerevan University and SEUA into the efficient utilisation of energy in industrial buildings	Preparation, by the University of Architecture and Construction, of educational materials intended to increase students' knowledge about energy efficiency	Audit and training sessions conducted by the Ministry of Energy and Natural resources devoted to the improvement of efficiency of energy use in residential buildings
Energy investments	Development a project by the Armenian Bank and Erste Bank Austria concerning renewable energy for heating greenhouses with the use of solar technology, with an overall value of EUR 2.8 million	Bank financing of energy audit training and establishment of the Centre for Strategic Studies	Improvement of financing of projects promoting the use of sustainable energy; providing access to international credit lines

Source: own based on INOGATE & Armenia, <http://www.inogate.org/countries/1?lang=en>; INOGATE & Georgia, <http://www.inogate.org/countries/4?lang=en>; INOGATE & Azerbaijan, <http://www.inogate.org/countries/2?lang=en> [21.10.2015].

The data presented in Table 2 suggest that each country took a different direction in the implementation of energy policy. Armenia focused on the introduction of energy passports for houses, Georgia began to develop an energy efficiency plan and Azerbaijan took steps to establish procedures increasing the security of petroleum, gas and energy transit. With respect to energy markets, Georgia was the only country that undertook to align its energy laws with aquis communautaire. Azerbaijan

focused on becoming acquainted with the energy laws of the partner countries and Armenia targeted the issue of charges in the sector. The only country that conducted a tariff review according to EU requirements was Georgia. Armenia carried out tariff calculation, whereas Azerbaijan made slight adjustments in the national law [Investing in Azerbaijan Pipelines 2015]. The statistical offices of the three countries prepared energy consumption plans for 2012–2014. Only Armenia prepared a study concerning the use of renewable energy in buildings, while Azerbaijan produced a forecast of demand until 2020. Georgia took no practical measures in this respect [Renewable Energy 2015]. The energy efficiency objectives in Armenia were pursued by university research, in Azerbaijan – by improving students' knowledge and in Georgia – by organising training and audits. The energy sector investments in Armenia were financed by Armenian and foreign banks; in Azerbaijan – by Azerbaijani banks. Only Georgian investments were largely financed from EU funds. To evaluate the changes made in the energy sector in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, it is necessary to emphasise the low rate of progress and illusory character of the transformation [Nichol 2014]. The changes resulted from INOGATE objectives for 2009–2014, which included implementation of soft projects intended only as a preparation for transformation in the energy sector in order to approximate laws and subsequently adopt EU legislation and practices.

SUMMARY

The INOGATE Programme is one of the instruments for implementation of energy policy developed by the EU and the countries of the East European, Caucasus and Central Asian regions. In 1996 it was joined by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The INOGATE Programme in the partner countries was implemented within nine thematic areas, at a different pace and with emphasis on different thematic areas in the individual countries. Armenia focused on the introduction of energy passports for houses, Georgia – on the development of an energy efficiency plan and Azerbaijan – on the establishment of procedures increasing the security of petroleum, gas and energy transit. With respect to the implementation of energy policy in 2009–2014 Georgia was the most successful of the three countries, undertaking implementation of objectives in all the thematic areas except renewable energy sources. Despite Armenia and Azerbaijan's declaration of commitment in the Programme implementation, the changes in these countries were introduced at a far slower pace and were largely of illusory nature. This was also due to the policy pursued by Armenia and Azerbaijan which aimed a less strong relationship with the EU despite their attention to the region's energy security.

REFERENCES

- Adamiec D. (2010), *Cele i inicjatywy Unii Europejskiej w dziedzinie polityki energetycznej*, in *Polityka energetyczna* ed. by M. Sobolewski, „*Studia Biura Analiz Sejmowych*”, no. 1 (21), Warszawa.
- Antoń P. (2014), *Budowa jednolitego rynku Unii Europejskiej*, in *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne wyzwaniem XXI w.*, ed. by Z. Łacha, Wydawnictwo Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa
- Czech A. (2013), *Regionalna Współpraca w zakresie bezpieczeństwa energetycznego UE*,
http://www.ue.katowice.pl/uploads/media/6_A.Czech_Regionalna_wspolpraca_w_zakresie....pdf [19.10.2015]
- Energy Sector of Georgia, <https://www.energy-community.org/pls/portal/docs/1910181.PDF> [20.10.2015]
- Energy Sector of Armenia 2015 <https://www.awex.be/fr-BE/Nos%20services%20%C3%A0%20l'export/Tous%20les%20services/Documents/Armenwal/Energie.pdf> [19.10.2015]
- INOGATE GEORGIA, INOGATE ARMENIA, INOGATE AZERBAIJAN,
<http://www.microsofttranslator.com/bv.aspx?from=en&to=pl&a=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.inogate.org%2Fcountries%2F4%3Flang%3Den> [20.10.2015]
- Investing in Azerbaijan Pipelines,
<http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/investing-in-azerbaijan-pipelines/4632> [18.11.2015]
- Kaczmarski M. (2010), *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Unii Europejskiej*, in Seria Studia Europejskie, Wydawnictwo Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa
- Nichol J. (2014), *Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for US Interests*,
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/223462.pdf> [12.11.2015]
- Nieczuja-Ostrowski P. (2013), *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Armenii w kontekście układu geopolitycznego na Kaukazie Południowym*, in *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne surowce kopalne vs alternatywne źródła energii*, ed. by P. Kwiatkiewicz, Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Bezpieczeństwa, Poznań, pp. 11–34.
- Renewable Energy, <http://greengeorgia.ge/?q=node/1> [13.05.2015]
- Zasztowt K. (2008), *Aspekt energetyczny polityki zagranicznej Azerbejdżanu wobec państw regionu Kaukazu Południowego i Morza Kaspijskiego*, in „*Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*”, no. 7–8, pp. 265–280.

THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, GEORGIA, ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA DURING THE RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT IN 2008

Patrycja Rutkowska

*Faculty of Political Sciences and International Studies
Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
ul. Batorego 39L, 87-100 Toruń, Poland
patient@op.pl*

Abstract

Georgian - Russian relations always aroused concerns of neighboring countries, as well as the European Union and the United States. The conflict of 2008 aroused interest and magnified the fate of conflicts between the two countries over the centuries. An important role is also played by the disputed territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which was the reason of Georgian aggression. The author focused mainly on military forces of the Russian Federation, Georgia, but also the armed forces of the Republic of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. At the end losses that had involved armies both in soldiers and equipment are shown

Key words: *Russian Federation, Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Russian-Georgian conflict*

The military operation carried out in the Caucasus was undoubtedly Georgian as well as Russian show of force. The latter involved mainly the strength of North Caucasus Military District, which headquarters was located in Rostov-on-Don. The main strength of North Caucasus Military District was the 58th Army.

The North Caucasian Military District was unique for the Russian army, due to the conditions prevailing in the Caucasus, which was not contributing to the stability in the region. The North Caucasian Military District was also subordinate to the Military Group of Russian Forces which were stationed in the South Caucasus. The equipment of North Caucasian Military District was not technologically developed. The district had many bases in the Caucasus. In 2008 more than half namely 55,000 out of the 102,000 soldiers were regular or employed on contract. Before the outbreak of the war in August 2008, on the Ossetia border with Georgia there were three battalions which had the status of peacekeeping troops - Russian, Georgian and Ossetia. The North Caucasus Military District included Russian ground forces, which had a far greater number of soldiers and efficiency than the entire Georgia's armed forces. They consisted of 4 tactical commands that were of a size of division - three

mechanized divisions and one airborne: 19th Mechanized Division, the 20th Guards Mechanized Division, 42nd Mechanized Division and 7th Airborne Division. The troops which participated in the intervention in South Ossetia were mostly 58th Army forces. The whole army and airborne troops consisted of about 102,000 soldiers, 600 tanks, 1,900 IFVs and armored personnel carriers and 1,700 artillery systems. The main role in the conflict with the Russian army played regiments of the 19th Mechanized Division. [Gawęda 2008: 46-49].

North Caucasus Military District arms had in possession older equipment, in particular basic tanks T-72 and T-62 infantry fighting vehicle BMP-1, BMP-2, tracked armored reconnaissance vehicle BRM-1K, armored personnel carriers BTR-80, crawler tractors, older types of self-propelled artillery, rocket launchers BM-22 Uragan and BM-21 Grad [Gawęda 2008: 46-49].

58th Army was the main force in the Russian conflict with Georgia. During the armed clashes it was commanded by major-general Anatoly Chruliev. During the conflict with Georgia were sent to Abkhazia: 76th airborne Division, 98th airborne Division with paratroops subunits, as well as Spetsnaz sub-units. Russian paratroops, decided to use Novorossiysk troops. The 7th Airborne - Assault Division began to station at the turn of April and May in Abkhazia. It was supposed to be a reserve peace corps [Gawęda 2008a: 46-49].

Russia's airborne forces in South Ossetia during the conflict were significant. There stationed 4 battalion tactical groups: the 104th Guards Airborne Assault Regiment - one Battalion, 234th Guards Airborne Assault Regiment - one Battalion, 217th Guards Airborne Assault Regiment - two battalions, 76th Guards Air Assault Division, the 98th Guards Airborne Division, 45th Special Reconnaissance Brigade in Kubinka – one company. In Abkhazia participated: 7th Guards Air Assault Division, the 108th Guards Air Assault Regiment - two battalions, the 247th Guards Air Assault Regiment - two battalions, 114th Guards Rifle Division, 31st Guards Airborne Brigade - two battalions and the 45th Detached Reconnaissance Brigade [Gawęda 2012a: 209-212].

During the conflict also the Russian Special Forces were involved. These were two Spetsnaz battalions - Vostok and Zapad created in 2003. They are referred to as Chechen forces, as they consisted of Chechen soldiers who sympathized with the Kremlin. Vostok operated in South Ossetia. The number of soldiers in Vostok battalion is not known, however, it is said that it counted from about 800 to 1,500 soldiers. It is assumed that the number of Vostok soldiers, who fought in Cchinvali, did not exceed 200. Zapad battalion operated in Abkhazia. The analysts assume that one of its companies was in the Kodori Valley on 10th August [Gawęda 2012: 209-212].

Spetsnaz main task was the removal of snipers and Georgian soldiers, who guided artillery against Russian forces [Gawęda 2012: 209-212].

Russia's navy in the region is known as the Black Sea Fleet. Russia organized two teams to operate on the sea and they had specific tasks assigned. The first group was assigned to patrol the sea areas of Georgia in order to cut off the supply of weapons that were transported to Georgia by the sea. The second team had to blow up the embankment at the port of Ochamchire in Abkhazia to help Russian troops. It is said that they were quite large forces, in particular 4,000 soldiers and armored vehicles [Makowski 2011: 45-48].

Figure 1. The main directions of Russian troops activities during the intervention against Georgia in 2008



Source: Międzynarodowe prawo humanitarne. Konflikt rosyjsko - gruziński w 2008 roku. Tom II, red. D. Bugajski

Figure 2. The composition of the Russian Federation forces of the Black Sea Fleet appointed to carry out the operations in Georgia

	Klasa	Nazwa, nr burtowy	Projekt, ozn. NATO
Okręt flagowy	KRR	<i>Moskwa</i> , 121	proj. 1164, <i>Slava</i>
1. ZO	ODD	<i>Cezar Kunikow</i> , 158	proj. 775, <i>Ropucha I</i>
	ODD	<i>Jamał</i> , 156	proj. 775, <i>Ropucha I</i>
	KoZOP	<i>Suzdalec</i> , 071	proj. 1124.4, <i>Grisha V</i>
	Z	Koyda	proj. 577D, <i>Uda</i>
2. ZO	MOR	<i>Miraż</i> , 617	proj. 12341, <i>Nanuchka III</i>
	OPa SG	<i>Briz</i> , 065	proj. 1041Z, <i>Svetlyak</i>
	Tr	<i>Turbinst</i> , 912	proj. 266, <i>Natya</i>
	ORR	Ekwator	proj. 861M, <i>Moma</i>

Source: Międzynarodowe prawo humanitarne. Konflikt rosyjsko- gruziński w 2008 roku. Tom II, red. D. Bugajski

The first group of ships that were assigned to patrol the waters of Georgia consisted of two large landing ships: Caesar Kunikow and Yamal, anti-submarine corvette and tanker Suzdalec Koyda. The second team of ships, which were supposed to help transport the Russian troops to Abkhazia was a small rocket ship Miraż, border guard patrol boat Britz, minesweeper Turbinist, and spy ship Ekwator [Makowski 2011: 45-48].

At the beginning of 2008, after the re-election of Mikheil Saakashvili as the President of Georgia, the pro-Western policy was born. It aimed at the elevation of Georgia to make it independent of Russian influence; however the help of the West countries would be needed to achieve that. This situation would also set the path, which other countries of the Caucasus could later on follow in their road to independence [Makowski 2011: 45-48].

After the Rose Revolution in 2003, in the Georgian minds gave birth to the idea "of Georgian conquest and the modernization of the army." This came with the introduction of a new military doctrine in 2003, which increased military spending in the country. Among the political-military elite an idea was born to organize disorder in the Caucasus and to gain control over separatist Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia allies, in particular Americans as well as advisors from Israel and Turkey had considerable influence on the desire to improve the state of the military forces [Brażkiewicz 2010].

The aim was to complete the plan to change the army into smaller, but highly trained forces. The aim was to obtain a professional army, which would represent 10% of the whole army; the rest of the soldiers would constitute military reserve force. They started to train reservists whose military potential reached around 100,000 and 65,000 of which were after completed training. Georgian armed forces were supposed to have the latest equipment along with the latest technologies that would allow them to conduct military operations within the framework of NATO. Georgia has been strongly aspiring to achieve this goal [Gawęda 2008b: 48].

Georgia modified equipment and weapons of Russian origin and also purchased new ones. In Ukraine they modified tanks, armored vehicles, antiaircraft systems, missile boat, in Bulgaria – mortars, in Turkey - light wheeled armored personnel carriers, in Israel - unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, rifles, and in Turkey - light wheeled armored personnel carriers. It was decided to also purchase Air Defense Buk-1M, which is a very difficult equipment to locate by the opponents [Brażkiewicz 2010].

Before the revolution of Roses in 2002, Georgia's budget for the army was 19 million dollars. In 2006, the budget was 317 million dollars higher as it increased to 336 million dollars and in 2007 reached nearly 600 million dollars. As compared to 2002 the amount was already 40 times higher. The budget planned for 2008 was estimated to nearly 990 million dollars. The increase in military spending was carried out at the expense of the Ministry of Health, on which fewer funds were spent [Gawęda 2008b: 49-50].

Expenditures that were made by the Georgian authorities were motivated by the need to strengthen the position in the region in connection with the planned partnership with NATO. Furthermore, they were triggered by alleged aggressive actions of Russia, which supported the separatist Abkhazia. The funds were not only intended for

specialized equipment, but also on the increase in wages for senior military personnel. The pay in the years 2004-2008 increased by several hundred percent. Also air bases in Kobuletii and Kopitnari were expanded, and new bases for reservists were built. The changes that occurred after 2004 were the result of poor appraisal of Georgian troops after the Rose Revolution [Gawęda 2008b: 49-50].

Senior officers of the Israeli army who were no longer serving in the army, e.g. gen. Israel Ziv and gen. Gal Hirisch were involved in the process of creating and training Georgian troops. They helped the Georgian training services, such as the military and the police. Also the help came from Shin Bet - former Israeli Intelligence Service member, or even members of the sub-units of anti-terrorist police. It is estimated that at the same time Georgia could have about 1,000 instructors and trainers from Israel, who were involved in the formation of efficient armed forces of Georgia. For the period 2005-2006 the Georgian Ministry of Defense designated training priorities. These were: a) the modernization of equipment and weapons through the exchange of used equipment, b) providing the equipment for 1st, 2nd, 3rd Brigade so that they are able to conduct operations in accordance with the guidelines of NATO, c) creation of 4th Brigade out of the interior troops, d) improve the operation of artillery by rearming and training, e) training special forces so that they are able to participate in asymmetric warfare and conduct anti-terrorist operations. There is no denying that the Georgian army at the outbreak of the conflict was in the process of forming and retooling. It can be said that the army was small, but the equipment that was purchased after 2004 was quite modern, which meant that the Georgian army was a modern army [Gawęda 2008b: 50-51].

In July 2008, less than a month before the outbreak of the conflict, the Georgian Parliament approved the increase of the Georgian army by an additional 5000 troops, as well as increasing funds for the army of 210 million dollars (Gawęda, 2008b, s. 50-51). the information about the size of the armed forces of Georgia varies depending on the source. According to the British group information - Jane's Information Group, on the eve of the conflict, Georgia had a potential of about 26 900 soldiers, 82 T-72 tanks, 139 BMP-1/2 and BTR 70-80, 7 assault aircraft Su-25SM, 95-caliber artillery systems over 100 mm, including half of which were rocket launchers Grad BM -21 (Gawęda, 2008b, s. 50-51). According to Russian reports from RIA Novosti, Georgian armed forces numbered more than 30,000 troops, of which 20,000 were ground troops, 200 tanks and 200 armored vehicles, about 120 guns caliber over 122 mm, more than 40 missile launchers and 180 mortars. As for the Air Force, a Russian news agency reported that the Georgians used the 5 assault Su-25, fifteen L-29 and L-39 and about 30 helicopters, including 8 arts assault Mi-24 (Gawęda, 2008b, s. 51-53). The Ministry of Defense of Georgia reported, however, that on the first day of the conflict, that is 8th August 2008, the Georgian army had about 32 000 soldiers [Strategic 2007: 2007].

Taking into account the scale of the conflict and the activities that were to be carried out within the framework of the establishing order in the Caucasus the military forces sent to South Ossetia were disproportionately large. During the conflict, the Georgian army was on a mission to 2,000 troops in Iraq and 200 in Afghanistan [Gawęda 2008b: 51-53].

The Georgian Navy bases were in the major ports of Poti and Batumi and there stationed about 1000 sailors. The Georgian Navy had 2 rocket boats: Tbilisi built in

1981 in the Soviet Union that Ukraine handed over to Georgia in 1999. The ship had six barreled anti-aircraft gun at the bow and two rocket launchers Termit. The second cutter named Dioskuria was built in France and handed over to Georgians by Greece in 2004. The ship was equipped with Exocet missile launchers, two torpedo tubes and 2 double-coupled canons Oerlikon [Sobański 2008: 98-104].

In possession of the Georgian Navy there were also 28 patrol boats e.g. Batumi, Kutaisi, Akhmeta, Iberia, Mestia, Tskaltubo. Furthermore, they had 5 hydrographic units 2 landing crafts Vydra, another 2 boats and amphibious Ondatra 4 minesweepers Yevgeenya. On the first day of the war, on August 8th, the Georgian Navy was clearly weakened, as both rocket boats Dioskuria and Tbilisi were damaged and unfit for the warfare [Makowski 2011: 47-50].

Figure 3. Composition of the naval forces of Georgia during the conflict in 2008.

Klasa	Nazwa, liczba	Projekt, ozn. NATO
KTR	Dioskuria	<i>Anninos (La Combattante II)</i>
KTR	Tbilisi	Matka
KPa	Batumy	Stenka
KPa	Kutaisi	Turk
KPa	Akhmeta	<i>Poluchat I</i>
KPa	Iberia Mestia	Dilos
KPa	Tskaltubo	pr. 360
KPa	1	pr. 371U
KPa	5	ex-trawler
KPa	16	—
jednostki hydrograficzne	5	—
KTD	2	Vydra
KTD	2	Ondatra
TR	4	Yevgenya

Source: Międzynarodowe prawo humanitarne. Konflikt rosyjsko- gruziński w 2008 roku. Tom II, red. D. Bugajski.

The actions of the Georgian Navy had to focus on the defense of the territorial waters and on the patrol of the economic zone. Furthermore, the Navy was involved in the support of the defense of the country from the sea and landing troops ashore probably in Abkhazia. Georgia was capable to conduct such actions, because it had fast means

of transport as semi-rigid inflatable Black Shark boats - 12 pieces, 60 pontoons and two other types of landing crafts [Makowski 2011: 47-50].

It is worth mentioning the special forces of Georgia. The Georgians had the Special Operations Group, which size was approximately 1,500 people. It consisted of command - Company Command and its subordinate 3 battalions. Each of them consisted of about 250 people. Each battalion was divided into three companies. Companies were divided into small units, consisting of about 12-14 soldiers. Battalion called "Commando" was organized differently and had a different structure. It consisted of about 600 people. It was also a sub-unit of Spetsnaz, which counted 50 soldiers. The units were managed the Ministry of Defense of Georgia [Tokarz 2012: 202].

It is worth emphasizing the fighting potential that Georgia had during the war. It was considerably increased by the purchase of weapons from the Ukrainians. In 2007, Georgians bought from Ukraine 74 different versions of tanks T-72 tanks, while in May 2008, Georgia bought 20 more tanks, for which the Ukrainians demanded 250,000 dollars per piece. In addition, the Georgian army has acquired, five 2S7 Pion self-propelled cannons caliber 203 mm and 4 radars. Earlier purchases that Georgians did were mainly small arms, armored vehicles, helicopters and howitzers. According to one of the Ukrainian arm industry companies Georgia bought from Ukraine 6% of its total arms exports [Gawęda 2008b: 51-52].

The armed forces of South Ossetia were created in the 90s of the twentieth century, during the war between Ossetia and Georgia. The year 2002 was a turning point for South Ossetia, as it began to invest in the army. They purchased the equipment abroad and used it for training purposes. Ossetia entered into a phase of infrastructure recovery and military training of reservists. All this has taken on even greater momentum after the episodic conflict with Georgia in 2004 [Gawęda 2012b: 223-232].

Regular troops of the Republic of South Ossetia consisted of 3,000 soldiers and about 15,000 trained reservists, which gave a total of 18,000 soldiers in August 2008. According to the information provided by the intelligence Georgian troops in South Ossetia were grouped in 10 infantry battalions and several independent branches. Individual battalions were ranged from 150 to 250 soldiers. In addition, the unit also worked Interior Ministry contingent, which numbered more than 1,000 officers of OMON, the KGB, Frontier Service and the Diplomatic Security Service [Gawęda 2012b: 223-232].

Ossetia troops had the tactics of withdrawal; they did not involve in any major conflict areas in order not to be destroyed in the first phase of the conflict. They expected help from Russia, as the first phase was the most difficult for the Ossetia troops. The army of South Ossetia was equipped with weapons from the old, post-Soviet generation e.g. AK-type rifles, grenade launchers RPG-7, CKM, sniper rifles SWD [Gawęda 2012b: 223-232].

Most of the battalions consisted of 180 to 250 soldiers, for example, the battalion which stationed in Tskhinvali - V BT, counted 180 soldiers equipped had 8 mortars, 2 howitzers, 3 SPG-3 grenade launchers and 2 anti-aircraft guns ZU-23-2. Moreover, Prisi Company was also included in the battalion. It consisted of 150-160 soldiers and had in possession of 5 BMP-1, four 120 mm mortars, 2 82 mm mortars and ZU-23-2 antiaircraft gun.

The battalion that stationed in Kvaisa consisted of 100 soldiers and had antiaircraft gun ZU-23-2, anti-needle system, grenade SPG-1 and two tanks T-55. Forces of the Republic of South Ossetia, according to the data that come from the Georgian intelligence, the battalion OMON had about 350 officers who were located in three places, e.g. Tskhinvali, Java and Kornisi. This unit was equipped with small arms including TT pistols, AKS-U rifles, SWD sniper rifles, as well as various kinds of grenade launchers. In stock they also had 3 BTRs, one BMP, as well as 66 UAZ and GAZ cars. The battalion consisted probably of staff command and 4 operating companies [Gawęda 2012b: 223-232].

OMON was so important because it fulfilled tasks pertaining to staffing border posts, and participated in cross-border conflicts. Another division, which operated on a similar principle as OMON, was SOBR- Special Rapid Reaction Unit. The task of this unit during the war was fighting on the streets of Tskhinvali. SOBR consisted of about 45 people, armed like the OMON [Gawęda 2012b: 223-232].

In the defending of Tskhinvali members of Gosochrany also took part. They are also known as the state security services. The number Gosochrany troops are not fully known. It is reported that it had no more than 50 people; however there are also indications that it had 3 times more people. The main task of Gosochrany was the protection of the state facilities and to the security of the leaders. They played an important role in the battle for Tskhinvali [Gawęda 2012b: 223-232].

Another paramilitary branch involved in the conflict on the part of the Republic of South Ossetia was the Frontier Service. In August, it had about 380 officers. It was equipped with machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers, AK pistols, as well as armored personnel carriers BTR-80 [Gawęda 2012b: 223-232].

It is hard to assess and describe the structure of the armed forces of Abkhazia, since there is no official information on this subject. It is difficult to talk about the Abkhazian army as large formations, which would have saved their territory from the Georgian attack. Just before the outbreak of the conflict, the Russians sent their troops to Abkhazia under the pretext of building a railway that leads to Sochi which had held the Olympic Games. The Russian troops consisted of 400 soldiers [Dziennik.pl 2010].

After a few days of the conflict, each party had to start counting losses among soldiers, civilians, infrastructure and military equipment. Each party had a difficulty to estimate the damages and unambiguously determine the balance. Also, it was difficult to refer to international public opinion as the information provided by each of the parties was not always reliable and true [Gawęda 2012b: 223-232].

Russia in the first days of the end of the conflict had announced a loss of soldiers. Military General Staff of the Russian Federation initially presented to public information a list of people, and 74 people were killed in the fighting, 19 soldiers were missing and 323 were wounded. In 20th August 2008 Anatoly Nogovitsin - Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Russian armed forces in a public speech announced that the earlier estimates were underdeveloped and during the conflict 64 soldiers died and no soldier was missing [Gawęda 2012b: 223-232].

In February 2009, Russia Deputy Minister of Defense gave an interview to Echo of Moscow radio station, where he reported that 64 soldiers were killed, and the number of injured was 283. The number of missing soldiers once again changed and was 3. It is difficult to estimate how many soldiers from the Russian Federation were killed

during the conflict with Georgia, but the losses compared to those incurred by the Georgians were very small. As for the loss of weaponry suffered by the Russian army, the details should be taken from both sources, that is, the information provided by Russia itself, but also the information that was given by Georgia (Brażkiewicz, 2010). According to official reports from Russia, the Russian air force lost 4 planes, in particular 3 Su-25 and 1 Tu22M3. However, there was also unofficial information on Russian websites that 11 machines were damaged; 5 completely destroyed and 6 damaged [Gawęda 2012b: 223-237].

As far as the loss of equipment is concerned of the Russian side, the number provided by Georgia was much higher. Georgian authorities announced that they were able to shoot down 21 Russian planes. This was not only done by the Georgian planes, but also by infantry soldiers armed with Israeli antiaircraft systems [Gawęda 2012b: 223-232].

The total losses incurred by Georgia reported by the Georgian media were also not clear. However, most often it said that 169 soldiers, 16 police officers and about 228 civilian victims died in the conflict (Brażkiewicz, 2010). However, the Georgian authorities provide different data in this respect. It is worth mentioning that all this information appears to be underestimated. It is said that in fact 215 people were killed in particular 69 civilians, 133 soldiers and 13 police officers. There were also 1,496 people wounded and missing [Gawęda 2008b: 51-53].

These losses compared to the Russian losses were huge, and taking into account that the conflict lasted only five days, the scale is large. Huge amounts of Georgian civilians were fleeing from the conflict areas, often in search of a new place to live [Brażkiewicz 2010].

Some postwar analyzes estimate that the Georgian army could lose up to about 4,500 soldiers. According to estimates created by NATO in the fighting in South Ossetia 200 soldiers were killed and 1,700 were wounded [Gawęda 2008b: 51-53].

The representative of the Russian land forces, Igor Konashenkov, announced that the Russian troops destroyed a total of 3 Su-25, 2 L-29, 3 AN-2, 2 Mi 24 and Mi-14 [Web.archive 2014].

In Tskhinvali, Georgia lost a large amount of heavy equipment, including tanks. Georgians left the equipment and military vehicles when they ran away in panic. The Russians took over all the equipment left by the Georgian army. They took over also the military bases that were not evacuated, airports and warehouses. They occupied the port in Poti, and bases in Senaki and Zugdidi. Abkhazians also did not fail to take the arms that Georgians left behind. They obtained significant amounts of mortars, rocket launchers Grad-21, as well as large quantities of arms [Gawęda 2008b: 51-53].

According to Russian statistics, the Russians overtook 24 T-72 tanks, 15 BMP-2 and BMP-U1, as well as rocket launchers, anti-tank gun and Ural trucks. Russians probably also obtained 4 Hummer vehicles that American army provided to Georgia [Gawęda 2008b: 51-53].

Georgian armed forces were not prepared to fight with such intensity. They planned blitzkrieg attack, but dreams of a rapid occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia had not been fulfilled, and yielded only loss and shame on the international arena. The information about the losses of Ossetia and Abkhazian are not fully known. The data varies. On 4th September 2008 the commission of inquiry investigating the

conflict in South Ossetia announced that 365 people were killed, however they did not state how many of these people were soldiers and how many were civilians.

REFERENCES

- Brażkiewicz D. (2010), *Wojna rosyjsko – gruzińska*, <http://www.geopolityka.org/analizy/438-wojna-rosyjsko-gruzinska>, [online:] 22.04.2014r.
- Gawęda M. (2008a), *Wojska rosyjskie w wojnie z Gruzją*, „Nowa Technika Wojskowa”, nr 10/2008.
- Gawęda M. (2008b,) *Wojska gruzińskie w wojnie z Rosją*, „Nowa Technika Wojskowa”, nr 11/2008
- Gawęda M. (2012a), *Rosyjskie wojska powietrzno-desantowe na froncie abchaskim* [w:] *Konflikt Kaukaski w 2008 roku*, Potocki R., Domagała R., Sieradzan P. ed., 2012, Warszawa.
- Gawęda M. (2012b), *Południowoosetyjskie formacje zbrojne w wojnie sierpniowej* [w:] *Konflikt Kaukaski w 2008 roku*, Potocki R., Domagała M., Sieradzan P. ed., 2012, Warszawa.
- Makowski A. (2011), *Działania rosyjskich sił morskich podczas interwencji przeciwko Gruzji w 2008 roku* [w:] *Miedzynarodowe prawo humanitarne. Konflikt rosyjsko-gruziński w 2008 roku. Tom II*, Bugajski D. ed., 2011, Gdynia.
- Strategic Defence Review, 2007, “Ministry Defence of Georgia”, Tbilisi.
- Sobański M.S. (2008), *Gruzińska awantura*, [w:] *Okręty Wojenne*, Nr5/2008.
- Tokarz G. (2012), *Działania specjalne podczas wojny sierpniowej* [w:] *Konflikt Kaukaski w 2008 roku*, Potocki R., Domagała M., Sieradzan P. ed., 2012 Warszawa.

GLOBAL AND SYMBOLIC PERSPECTIVE OF POLITICS

THE MARKET, NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE FORMATION OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Marek Rewizorski

*University of Gdańsk, Department of Political Science,
Jana Bażyńskiego 4 Str., 80-309 Gdańsk, Poland
marek.rewizorski@ug.edu.pl*

Abstract

This paper reflects on the role of a global market defined as the space where various relations between state and non-state actors take place. The first section highlights market as a base for political, economic and financial interactions and serves as introduction to analysis developed in section two and three. The evolution of the idea of market as a point of reference in the discussion on economic aspects of globalization, presented in section two, is showed using transnational historical materialism approach, extended also to the works of Polish economists and political scientists. Section three attempts to identify various forms of private authority and transgovernmental regulatory networks as *spiritus movens* of global governance. The final section is an attempt to assess the current and short-time future relationship between states and non-state governance structures and the role which market plays in it.

Key words: *the market, global governance, commodification, private authority, transgovernmental networks*

INTRODUCTION

At the dawn of the 21st century, both state and non-state actors of international relations faced the need to find their place in reality which appears to be increasingly unclear. Particularly emphasized is the process of reconfiguration of the anarchic character of international environment. This process is articulated by unprecedented heterogeneity of entities operating across state borders, and not within their limits. It is accompanied by the emergence of many equivalent decision-making centres which base their actions on pluralism, cooperation and departure from hierarchical relations between territorial and non-territorial actors. Above-mentioned reconfiguration is accompanied by the idea of governance. This peculiar mode of

steering is linked more with controlling than governing, and so with a wide range of processes used to coordinate decision-making and implement certain policies. It is noteworthy that governance consists in adaptation of individual and collective methods of solving common issues so as to find solutions to continually emerging conflicts, mitigate differences in interests and, as a consequence, to broaden the field of possible cooperation between heterogeneous entities. Various informal and formal institutions play a key role. Their intentions may become a catalyst of group activity [UN 1995: 2].

This paper reflects on the role of a global market considered as platform or area, where new system of interrelations between a state and non-state actors gets materialized. Especially considerable here is the fact, that increasingly vital holders of the power exceed the state, emerging private structures are acquiring broad autonomy within national and international law. Thereby, they become important regulators of jurisdiction and international economy. From this perspective, globalisation leads to extension of the scope of rules regulating more and more fields of economic activity conducted beyond national borders.

The structure of article is as follows. The first section presents market as a base for political, economic and financial interactions and serves as introduction to analysis of the market presented in section two and three. The evolution of the idea of market as a point of reference in the discussion on economic aspects of globalization, presented in section two, is showed using transnational historical materialism approach, further extended also to the works of Polish economists and political scientists. Section three attempts to identify various forms of private authority and transgovernmental regulatory networks as *spiritus movens* of global governance. The final section is an attempt to assess the current and short-time future relationship between states and non-state governance structures and the role which market plays in it.


MARKET AS PLATFORM FOR GLOBAL INTERACTIONS

What fundamentally distinguishes governance from a traditional political order is the dilution of hierarchical state power and thus, withdrawal from ‘rule and control’ as a method to regulate individual and collective actions. Indeed, governance shall be depicted as a package of horizontal interactions taking place between the state and non-state actors who are involved in various relations with the state and take advantage of the developed network structures, private and public partnership as well as other tools of political activity. Consequently, opposite poles of governance are taken by hierarchically organised states on one hand and self-organising and substantially decentralised groups of civil society on the other hand, which most frequently assume forms of non-government organisations, social movements and *non-profit* organisations.¹ They take advantage of the markets which are used to

¹ As indicated in political science literature, globalisation entails changes which result for example in an increased number of rapidly spreading non-government organisations constituting the basis for global civil society. The latter involves: “entities, ventures, enterprises, non-profit organisations, social movements, various communities, celebrities, intellectuals, think-tanks, charity organisations, pressure groups, protest movements, media, Internet

allocate resources and where formalised rules imposed by the state become weakened and the governance turns out to be of more economic and financial character [fig. 1].

Figure 1. The governance as a package of horizontal interactions between the state and civil society



Source: Own elaboration

When applying the concept of governance on a global level, it should be noted that it is based on contemporary transformations occurring in technology, transport and, above all, in communication. Reduction of time required to process and send information is the factor notably enhancing various forms of transnational political organisations. The aforementioned transformations are displayed especially by the supporters of neo-liberalism. As they argue, the state-centric model proves to be inadequate towards increasingly complex regulatory issues which require good governance in order to be solved. It cannot be ensured by the states without participation of the markets (especially the business sector) and global civil society.² It is exemplified by closer relations between the states which are part of such groups as G7/8 or G20 and business institutions. Representatives of the states within G7/8 or G20 distinguish entities operating in the business sector from non-government organisations of non profit type, more and more arguments appear in favour of incorporating business sector into the civil society, which may involve gaining more leverage by the latter one within the Gx system structures.³ Probability of such a solution was attested by the extended agenda of G20 summit in St. Petersburg (2013),

groups and sites, trade unions, employers' federations, international commissions, sporting organisations, all forming multi-level, tightly connected space". Cf. E. Pietrzak (2013), p. 85.

² The above views are not a novelty. They stem from the tradition of political concepts of the West, highlighting importance of the mechanisms of free market, reciprocity, trust and solidarity. They provide contrast with control and subordination, as concepts thoroughly anti-liberal. Cf. W. Streeck, P. C. Schmitter (1985), pp. 119–38.

³ "Gx System" expression was used for the first time by the Stanley Foundation in 2009 r. It refers to G7, G8 and G20 - non-formalized clubs, international cooperation forums forming a specific system with network structure. The system includes organisation of unofficial meetings, where summits organised at the heads of state level (G20 Leaders) play the most important role. Meetings at the highest level are accompanied by consultations conducted on lower levels: ministers, sherpas, working groups. Cf. The Stanley Foundation (2009); P. Hajnal (2007), p. 1.

attended by representatives of civil society as well as representatives of business sector, so-called Business 20 (B20). The group under the Russian leadership had its first meeting on 12th December 2012 in Moscow. Six months later, between 20th and 21st June 2013, the group had its next summit (also held in Moscow) during which a White Paper [B20 2013a] was adopted. Together with a report prepared by B20 Dialogue Efficiency Task Force established within B20 [B20 2013b], the paper appeared to be a basis for strengthening relations between global business and G20. G7/8 and G20 summits referred to above became an opportunity for cooperation towards ‘more social dimension’ of the markets, as part of the concept of sustainable development. They were attended not only by ministers of the economy from G20 countries, but also by famous celebrities from the global business, such as Bill Gates, founder of Microsoft company who participated in the summits of the group of twenty in Cannes (2011) and Los Cabos (2012). What is noteworthy, his participation had an active character. During the G20 leaders meeting in Cannes Bill Gates even presented his own report related to cooperation between various business groups and representatives of global civil society covering health protection and development [Gates 2011]. The same context also includes actions undertaken by such celebrities of the global music market as Bono and Bob Geldof, who performed at “Live 8” concerts preceding G8 summit in Gleaneagles (2005), cooperated with G7/8 and G20 within the framework of ONE/DATA (*Debt, Aids, Trade, Africa*) campaign, and who co-published in May 2010, before the G7/8 summit, a special issue of Canadian newspaper *The Globe and Mail*, entirely devoted to the problems of Africa.

The market, referred to several times herein, is one of the most important areas where we can observe occurrence of complicated relations, involving both states and non-state entities. Interactions taking place between them may lead to improvement of global governance mechanisms, in areas of trade, finance or environmental protection for instance, yet they may constitute certain risks. Contemporary transformations present mainly in the field of economy and politics may give rise to threats to states and their position within the international system. For, there is no denying that international system is decreasingly dependent on the states' will, thus becoming a network structure created by “states, non-state participants, relations and links between them, binding rules of international law as well as international regimes, alliances and institutions” (Łoś-Nowak 2011: 28-29). It is consequently worth giving a thought to market as the area where new system of interrelations between a states and non-state actors gets materialized and also indicating relations existing between them.

GLOBALIZATION AND EXPANSION OF THE MARKET

Importance of the market as area where political, economic, financial relations between state and non-state entities occur, is growing. Progress of globalisation which displays in broadening, intensifying and accelerating economic, political, social and cultural interdependences between individuals, groups, organisations, states and other entities within international system, is the main reason to it [Brown 2008: 45; Naim 2009: 29]. Market serves as a point of reference in the discussion on economic aspects of globalisation. Among those who give a prominent role to the

market are Immanuel Wallerstein and a group of scholars, including: Craig N. Murphy (1994), Ernest Mandel (1975), Michael Zürn (1995) and Henk W. Overbeek (2005). The latter points to a gradual, and lasting more than several hundred years, growth of the importance of commodity markets which form foundation of contemporary capitalism. According to Overbeek, in its essence, globalisation is a historical narrative taking place on economic grounds, depicting the process of commodification (derived from the English word “commodity”), which consists in processing, transforming goods, services and ideas into commodities sold on the market. It entails formation of a global market, initially having the character of goods trading, and later also related to services [Overbeek 2005]. Its modern dimension was adopted in the 1970s and the 1980s and continues also today. In Overbeek's opinion, in the last 30 years the market experienced an increase in actions, transactions and relations characterized by: (1) increase in the volume of its diverse forms (such as an enhanced integration of financial markets, increased level of services in international trade, development of intra-industry trade, expansion of trans- and multinational companies, growing importance of international regulations gaining global significance at the expense of national regulations, deregulation of financial markets, international mobility of capital, growth in mergers acquisitions, existence of small states with high foreign trade turnover to GDP ratio as Taiwan, Singapore, Finland, Ireland; (2) transition of sectors subject to state control to market-oriented economy (privatisation of state-owned enterprises, including those having a strategic role in national economy, for example in telecommunication, transport, energy sectors); (3) incorporation (leaving certain level of diversion as can be seen in case of China or Scandinavian countries) of individual states or even regions into the framework of capitalist global market which by principle rejects economies based on the socialist model; (4) subordination of individual spheres of human activity, including those highly ‘personalised’, such as reproduction or artistic creativity, to impersonal and automated market powers. As Overbeek argues, market transformations shaped contemporary image of neo-liberal globalisation which in the last thirty years gained its ‘trade mark’ covering expansion of transnational capital on an unprecedented scale [Overbeek 2005: 43].

MARKET, TRANSGOVERNMENTAL REGULATORY NETWORKS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

The aforementioned processes, characterised by high dynamics, allow us to put forward the assumption that idea of the market embodies the rule of special order, where cooperation is based more on mutual benefit than on political hierarchy and fixed values. Market plays an essential role as refers to formation of global economic governance. It allows to differentiate between governing and governance. Some observations are necessary in this aspect. It can be noted that several opinions can be distinguished in the debate on the role of markets as a basis for the development of economic governance. For some researchers, market has a normative character. In this sense it serves as guarantee of liberty and instrument of democratic change. For others, functioning of the markets, including the global ones, is not sufficient to solve global problems, regardless of whether they are related to climatic changes,

uneven economic growth or rising social disparities. Supporters of the open-market option, will always consider state interference as the worst-case scenario. For neoliberals “state interferences on the markets must be minimised, as the state is not able to gain sufficient information to anticipate market signals (prices), while powerful groups of interest will inevitably distort and bend interferences in order to obtain advantages for themselves” [Harvey 2005: 2]. There is also an opinion, that the market under control of neoliberal powers is a tool with which globalisation is relatively weakening the role of the state, pushing it out to a peripheral position. The perspective of ‘kidnapping’ of economic and social space by neoliberalism as structural cause of economic crises is referred to by David Harvey [2005], Jerzy Żyłyński [2009: 163-188] and Grzegorz Kołodko [2008; 2010a: 117-125]. According to G. Kołodko, spreading of neoliberalism is the primary reason of financial crises, including the present one which is compared to the Great Depression of 1929 - 1933. He notes that “roots of the crisis lie deep in neoliberal capitalism. It could not originate in states with social market economy (...), but only in the conditions of neoliberal Anglo-American model” [Kołodko 2010b: 95]. Polish scholar seeks reasons for crisis-rising phenomena and processes in typically neoliberal combination of values, institutions and politics. According to its recognition of values, excessive role is attributed to individualism and glory is given to greediness which, while negating social aspects of management, leads to “financialisation of nearly everything” [Kołodko 2010b]. From institutional point of view, neoliberalism is opposed to interventionism, and consequently negates a state and its role as the second, apart from the market, institution of contemporary economy. The neoliberal policy's objective is not a sustainable development (also within the social and ecological aspect), but ‘zero-inflation world’ and maintaining independence of central banks and monetary stability while pushing aside other objectives, such as reducing unemployment.

Above-mentioned opinions suggest relative weakening of the role a state in relation to market powers and entities undertaking broad range of actions in economy, trade, finances and law. Thomas J. Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall define the sphere of activity of these actors as “private authority in global governance” [Biersteker and Hall 2002]. More and more examples of it can be found in the recent years. Private commercial arbitration, offered by international companies, which have increased in number from 10 in 1919 to more than 100 in 1985, is one of them. They use international trade law as codified in the framework of the rules of trade agreements as defined by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law - UNIDROIT [Mattli 2001: 919-47]. Another example is the activities of credit rating agencies (CRAs) involved in the assessment of the creditworthiness of money lending entities, i.e. companies, funds, banks, organizations and governments as well as the assessment of the same debt instruments used on economic markets.⁴ The most

⁴ The market of rating agencies is under control of several companies in the United States. These include: *Fitch Ratings*, *Moody's*, *Standard & Poor's*, *AM Best* and *Dominion Bond Rating Service*. In addition, on the market there are several companies and institutions, which play the role of national credit rating agencies in their countries, such as *Japan Credit Rating Agency* or *Malaysian Rating Corporation*. Their credit ratings are, however, less important on an international scale, although they are locally counterweight to the ratings published by the American agencies. In Poland, there are also local rating agencies, namely *EuroRating* Rating Agency and *AFS Rating Agency*. The global market is characterized by gradual rating mergers and acquisitions of smaller national and international rating agencies. For example, *Standard & Poor's* in 1990, took over the *Insurance Solvency International Ltd.* Agency and

prominent and largest financial institutions worldwide, nationwide and local ones undergo the procedure of granting financial credibility assessment. According to the rating conducted by Standard & Poor's agency in November 2013, only 14 countries received the highest evaluation level (AAA).⁵ These include the United Kingdom, Sweden, Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Hong Kong, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany and Finland. The rating for Poland was determined at the level of A, while for Spain and Greece it amounted to BBB-, and B (Standard 2013). Table 1 below presents the designations that are used by rating agencies in assessing the credibility of their clients.

Table 1. Rating designations used by Standard & Poor's agency

Designation	Creditworthiness
AAA	No credit risk
AA+	Safe investment, low risk of bankruptcy
AA	
AA-	
A+	Safe investment unless the economy or industry experience unpredictable phenomena
A	
A-	
BBB+	Average level of investment safety. A noticeable deterioration in the condition of the economy
BBB	
BBB-	
BB+	Speculative investment. Significant economic problems affect large investment risk
BB	
BB-	
B+	Speculative investment. Very high investment risk
B	
B-	
CCC	
CC	High risk of bankruptcy
C	
D	Entity in bankruptcy or permanently unable to discharge liabilities

Source: J. Brylak (2011), p. 317.

Andrew Dukan, and in 1995 - the French agency *Agence d'Evaluation Financiere (ADEF)*. In 1997, *Fitch* agency conducted a merger with *IBCA Ltd.* and then took over the following agencies *Duff and Phelps Credit Rating Co.* (April 2000) and *Thomson Bank Watch* (December 2000). According to the report of Swiss Re, 80% of the total revenue of rating agencies in the world is divided between *Standard & Poor's* and *Moody's*, *Fitch* gets 14%, 4% for *AM Best*, and only 2% for other agencies. See J. M. Ammer, F. Packer (2000); AWA Boot, T. T. Milbourn, A. Schmeits (2006), pp. 81 et seq; J. Brylak (2011), pp. 311-314.

⁵ It should be noted, however, that in practice the ratings differ considerably from reality. The reason may be the fact that agencies often base on historical data as well as mathematical models that do not take into account the most important factors during the crisis, i.e. psychological parameters and unpredictable changes on the market, such as the collapse of the real estate investment exchange quotations.

Credit rating agencies constitute opinion-forming element for free-market economy by having high credibility and maintaining complete independence from investors (equity lobby) and political circles. Above all, their sphere of ‘power’ is shown in the financial markets. The success of most debt securities issued depends on the ratings assigned to them, which are considered a prerequisite for seeking external financing on the securities markets. Issuers credibility ratings determine the interest rates they must offer in order to obtain external financing. In some countries, investment products may be sold only if the issuer demonstrates an appropriate level of credibility confirmed by a rating agency of recognized reputation [Brylak 2011: 320-321].

In addition to private arbitration and rating agencies, the entities of ‘private governance’ operating in the market include private organizations such as the International Organization for Standardization, being in fact a network of about 180 committees, subcommittees and 2 550 thousand working groups [Mattli and Buethe 1993]. Other, more complex examples are hybrid public-private regulatory bodies, such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers dealing with the granting of domain names, setting their structure and general supervision over the operation of DNS⁶ servers around the world, and the Codex Alimentarius Commission. This committee deals with food safety standards. It cooperates with both business communities, as well as international organizations. The latter include the WTO, which is responsible for compliance with the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures [EC 1994], adopted as one of the tangible effects of results of the GATT Uruguay Round [Rewizorski 2011: 28-39; Prévost and van den Bossche, 2005: 231-370; Scott 2007].

Analysing the factors influencing the development of global governance mechanisms, we should also indicate the emergence of the transgovernmental regulatory networks. Anne-Marie Slaugther - adviser to President Barack Obama in the field of foreign policy and a close associate of Hillary Clinton - believes that global governance should be understood rather as a network structure than the result of actions by individual states. She notes that the perception of the world as divided states rather than unitary states allows leaders, politicians, analysts, or simply interested citizens to recognize the characteristics of the global political system that had previously been hidden. Government networks suddenly appear everywhere, from the Financial Action Task Force - FATF, networks of finance ministers and other financial regulators to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, the Free Trade Commission - a network of trade ministers empowered to interpret the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), to the network of ministers responsible for security at the borders following the events of September 11, 2011. At the same time, we may see the divisions taking place in international organizations, especially the “vertical networks” created between national regulators and their transnational counterparts [Slaugther 2004: 5-6].

⁶ The Domain Names System (DNS) is a solution that provides conversion of domain addresses to IP addresses. By using the DNS, a mnemonic name, eg. uke.gov.pl, can be converted into the corresponding IP address (in this case, 193.227.131.12). See http://www.dns.pl/ENUM/dokumenty/2007_09_10_ENUM.pdf, accessed on 3.06.2015.

Following the position of A-M. Slaughter, it is worth noting that global networks play an essential role in the creation, development, diffusion and implementation of various standards, rules and regulations covering more and more fields. These networks accelerate the exchange of information, generate the rules to fulfil the general agreements achieved on the summits of heads of states and heads of government. Most of them are technical in nature and take the form of soft law as well as various declarations and memoranda [Reinecke 1998]. Slaughter maintains that transgovernmental regulatory networks more effectively ‘penetrate’ the sovereignty and draw from the experiences of public and private actors. They are characterized by informality, flexibility, impermeability to the public and ease of adopting to new problems and situations. As a result, they may avoid the use of negotiated procedures characteristic of traditional relations between states. In addition, these networks are gaining in efficiency due to the close links between the drop-down norms and rules of conduct and their implementation and enforcement. As A.M. Slaughter rightly notices, the actors who make rules or formulate rules governing management networks are the same ones that have the power to ensure their enforcement [Slaughter 2000: 206]. In that model, the central assumption boils down to the assertion that the modern world no longer relies on rigid relations. Instead, it took on the shape of a spider's web, where advantages arise from mutual, fairly loose ties, rather than from inclusion [Slaughter 1997: 183-197; Slaughter 2004; Slaughter 2005: 281-295; Slaughter 2009: 94 -113]. It began to resemble the same global market in which - as already mentioned - formalized rules imposed by the state become weakened, and management takes economic and financial nature being largely determined by non-state actors, possessing so-called ‘private power’, as well as supranational organizations, which, as shows the example of the European Commission participation in the G8, over time can emancipate themselves from the tutelage of states.

CONCLUSIONS

In the era of spreading globalization increasing attention is paid to the markets and their ‘power’. Its economic dimension is dominated by neoliberal thinking focused on demonstrating the close relationship between the sort of authority of market entities, and the market as a space of their actions, where they can update their potential. The proliferation of business groups, international companies, transnational pressure groups, briefly speaking the spread of global networks of connections is correlated with the acquisition of new competences by non-state actors, thereby forming the foundations of international economic policies which to a lesser and lesser extent belong to the states. The latter are dependent on changes in individual markets. One can find many examples to substantiate this claim. One of them is the dramatic situation of the telecommunication company Nokia, which has been a ‘motor’ of the Finnish economy for many years. The reasons for this can be sought in *offshoring*, as some factories of Nokia phones moved from Salo (Finland) and Cluj (Romania), to Asia (China, South Korea, India and Vietnam), as well as the decline in

the share of Nokia in the global market for mobile phones and smartphones⁷ for Apple and Samsung. By 2014, the company announced the elimination of 10 thousand jobs in several states, leaving only the factories in Finland, as well as research and development facility in Ulm, Germany, which employs 730 people. The plans of employment reduction mean that from September 2010 more than 40 thousand people may lose their jobs in Nokia. Not only the Finnish government, but also the EU (which in 2013 paid 9.81 million Euro from the Globalisation Adjustment Fund to help the redundant workers) have been trying for years to deal with this situation unsuccessfully.

The above example indicates the negative aspects of the ‘power of globalization’. The global market, transnational space of exchange, is shaped largely by private entities. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler and Tony Porter even suggest the existence of “transnational private regimes”, defined as “integrated sets of formal and informal institutions, which are sources of managing the economic issues” [Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999:13]. More and more evidence shows that their action may under certain circumstances cause serious consequences and lead to an increased risk of financial and economic turbulence. It is sufficient to recall the recent example of the three major U.S. credit rating agencies whose functioning affects the behaviour of investors and the condition of the economies of most countries in the world, including the United States. In autumn 2008, six days before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Standard & Poor's maintained its investment grade rating for him at ‘A’. Moody's waited even longer, lowering the rating one working day before the collapse of the bank. It is not surprising that, different actors of private governance are faced with many questions, most important of which relate to whether rising importance of the private entities, operating in the markets is given to them, enabled, by the states or rather it is going out of their hands and whether a modern state can ensure efficient operation of mechanisms to reconcile the development of private entities with the objectives of internal policies.

The answers to these questions are hampered by the fact that in the global market, apart from state and private entities, there also operate transnational agents and inter-governmental organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with a considerable degree of autonomy to the states. The example of IMF indicates that such organizations exert strong pressure on the state, acting as a lender of last resort and often deciding on the relocation of companies regarding their restructuring, employment sizes. Considering the increasing mobility of capital states, as recipients of global capital, often are ready to go for significant concessions to attract the capital. Therefore it is understandable that the markets are perceived as ‘organisms’ capable of “reward or punish, depending on the assessment of how

⁷ Nokia's market share in the basic models of mobile phones dropped from 33% (2010) to 24% (2011) and the decline continued in 2012, in the second quarter of 2012, Nokia maintained the market share of 6.6% (down from 38% at the beginning of 2010), while Apple had 16.9%, and Samsung 32.6% Cf. COM (2013), Application for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on mobilization of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund in accordance with point 28 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial management (application EGF/2013 / 001 FI / Nokia Salo from Finland), Cf. COM (2013), pp. 3-4.

governments deal with money supply, budget deficits, foreign debt, deregulation (...) bank cartels, increase in the efficiency of their local banks and credit markets” [Strange 1997: 9]. This is one side of the coin. There is another too. The market can be very helpful for a state for a reason that governments often blame it for failures in the course of national economic policy, simplifying this way the political reality, building the division into what is good, internal, national, predictable, namely ‘good’ and what is ‘bad’, because it is external, crisis-bringing, foreign, dangerous, unstable. Such reasoning and blurring of responsibility by governments to societies for their actions, however, cannot last forever. State failure and arbitrariness of market actors may in fact be the cause of the loss of power by governments incapable of keeping a tight rein on capital. Markets in order to survive and develop need political stability and institutional basis, which the state provides. When properly used, they are organs of state policy, but they cannot be its substitute. And here is substantial doubt. On the one hand, it seems that the modern state, functioning in a globalizing world steeped with neoliberal ideas, to the market should play the role of crisis manager, always ready to intercede together with international organizations wherever market stability is called into question and there is a threat of social and economic crisis. On the other hand, the course of economic and financial crisis, a symbol of which is the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, showed that even coordinated action by states clustered in the G7/8 and G20 become insufficient, and restoration of stability to the markets appears to be, at least in the short term, an example of wishful thinking. So the question is, what can happen if similar crises are more frequent and more intense. It seems that one of the likely scenarios is that the regulatory and stabilisation functions in the market will be taken over by former agents of the states. Perhaps the expansion of private entities, organizations and transnational transport, as well as the gradual increase of their power in accordance with the principle of ‘too big to fail’ is the first marking line.

REFERENCES

- Ammer J.M., Packer F. (2000), How Consistent Are Credit Ratings? A Geographic and Sectorial Analysis of Default Risk. FRB International Finance Discussion Paper, No. 668.
- B20 (2013a), B20–G20 Partnership for Growth and Jobs: Recommendations from Business 20. Available at: http://www.b20russia.com/B20_WhiteBook_web.pdf, [accessed April 27, 2015]
- B20 (2013b), From Toronto to Saint Petersburg: Assessing G20-B20 Engagement Effectiveness: Draft Report. Available at: www.hse.ru/data/2013/06/24/1287462471/G20-B20_engagement_effectiveness_report_full.pdf, [accessed April 27, 2015].
- Boot A.W.A., Milbourn T.T., Schmeits A. (2006) *Credit Ratings as Coordination Mechanisms*, “Review of Financial Studies”, Vol. 19(1): 81-118.

Biersteker T. J., Hall R. B. (eds.) (2002), *The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brown G. W. (2008), Globalization is What We Make of It: Contemporary Globalization Theory and the Future Construction of Global Interconnection, "Political Studies Review" 6(1): 42-53.

Brylak J. (2011), *Agencje ratingowe na rynku inwestycji. Prawne aspekty instytucji*, Polskie Towarzystwo Naukowe, „Zeszyty Naukowe”, Vol. 11: 311-331.

COM. (2013), Application for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on mobilization of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund in accordance with point 28 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 between the European Parliament, The Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial management (application EGF/2013 / 001 FI / Nokia Salo from Finland), COM (2013) 707 final, Brussels.

UN (1995), Our Global Neighbourhood, Commission on Global Governance, New York: Oxford University Press.

Cutler C., Haufler V., Porter T. (eds.) (1999), *Private Authority and International Affairs*, NY:SUNY Press.

EC (1994), Official Journal of the European Communities L 336 , 23 December.

Gates B. (2011), Innovation with Impact: Financing 21st Century Development. Available at:
<http://www.thegatesnotes.com/~media/Images/GatesNotes/G20/G20-Documents/g20-report-english.pdf>, [accessed May, 2015].

Hajnal P. (2007), *The G8 system and the G20: evolution, role and documentation*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Harvey D. (2005), *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

http://www.dns.pl/ENUM/dokumenty/2007_09_10_ENUM.pdf, [accessed June 3, 2015].

Holm H. H., Sørensen G. (eds.), *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of Cold War*, Boulder:Westview.

Kingsbury B., Krisch N., Stewart R.B. (2005), *The Emergence of Global Administrative Law*, "Law and Contemporary Problems", Vol. 68(3-4): 15-62.

Kołodko G. (2013), *Dokąd zmierza świat. Ekonomia polityczna przyszłości*, Warszawa.

Kołodko G. (2010a), *Neoliberalizm i światowy kryzys gospodarczy*, „Ekonomista”, Vol. 1: 117-126.

Kołodko G. (2010b), *Neoliberalizm i systemowy kryzys globalnej gospodarki*, in G. Kołodko (ed.), *Globalizacja, kryzys i co dalej?*, Warsaw: Poltext.

Kołodko G. (2008), *Wędrujący świat*, Warsaw: Prószyński i S-ka.

Łoś-Nowak T. (2011), *Polityka zagraniczna w przestrzeni teoretycznej*, in T. Łoś-Nowak (ed.) *Polityka zagraniczna. Aktorzy-potencjały-strategie*, Warsaw: Poltext.

Mandel E. (1975), *Late Capitalism*, London: Verso Books.

Mattli W. (2001), *Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration*. “International Organization”, Vol. 55(4): 919-947.

Mattli W., Büthe T. (1993), *Setting International Standards: Technological Rationality or the Primacy of Power*, “World Politics”, Vol. 56(1): 1-42.

Murphy C.N. (1994), *International Organization and Industrial Change. Global Governance since 1850*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Naím M. (2009), *Think Again: Globalization*, „Foreign Policy”, 30 September, Available at: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/09/30/think-again-globalization/>, [accessed May 9, 2015].

Overbeek H. (2005), *Global governance, class, hegemony. A historical materialist perspective*, w: Ad. Ba, M.J. Hoffman (eds.), *Contending Perspectives on Global Governance. Coherence, contestation and world order*, London-New York: Routledge.

Pietrzak E. (2013), *Nieposłuszeństwo i profanacje - globalne społeczeństwo obywatelskie*. “Przegląd Politologiczny” Vol. 1: 83-91.

Prévost D., Van den Bossche P. (2005), *The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures*, in P.F. J. Macrory, A.E. Appleton, M.G. Plummer (eds.), *The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis: Volume I*, New York: Springer: New York.

Reinecke W. (1998), *Global Public Policy: Governing without Government?*, Washington, DC: Brookings.

Rewizorski M. (2011), *The WTO Legal System*, Volume 2. The Uruguay Round Agreements (Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization – Annex 1A), Kołobrzeg: Offset.

Scott J. (2007), *The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: A Commentary*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Slaughter A-M (1997), *A New World Order*, “Foreign Affairs”, Vol. 76(5): 183-197.

Slaughter A-M. (2004), *A New World Order*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Slaughter A-M. (2000), *Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks*, w: M. Byers (ed.), *The Role of Law in International Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Slaughter, A-M. (2005), Government Networks, World Order, and the L20, in J. English, R. Thakur, A.F. Cooper (2005), Reforming from the Top: A Leaders' 20 Summit, Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

Slaughter A-M (2009), *America's Edge: Power in the Networked Century*, "Foreign Affairs", Vol. 88(1): 94-113.

Standard & Poor's 2013. Available at:
<http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/sovereigns/ratingslist/en/eu/?subSectorCode=39&start=50&range=50>, [accessed on February 3, 2014].

Strange S. (1997), *Territory, State, Authority, Economy: A New Realist Ontology of Global Political Economy*, in R.W. Cox (ed.), *The New Realisms: Perspectives on Multilateralism and New World Order*, Tokyo: United Nations Press.

Streeck W., Schmitter P.C. (1985), *Community, Market, State—and Associations?*. "European Sociological Review", Vol.1(2): 119-138.

The Stanley Foundation (2009), *Waiting to Join the Club*, "Courier", No. 63.

WTO (2007), Understanding the WTO, Geneva: WTO.

Żyżyński J. (2009), *Neoliberalizm jako strukturalna przyczyna kryzysu a poszukiwanie dróg Naprawy, „Ekonomista”*, Vol. 2.

Zürn M. (1995), *The Change of Globalization and Individualization: a View from Europe*, in Holm H. H., Sørensen G. (eds.), *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of Cold War*, Boulder:Westview.

THE SPHERE OF POLITICS WITH MYTH AND STEREOTYPE IN THE BACKGROUND

Grzegorz Piwnicki

*Department of Political Science, University of Gdańsk,
ul. Bażyńskiego 4, 80-309 Gdańsk
grzegorzpiwnicki@wp.pl*

Abstract

From time immemorial myths were connected with the beginning of the existence of civilization. Genealogic and eschatological myths identified the history of humankind with chaos. Every myth is in some way connected with politics.

The political myths shape the public opinion. They are means of ideological propaganda. While they cannot adapt rules of scientific explanatory rules, they adhere to the “understanding faith”, exclude discussion and interpretation. Among the genres of political myths one may name: spontaneous myths, adopted by individuals and social groups, and myths “consciously” created. They are often used in politics.

The political stereotypes are important emotional clichés in the conceptual system accepted by an individual. They are also universal mechanisms of interpersonal communication. The contemporary myths and stereotypes base on emotional states immune people to truth and falsehood.

Key words: *Political myth, ideological propaganda, political costume, stereotype, emotional states*

From time immemorial, myths are connected with genealogy and the beginning of existence. It were genealogic and eschatological myths that identified history with chaos, while myth of the beginning described the virtues of the existing order and presented chaos as a state which had been overcome.

Thus an attempt to arbitrary demarcate political myths as an autonomous phenomenon is a misunderstanding. All of the myths are related to politics at least in some extent. One may show among them those, which have played a special role in politics. One should agree that “a myth became a peculiar invention of politics of the 20th century” [Filipowicz 1988: 76].

The dialogue between “tellers” and “listeners” is a transcendental principle of myths in every culture [*Ibid.*: 60].

In this *theatrum mundi* priests, wise men and politicians were actors. The truthfulness of the political ideas are impossible to prove, so the art of political

persuasion is based on making people accept the truth without any proof. In the contact with broader audience the symbolic meaning, shamanic gesture is more important than discursive elaborates. Thus the art of political persuasion does not depend on arduous explaining tangled and complex issues. It also has nothing in common with intellectual comprehension. Not the depth and perspicacity of the reasoning, but the power of suggestion (a kind of magic) breaks the barrier of distrust, thus becoming meaningful and convincing.

“Magic is indeed an unattainable ideal of political efficiency, an obvious destiny of political efficiency, which always has to be based on word at the point of entry, but eventually strives towards certain real effects” [*Ibid.*: 190].

Over the centuries the emerging mythologies recovered the initial truths, uniting the historical time with “sacral time” – time of the beginnings. Succumbing to the rules of variability, the imitating the sacral patterns becomes more and more desacralized. Every transition of this kind has, however, its own mythology. In the contemporary societies the needs, which were satisfied by myths in the primordial communities, do not vanish, because every new form of the social order has to be confirmed by adequate values.

The necessity of manipulation and control over the collective consciousness always exists in politics. In order to do that, one must “run his imagination”, always opened towards the model resolutions. The presence of “sacrum” understood as the primary attribute of faith and morality is necessary here. The mythogenic situation in the pattern given above is created by the division into “tellers” and “listeners”. Persuasion is most often an attempt to win over the approval, leading directly towards dominating the mass imagination.

The mythogenic structures are created in the moment, when thought is not subordinate to procedures, which make making the verification of convictions possible. The problem is the scientific knowledge itself becomes an object of mystification. It happens especially when science is connected with particular political options, which by definition cultivate “worldview-valuing humanities” – the “magical thinking” occurs [*Ibid.*: 109].

The “magical thinking” in politics is directly connected with symbols. They send a signal to the visions and tales, often of prophetic character, referring to the primordial patterns, which are authentic and “enable manipulation with empirical sense of events (...), valorize the sense of political actions, overshadowing their direct empirical sense” [*Ibid.*: 186]. They have a magical power of effect, are ruled with its own logic, which make facts gain another meaning.

The symbolic of political myth covers many designates of reality, both historical and tradition-based. It may concern days and periods of commemoration, holy and public sites, monuments, music, songs, banners, decorations, sculptures, collections of stories and tales, ceremonies, parades, mass demonstrations etc. Thanks to those symbols, power is treated as superior power, as sacrum and taboo.

The effect of symbols is often connected with wider area of myth and mythogenesis. A myth can be placed between religion and science. Religion attempts to explain the essence of being on the basis of the existence of God and thus becomes fully detached from reality and rationality. The belief of myth has a different nature: “the believer in myth analyzes reality, but only to confirm the myth and never to question it. Contrariwise, the claims of science never definitely prejudgets the reality. The system

of scientific claims is an open set, contrary to the myth, which is closed, definite set" [Blok 1999: 189].

The contemporary myths, which are not par excellence acts of symbolic expression, use detailed and concrete information in order to gain credibility and trust. Concerning the mythogenic character of mass culture, they became well-tried mean of social engineering and psychological engineering [*Ibid.*]. They are accompanied by particular keywords, gestures, paraphernalia, dresses which are called "a political costume" by Stanisław Filipowicz [1988: 62].

Considering the functional and semantic aspects of myth in the politics, should analyze the relation between social and political situations and emergence of the phenomena which may be qualified as political myths. Political aspects of myth create a complex of visions, which concern its relation with politics [Biernat 1989: 7], particularly with an integration of social group in fight for political power. The question of mystification of political goals is directly connected with this problem.

Characterizing the features of mythical thinking, Tadeusz Biernat emphasizes that the first manifestation of this phenomenon is mythical identity – the lack of difference between what is real and what is ideal: thought and being are indivisible. The second feature of mythical thinking is lack of difference between subject and its attributes; the third is specific attitude towards causality: "post hoc, ergo propter hoc" – "after this, therefore because of this". In other words: everything way is the cause of everything, and incidental temporal relation is enough to notice a causal relation.

The political myth in its form and content does not differ from the traditional mythical images. Its peculiar feature is the fact that it is related to a particular section of reality, which is politics. We use it while motivating particular political attitudes and modes of behavior. The most looked for are spontaneous myths, emerging in the consciousness of social groups, because the main task of ideology is shaping people's beliefs in order to motivate attitudes and modes of behavior in the field of politics.

Ideology is always the result of social conflict. The myth supports ideology and participates with it in creating rituals of political life of society.

It was mentioned that pseudo-scientific logics of myth, contrary to scientific reasoning, has closed and definitive character. The basis of this kind of myth is a "friend-enemy" dichotomy. In the same time, clearly and simply articulated evaluations make the real world play a subservient role in relation with created meanings, compatible with the myth's intention.

In the political theories the world is perceived as an image of struggle, conflicts, imminent confrontation of contradictory social forces. "Hence the political theories, like myths, present the conflict between good and evil, revealing antinomy of Logos and Chaos" [Filipowicz 1988: 115].

With the creation of political myth comes the technique of creation of political myth, which depends on compatibility of aims and aspirations of political leader with the system created by people. If this kind of compatibility exists, the ordinary information impact, referring to "the state of information arousal, is enough" [Biernat 1989: 7]. If compatibility does not exist, one should act in order to create the state of "emotional arousal".

In the stimulation of the "emotional state", the political images and deeply rooted views, connected with the collective consciousness of group and nation, simultaneously connected with emotional experience of historical events. Most often

the uncomfortable facts and events are omitted or left unsaid. As a result of the presented situation, “myths of political meaning” emerge. “This kind of dogmatized and mythologized version of history is perfectly suitable for composing different irrational visions of reality” [Ibid.: 144].

The irrational images of reality are seen in its fullness when the cognitive functions of political myth are considered. This function allows the reconstruction of the information structure of “mythomaniac” and uniformization of all experiences and beliefs.

In the political myth, the target ideological vision plays a particularly important role. “It is very difficult to materialize, but has a very strong power to call on action” [Przybylski 1996: 117].

The integrating, evaluating and explaining functions of political myth make group coherent, are patterns of conduct, models of relations, actions and orders. The functions given above exert direct influence on “stabilization, dissolution and formation of power, results of political processes, and – most of all – the genesis and development of political movements” [Ibid.].

The myths in politics, as well as so-called political myths, play regulating functions in relation to society are the factor of legitimization of political order. The main function of this myth is creation of power infrastructure. The relation of power, myth, and sacrum is the relation of values, which mutually imply themselves. Thus the analysis of relation between power and sacrum is a natural complement to considerations of the regulative functions of myths [Filipowicz 1988: 138].

The temporal dimension points to the regulative character of myth. In the primordial society the myth told the hierophanic events, which have universal dimension. The “political hierophany” undergoes a quick and permanent erosion by the influence of time, permanent transition and degradation. That is why “the political holidays glorifying particular events have substantial meaning for the formation of social balance, but never exert a direct influence like myth-based ritual” [Ibid.].

The temporal changeability causes the atrophy of temporal limitations in human beings. Rules which arrange experience do not exist anymore; there are no rules and values arranging the experience. The fact that political leaders still need persistent religious, historical and political eschatology should not be a surprise.

The distribution of myth in the politics is always connected with change of views on the existing reality. Two aspects of myth – prospective and retrospective – undergo a permanent re-evaluation. The prospective myth emerges in the crisis situations. This kind of situations take place when there is no chance of the fulfillment of current needs of society and when particular aspirations of different circles, social groups, nations have no chance to materialize. It is the situation when the myth of the “Promised Land” appears in order to mobilize to action through sacrifice.

The retrospective myth plays a role which is complimentary to the prospective myth – it “restitutes” forgotten values and ideals. It is a form of remedy for the “present evil” [Przybylski 1996: 16-17].

The creation of political myths, their goals and aspirations, is sometimes perceived as a phenomenon of the creation of myths [Biernat 1989: 137]. The introduction of myth-creating “technicization” depends on whether the aspirations of the myth creator are coherent with potential followers or there is no compatibility between the sender and the receiver of the myth-creating signals. In the first case, “the ordinary

information action generating the state of emotional arousal” is enough to reach the consensus [*Ibid.*]. In the situation when this kind of agreement does not exist, a particular mode of influence to induce this state is needed.

In order to achieve social and political success, one should adhere to images and notions deeply rooted in the collective consciousness of particular groups and nations. Moreover, they should have a large emotional charge and be imprinted by historical events.

The political myth is usually collocated with the political society. Within the “political society” the social groups which do not accept the myth also participate in it (albeit “ineffectively”), creating so-called “antipolitical” myths [*Ibid.*: 247]. Some researchers claim that political mythology is in the first place a mythology of nation and state, and those spheres and political movements of particular social groups and classes are the most important area of the formation of myths [*Ibid.*].

From the beginning of Polish statehood, the nation became harnessed into the mystical and mythical image of “a bulwark”. Polish national mentality was formed through the ages, both in the times of enslavement and sovereignty. It was connected not only with the Catholic faith, but also with West European civilization. (“What Frenchman invents, Pole is going to like” (Adam Mickiewicz: *Pan Tadeusz*), “you were a peacock and a parrot of nations” (Juliusz Słowacki: *Grób Agamemnona*) are only two examples from Polish literature that confirm the existence of myths about Poles and Poland).

The myth of “Antemurale Christianitatis” was reactivated at the beginning of the 20th century. As a result of the new ideological divisions (like the victory of the October Revolution, the Yalta order, which emerged after the Second World War), the Polish myth of a defensive “bulwark” of the Western civilization against the “barbarity” of the East was strengthened by the new creative force [Biernat 1989: 215]. The extremity of the political situation in Europe has grown exponentially because of “the cult of personality” and “distortions in socialism-building”.

New inspiring legends, like “Miracle at the Vistula” or “Solidarity” were created. The word “solidarity” has soon turned into a keyword, a word-spell; it became a legitimacy for the highest ideas which has grown on a Polish ground. The eighties of the 20th century, particularly the year 1981, became a myth-creating turning point; abound with political and national mythology. The message sent by “Solidarity” to the nation beyond the “Iron Curtain” was a convincing sign of vitality of Polish mythology connected with “Antemurale Christianitatis” and Messianism. This message and mission of our nation were strengthened during visits of John Paul II, Polish Pope in his homeland.

The question if we can speak about the rebirth of “the Bulwark of Christianity” myth and messianism seems rhetorical. The nation is in the situation of search for its new state and political order. In the background of political and social transition, new phenomena are being re-read and re-given to the nation to accept them: national consciousness, Polish reason of state, Eurocentrism (Polonocentrism), freedom, tolerance and ethics of collective life within the canons of Catholic faith. In the relation between nation and state, the nation prevails. The national and state ambitions are based on the fact that “we wanted and want to claim our historical post among the nations of Europe once more” [*Ibid.*].

The contemporary political myth is most often expressed by the general notion concerning the reality, trying to keep the semblance of the truth. It does not recognize any form of verification of authenticity of its words. The myth may adopt a complex shape – then it appears as a “myth-like” structure.

The political myth shapes the public opinion; it is the mean of ideological propaganda. While it cannot (or does not want to) use the rules of scientific justification and explanation, it confines itself to the “understanding belief” [Kołakowski 1968: 47]; it excludes discussion and interpretation.

Among the kinds of political myths, we meet the most often spontaneous myths, embraced by social groups and individuals and myths which are consciously created [Jabłońska-Bonca 1995: 27]. Spontaneous myths are often used in propaganda and politics.

THE POLITICAL FUNCTION OF THE STEREOTYPE

The phenomenon of mythologization and stereotypization is connected with subjective cognition. The ideas about the world appear to be one-sided and schematic. In the stereotypes we have to do with freedom of rations and arguments appearing after another; casual and personal creation of temporal and special connections. In both cases we can notice a particular susceptibility to personification [Biernat 1989: 320].

Walter Lippmann draws stereotype out of myth. He claims that stereotype and myth appear with the same intensity: both affective and cognitive. However, on the basis of the emergence of myth, two distinct elements appear. The first is located out of the subject, imposed from the outside by the information context. The other is located within the context, processed as a component of consciousness.

Every day we face the differences in differing the myth from the stereotype. “They are connected by the fact that they assign the facts without the necessary personal experience. The difference is that the stereotype is the active impulse of the word’s collocation – the name, which is also a call sign [Jabłońska-Bonca 1995: 30].

Francis Bacon in his considerations over the stereotypes derived them from “idols of mind” and “fallibility of the senses”. Moreover, he added “traditional prejudice” and “imperfection of language” [Bacon 1955: 27].

The answer to the question whether stereotype is a form of consciousness or only an attitude seems to be complex. There exist a number of opinions on this matter. The claims emphasizing the social nature and social conditioning of stereotypes seem to be theoretically creative.

The exploration of the stereotype (according to Lippmann’s theory), an attempt to explain and define the consciousness phenomena lead directly to identifying stereotypes with attitudes. This notion is confirmed by the structuralist definition of attitude, formulated by Milton Rokeach: “The attitude is relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner” [Nowakowska 1975: 174].

This subject was also covered by M. Marody [1976: 17] who introduced three basic components of stereotypization: cognitive, affective and behavioral. Which of those components dominates – it is a different problem. At first glance it seems that affective

component dominates. However, the consciousness of one's distinctiveness, for example ethnic, makes the cognitive component a basis for emotional states. In the sphere of the consciousness processes, concerning social and political facts, myths, stereotypes and superstitions contain a large emotional charge.

While the inner consciousness state is the most important for the myth, the stereotype is mostly based on the elements imposed from the outside by the information. The myth has thus the wider plane of reference that the stereotype, which makes the annexation of the existing stereotypes possible. It must be noted that myth is not a sum of stereotypes.

The political stereotype may not be seen in the categories of "inability to recognize complex social life" [Rozciecha 1979]; it cannot be evaluated from the point of view of lack of sense, the fatal force or any human voice. Stereotype is the second nature of a thinking human.

The idea of stereotype is described in the fullest way in *Encyclopedia of Political Science*: "the stereotype belongs to the sphere of imagination and beliefs. The images and beliefs are inseparable attribute of human nature. Thus the stereotype always exists on the level of consciousness and is historically, socially and culturally conditioned, relatively enduring, emotional, taking a form of generalization or categorization" [Maj 1999: 272-273].

Adam Schaff defines the features of the stereotype and adds that it is always connected with value judgment (negative or positive), connected with belief. The object of this belief are groups of people: racial, national, class, political, professional, gender etc., and also the secondary social relations between them. This stereotype is an expression of public opinion transmitted to the individual by family and the environment through the process of upbringing, irrespectively of the personal experience of the individual. It has an emotional charge (negative or positive).

It may be fully inconsistent with the facts or partially coherent with them, pretending to contain the real meaning. The stereotype is resistant to changes and thus independent from experience, emotionally persistent.

The features of the stereotype which were listed above enable it to realize their social functions, defend the values accepted by the society and group, which condition the integration of the individual with the group. The stereotype is tightly connected with a word-name. The name used by the stereotype is connected to the particular idea mystified by the stereotype. The emotional charge is particularly important for the stereotype, the apparent authenticity of its content, the endurance of its influence and resistance to changes, as well as ability to defend accepted beliefs and norms conditioning the integration of the individual with the group [Schaff 1981: 115-116]. The most important feature of the stereotype is its vitality and resistance to changes. The Greek nature of stereotype: "stereos" – "tightened", "solid", "typos" – "type, image, imprint" – was repeated in late 18th century, when this word was used to describe printing matrices.

The one who introduced this term into the social science was Walter Lippmann, who described the political stereotype as "an image in the head" having the feature of individuality and schematicity.

The continuator of Lippmann's research, J. Fishman, divided stereotypes into four major groups: stereotypes as information contrary to facts, those who are partially consistent with facts, stereotypes as a processes of formulating imperfect

judgements, stereotypes as an expression of inflexibility of attitudes, stereotypes as an expression of group conditioning [Borowczyk, Pawelczyk 1993: 21].

According to Adam Schaff, we can say that non-verbal stereotypes do not exist. This notion is confirmed by Jan Betting and Christine Vilain-Gandossi, claiming: "Stereotypes are not ideas, but more or less general reflections of social phenomena. They are often connected with linguistic questions, and their verbalization induces a network of somewhat hazy associations or connotations" [1995: 14]. Czesław Mojsiewicz adds: "the human thinking is a verbal thinking, and great importance should be attached to the mastery of word. One should remember about the ambiguity of words" [2000: 170].

The process of stereotyping has psychological substructure, expressed and manifested by a cognitive dissonance, described as "theory of frustration and authoritarian personality" [Borowczyk, Pawelczyk 1993: 26]. The people having this kind of personality are ruled by unconscious motives, which make them perceive the word in a simple and brief way. For them the stereotypes are a tool which they use for their biased thinking.

The clinical recognition of stereotypical degeneration – the illness of "homo politicus" was presented by Th. W. Adorno, who connected it with conventionalism – strict obedience to contractual values and authoritarian subordination (the individuals of so-called authoritarian personality usually have a black-and white image of social reality, are intolerant and easily-prejudiced, mistrustful, and feel endangered). The authoritarians uncritically follow the authorities of their own group and behave aggressively towards those who break the conventional norms. They unconditionally believe in superstitions, express the cult of strength, think with the ready stereotypical language, project and impose their own impulses on the outside world [Wiatr 1980: 369].

The basic features of the stereotypes are their social dimension and context they originate from. The prerequisite of the functioning of the political stereotype are their potential of emotional impact: the emotive, stabilizing, rationalizing and strengthening function. The emotive function enables us to evaluate and choose "emotional charge" (to create an emotional bond with it and later enrich this charge with another elements in order to create possibly full and multifaceted stereotype existing in collective consciousness as a comprehensive mode of examination of a particular phenomenon [Tyszkowska-Gosk 1980: 114].

The stabilizing function of the stereotype provides a feeling of security for an individual and group, making it fit to the reality in both situations when stereotype seems to be coherent with the facts and in the situation of lack of coherence. The special case of a stereotype is a prejudice. The researchers of this phenomenon perceive it as a negative stereotype, because it is based on animosity, hostility towards others. A prejudice is also: "attitude towards any matter not based on one's own experience. They are judgements, views, expectations acquired from the others without verification" [Szacki 1980: 140].

As an effect of this function, the identity, which awakes the aggression against the aliens, becomes enforced. This is so-called "canalization of aggression".

Stereotypes, like many other concepts, are the result of social learning. The "socialization" of individual is thus necessary here – being a part of a group, members of which demonstrate stereotypes and prejudice. The stereotypes contradictory to the

character of society are treated as “alien”, posing a threat national, ethnic or group community. The objective points out to autostereotype and heterostereotype, which is a result of individual and collective dimension of stereotyping.

From the point of view of ideas and beliefs, the stereotypes may be divided into negative, attribute to the “others”, and positive stereotypes. Negative evaluation may not be a part of definitive essence of the stereotypes, but possibly is an element of prototype stereotypes (...) Nevertheless, even positive stereotypes may awake negative reactions [Marcae, Stangor, Hewstone 1999: 345-346].

It turns out that some social groups are particularly prone to the stereotyping. The social psychologists are most of all interested in racial and national stereotypes. Racial and national groups are particularly prone to stereotyping because of their cultural separateness and their “foreignness” from the ethnocentric point of view. This are the categories of distinctive membership index and strong emotional tone [*Ibid.*: 341].

Taking the “power” of different categories in the field of stereotype creation under consideration, they can be divided into “natural” and artificial”. The natural categories are stronger motivated, but culture (sometimes confessional affiliation) undoubtedly plays a large role too. For example, the stereotype connected with Islam strongly revealed itself after the terrorist attacks against Washington and New York. The racial and religious affiliation after this events seem to be the equally distinct category for Americans and Europeans, although the authors of *Stereotypes and prejudice* disagree with this notion [*Ibid.*].

Ethnic and national stereotypes also play a large role. They are connected with “us” and “them” division, concerning people of different culture. In the changing relations of peoples and nations connected with the actual state of international relations, the ethnic stereotype turned out to be very durable, considering the characteristic features ascribed to different nations. The national stereotypes are perceived as durable features associated with Poles, Jews, Germans, Russians or Ukrainians. A specific case may be observed in the ever-changing dynamics of Slovak – Hungarian relations reflected as shifts from ethnic and language stereotypes to symbolic questions [Mihálik, Marušiak 2014: 128-148]. Some images of “separateness” or “foreignness” coded through the centuries seem to invariably last in human memory. They durability and petrification are a kind of template, which enables to separate “us” from “them”, “aliens”. This difference mobilizes the members of a particular social group, emphasizing the feeling of affiliation and bond with “own” community. In the same time, it excludes and discriminates people and groups, whose culture is considered to be inferior.

In the time of crisis “a scapegoat”, blamed for the existing situation, is easy to find [Girard 1982]. Thus the possibility of modernization or revision of stereotypes is so important. They may be modified by applying different psychotherapeutic, sociotherapeutic and educational techniques, however it is known that people easily transform one stereotyping into another, addicted and entangled into snares of their own identity and culture.

Apart from many research perspectives, the political stereotype takes a special place. “What plays in one’s soul, what is seen in one’s dreams” (Stanisław Wyspiański: *Wesele*) formula mutates into renewed matrix of “words and names”. According to the *pars pro toto* rule, the “slogan-template” emerges and falls onto fertile soil of social

expectations as something natural and obvious. It is not a subject of discussion, it is an a priori truth in relation with experience.

The political stereotypes are the purest and the most meaningful primary emotional clichés in the conceptual system accepted by the individual.

The stereotypes are the most universal mechanisms of interpersonal communication, and thus communication between people which would be free of stereotypes of any kind is impossible.

The contemporary myths and stereotypes free of archaic metaphoric, allegoric or symbolic sheath disable skepticism, exclude discussion, rely on emotional state of society; make it resistance to truth and lie.

REFERENCES

- Bacon F. (1955), *Novum Organum*, Warszawa.
- Berting J., Villain-Grandossi Ch. (1995), *Rola I znaczenie stereotypów narodowych w stosunkach międzynarodowych: podejście interdyscyplinarne*. In T. Wallas (ed.), *Narody i stereotypy*, Kraków.
- Biernat T. (1989), *Mit polityczny*, Warszawa.
- Blok Z. (1999), *Mit polityczny*. In *Encyklopedia politologii*, vol. 1, Zakamycze.
- Borowczyk K, Pawelczyk P. (eds.) (1993), *W kręgu mitów i stereotypów*, Poznań-Toruń.
- Girard R. (1982), *Kozioł ofiarny. Człowiek i jego cywilizacja*, Łódź.
- Filipowicz S. (1988), *Mit i spektakl władzy*, Warszawa.
- Jabłońska-Bonca J. (1995), *Prawo w kręgu mitów*, Gdańsk.
- Kołakowski L. (1968), *Pochwała niekonsekwencji*, vol. 2, London.
- Maj Cz. (1999), *Stereotyp polityczny*. In *Encyklopedia politologii*, vol. 1, Zakamycze.
- Macrae C. N., Stangor Ch., Hewstone M. (1999), *Stereotypy i uprzedzenia*, Gdańsk.
- Marody M. (1976), *Sens teoretyczny a sens empiryczny pojęcia postawy*, Warszawa.
- Mihálik J., Marušiak J. (2014), *The Dynamics of Slovak-Hungarian relations – the shift from language issues to legal and symbolic questions*. „Baltic Journal of Law & Politics“, no. 1.
- Mojsiewicz Cz. (2000), *Rola opinii publicznej w polityce*. In *Świat w okresie przemian. Księga pamiątkowa dedykowana prof. Longinowi Pastusiakowi*, Gdańsk.
- Nowakowska I. (1975), *Definicja pojęcia postawa*, „*Studia Socjologiczne*”, no. 2.
- Przybylski H. (1996), *Politologia. Zarys problematyki*, Katowice.

Rozciecha B. (1979), *Stereotypy jako element kultury politycznej społeczeństwa polskiego*, „*Studia Nauk Politycznych*”, no. 4/41.

Schaff A. (1981), *Stereotypy i działania ludzkie*, Warszawa.

Szacki J. (1980), *Spotkania z utopią*, Warszawa.

Tyszkowska-Gosk A. (1980), *Stereotypy polityczne jako element świadomości społecznej*, „*Studia Nauk Politycznych*”, no. 4.

Wiatr J.J. (1980), *Socjologia stosunków politycznych*, Warszawa.