

**EUROPEAN JOURNAL  
OF  
TRANSFORMATION STUDIES**

**2013**

**Vol. 1, No. 2**



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**e-ISSN 2298-0997**

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# GEORGIA IN EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

## Georgia as an Element of European Energy Security System

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### Abstract

Contemporary Europe is facing serious problems connected with the delivery of energy resources. These problems are of geopolitical and geostrategic character, and therefore position of Europe in the world will depend on the solutions of these problems. One of the possible ways of solving them is to introduce the countries situated by the Caspian Sea and in Central Asia into the European power grid network. In order to make the project of diversification of energy resources delivery successful it is necessary to omit Russia which is monopolizing the European energy market. The only alternative is the Georgian option. The EU energy safety requires involvement of Georgia into the process of integration and the European cooperation.

### Key words:

*energy security, geopolitics, the Nabucco gas pipeline, energy resources*

### INTRODUCTION

This article is devoted to the issue of energy security of Europe within the framework of contemporary international conditions. Geostrategic significance of Georgia, which constitutes a potential energy corridor connecting the Caspian countries and Central Asian countries with Europe, is taken into consideration. Transit location implies considering Georgia in the con-

struction of the European energy system. (Potulski, 2010) This article is a geopolitical analysis.

## **GEOPOLITICAL CONDITIONING OF THE EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY**

Energy security is one of the most essential problems in the contemporary world and in the contemporary international relations. It is also a guarantee of a balanced development of every country. Therefore, competition and rivalry appear and their aim is to achieve a convenient and victorious position in the strategic efforts to obtain energy resources. In the contemporary world the prices of resources, the demand for them and their consumption increase. At the same time, their quality and availability decrease which is determined by the exploitation of traditional, present resources.

This rivalry concerning energy sources occurs not only between the individual countries but also between regions of the world, economic and political communities. Therefore, the race concerning energy resources may be considered also as a competition between developed and developing countries, and between political communities driven by the principles of liberal democracy and authoritarian countries.

It is crucial to understand these issues in whole. First and foremost, it is worth paying attention to an obvious fact that the distribution of energy resources, similarly to other resources, is uneven on a global scale. These inequalities imply either a cooperation or confrontation between the countries or regions of the world. Therefore, to great extent, energy security of Europe depends on its energy strategies which should include the balance between costs and productive inputs. Nowadays the Europeans are more and more careful while expressing their views on atomic energy. Obviously, reactor failures (especially the recent disaster in Fukushima), which led to ecological disasters, have affected the public opinion.

Interesting from the geopolitics point of view is an answer to the question concerning the way Europe should diversify the deliveries of energy resources in order to satisfy the needs of industry and individual consumers as well as public entities (schools, hospitals, caring institutions, etc.). The challenges, which the political decision-makers are facing, often require redefining of the present energy policies. By now, these policies have not included the increase in the significance of the developing countries as energy resources consumers. The

West stops being its main importer. The market of resources becomes the market of supply which on one hand leads to an increase in prices but on the other hand it shifts the competitiveness from the producers onto consumers. These are the consumers of the countries importing the resources, which compete with each other about the access to the sources.

In this way a specific system of geopolitical connections is created and developing countries, especially rising economic powers such as China or India, play an important role in this system. Western decision-makers are facing a difficult task to redefine the geopolitical strategies and set new goals in energy policy. Which countries should be taken into consideration while building the strategy of energy security? In our opinion three geostrategic vectors should be considered: Russia, countries of Far East and the countries situated by the Caspian Sea as eventual new sources of the delivery of energy resources for Europe.

Russia is the main exporter of energy resources in Europe. It is interested in a further expansion to the European market which is improving its economic and political position. The connection of economic and political matters makes Russia an unpredictable exporter. One of the elements of Russian foreign affairs policy is so-called energy blackmail used towards the Central and Eastern European countries. That is why new channels of resources delivery omitting countries neighbouring with Russia are built. In case of tension in bilateral relations between Russia and its neighbours, delivery of the resources to the Western Europe will not be disrupted. Present transit country can be threatened with the supply cut at the same time not jeopardizing the relations with other countries importing energy resources. North Stream pipeline conducted on the bottom of the Baltic Sea and designed Black Sea South Stream are used for such cases. Besides, the Kremlin authorities want Russian companies to take full control over the pipelines crossing the transit countries and prevent from realization of the projects of alternative ways of energy resources delivery such as the Nabucco pipeline. The aim of the energy policy is economic and political dependence of the Eastern European countries (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) (Marušiak, 2010).

The second element of this geostrategic system is comprised by dynamically developing China and India where the demand for energy resources is increasing. Their potential needs in the future are hard to predict. However, along with the increase in wealth of their citizens and the increase in industrial production, their share in a global gas and oil consumption

increases yearly. According to the data published by BP in 2010 China consumed 10.6% of global oil. (BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2011) Annually the consumption increased in a few per cent. Between 2009 and 2010, increase in 10% was recorder. China has not only reached the level of second world economy but also become second oil consumer after the United States. At the same time, their consumption of natural gas is not so high and it can be expected that it will constantly increase (in 20% between 2009 and 2010) – China also consumes less than 4% of the world gas consumption, slightly more than the UK and Italy. Similarly, India which as the second most populated country in the world, consumes 2% of world's gas. However, in case of India, increase in the consumption amounts to 20% (BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2011).

Due to the constant increase in energy consumption, both Asian countries are seeking for new sources of oil and gas securing their economic interests and ensuring a stable increase in their industrial production and internal consumption. The Caspian and Central Asian resources constitute an important aim of their geostrategic game. China and India are becoming real competitors of Europe competing for the access to these sources. However, three factors are in their advantage: firstly, geographical proximity to the Central Asian countries; secondly, lack of tensions in the relations with Iran – one of the main producers of energy resources in the Caspian Sea region; thirdly, strong economic conditions even despite the financial crisis. This third factor gives them the possibility to fund new energy projects.

Considering their own interest, the Caspian countries aim at diversification of the recipients of energy resources. This diversification secures them against the political and economic dependence on the countries importing these resources. However, the influence of the West over these countries is quite limited. It is in interest of the European countries to tighten the cooperation with the countries from the region of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. The aim should be to include them into the western system of energy resources delivery (Nuriyev, 2008).

However, a serious legal and international barrier is comprised by the unregulated status of the Caspian Sea constituting an alternative route – omitting Russia – of importing the Central Asian gas. Defining the status of the Caspian Sea by the countries with an access to it would enable installing the pipeline which would be used to import natural gas to the West via

Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Obviously, the Russian Federation is not interested in regulating the status of the Caspian Sea. Due to legal and international *status quo* it maintains its geopolitical position making European countries dependent on Russian supplies. The aforementioned Russian projects – North and South Streams - increase the European dependence of Russian energy resources delivery. That is why it is in interest of the European countries to support alternative projects and initiatives aiming at regulating the status of the Caspian Sea. Projects such as the Nabucco pipeline and IGTI increase the energy security of Europe. Owning them – omitting the Russian Federation, natural gas can be delivered to the European countries from the countries from the Caspian Sea region and in the future even from Central Asia. The success of these projects depends on the solutions of various difficulties of technical, political and financial nature.

### **GEORGIA AS GEOSTRATEGIC LINK OF EUROPE**

Georgia is perceived as a part of geopolitical unit called region of the Caspian Sea and the Southern Caucasus and therefore is of strategic significance for Europe's energy security. Georgia is already a part of an energy axis connecting the Caspian Sea, Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea (Gachechiladze, 2002).

The European Union does not conduct a clear and long-term policy related to Georgia and the eastern part of basin of the Black Sea. So far the EU's presence has been limited to funding various kinds of projects which are supposed to support development of democratic institutions and civil society there. Moreover, after the end of Russia -Georgia War, the EU keeps its police contingent here to control the ceasefire on the line of demarcation separating Georgia and separatist republic of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgians perceive this presence as highly necessary but at the same time insufficient. The authorities and majority of public opinion are in favour of Georgia's integration with the Euro-Atlantic structures, i.e. NATO and the European Union. The argument for including Georgia into the integration processes is on one hand its European heritage (Modrzejewski, 2011), and on the other hand its geostrategic location as a transit country in the energy resources delivery from the regions of the Caspian Sea (Azerbaijan) and Central Asia (Turkmenistan). Georgians offer a strategic partnership to the European Union, the partnership which will secure the deliveries of energy resources (Caspian gas and oil) at least to some member states (Shaffer, 2009).



As a result of the activity of Polish diplomacy, the eastern dimension of the EU internal policy is becoming a steady and essential component of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Polish efforts to intensify contacts with Georgia should be directed to show the geostrategic location of Georgia without which the projects of energy security would be hardly realized. Georgia, as a transit country, can play a key role in the EU energy strategy. That is why the foreign policy of the European institutions and member states should focus on those interested in the diversification of energy supply, further support to democratization, transparency and economic development of this Southern Caucasian republic at the same time with gradual introduction of the European integration processes (abolishment of visa regime, including Georgians in some Union programs such as ERASMUS or a free trade area). It may bring mutual benefits. For Georgians it is important to meet their European aspirations and expectations as well as political and economic stabilization of the region which can be ensured by the Euro-Atlantic institutions which are guarantors of security and integrity of Georgia and vice-versa, Europe or actually the European Union may expect a predictable partner who will play an important role as a link in a chain of energy resources supply to the Old Continent (Gamkrelidze, 2010).

Among the member states there is a lack of common will and determination in “Europeanization” of Georgia and in integration of the region of the Southern Caucasus (Georgia and Azerbaijan) into the European system of energy security. In particular, there is a lack of opinion of the main actors of the European politics i.e. France and Germany. Due to the fact that both countries have ensured their energy security for decades (French energy strategy is based on atomic energy and Germany have ensured direct deliveries of natural gas from the Russian Federation through the northern pipeline at the bottom of the Baltic Sea) they do not attach a greater importance to the Georgian issue and the use of Georgia as a transit country in the deliveries of gas and oil from region of the Caspian Sea and as a result of big energy-strategic projects being an expression of energy supply diversification are not treated with priority and do not have any chance to succeed in the nearest future. What stands in the way are the capital costs which the countries involved could not cover without any financial support of the European funds.

This situation is intensified by the economic crisis. The activities for the benefit of energy security of the European countries should be long-lasting. Even if in the present economic

conditions (Euro zone crisis, second wave of financial crisis, and slow-down of European economies) the funding of energy projects (e.g. the construction of the Nabucco pipeline) cannot be realised, these projects should not be abandoned at all. The crisis, even if lasting next few years, it will finish once. However, the energy resources deliveries from the Caspian region can ensure the European energy security not for a year but for decades. Long-term thinking implies preferring temporary benefits to the benefits of “long lasting”. Therefore, the benefits resulting from the introducing the eastern part of the Black Sea region into the European energy security system will be noticeable in the next decades. This ascertainment refers especially to the countries of Central and Southern-Eastern Europe. The share of renewable energy in the global consumption in these countries does not exceed a few percents. Moreover, as no other they are at risk of Russian energy resources delivery failure.

Undoubtedly, a factor which does not favour the marking and realization of new routes of gas and oil transit from Europe omitting the territory of the Russian Federation are the authorities in Moscow. Russia is interested in maintaining the control over the transport of Caspian energy resources. Therefore, strengthening the geostrategic position of Georgia as a transit country is not in Russia’s interest (Gachechiladze, 2002). However, it does not mean that it is not in the interest of the EU Member States.

Georgia is the only safe country through which energy sources can be transferred from Azerbaijan and Central Asia to Europe (Ismailov and Papava, 2008). Due to close bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia and Armenia and Turkey, the construction of gas and oil pipeline by a shorter route through the territory of Armenia is impossible because of political reasons. Therefore, the situation of Georgia in case of the agreement to diversification of the delivery of gas and oil has no alternative in fact. One alternative is the Russian Federation (Baku-Noworosyjsk pipeline since 1997). However, assuming that Europe aims at diversification of energy resources delivery, their transfer from the region of the Caspian Sea to the EU Member States through the Russian territory is senseless. It would strengthen the geopolitical and geo-economic position of Russia as a monopolist on a strategic market of energy resources.

Moreover, the Russian region of Northern Caucasus through which the pipelines from Azerbaijan must go is perceived as highly instable. It is the theatre of civil war; the federal au-

thorities have only partial control. Almost every day there are some armed incidents happened. Due to this fact a serious damage to the transit infrastructure should be taken into consideration; this damage can limit the delivery of energy resources. This problem does not occur in case of Georgia because the pipelines omit the separatist republics and run through the territory where Tbilisi authorities have a full control over them. Georgia is a safer solution for undisturbed deliveries of gas and oil to Europe.

At present times, there are three pipelines running through Georgia: oil pipeline Baku-Supsa (Georgian port by the Black Sea) opened in 1999, Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan (southern-eastern Turkey) opened in 2005 and gas pipeline Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum (eastern Turkey) opened in 2007. These pipelines may constitute an important part of the European energy network in the future. However, European energy security policy of the EU and the member states will be more important than Georgian foreign affairs policy.

### **STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE CASPIAN RESOURCES AND NABUCCO PROJECT**

The Caspian Sea region comprises one of the biggest reservoirs of natural gas. Based on BP data, 5.8% of the world's reserves (11 trillion cubic meters) can be found in only three countries (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). The greatest reserves are in Turkmenistan where there are 8 trillion cubic meters of gas – 4.3% of the world's reserves. These deposits cannot be used unless the statute of the Caspian Sea is regulated. As mentioned before, it is not in the interest of the Russian Federation to focus at monopolization of energy market in Europe. Therefore, Turkmen resources are not fully exploited. In 2010 Turkmen gas represented only 1.3% of world's production. In 2010 the production was at the same level as a decade ago (42.5 billion cubic meters). While the gas production in Azerbaijan tripled despite the fact that it represents only 0.5% of the world's production. In 2000 Azerbaijan produced 5.1 billion cubic meters of gas, and in 2010 more than 15 billion cubic meters. The main recipient of Azerbaijan gas is Turkey and Russia (BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2011).

What is essential for the exploitation of the Caspian resources is the construction of industrial infrastructure. One of the most significant projects is the construction of the Nabucco gas pipeline. This pipeline is one of the most cost demanding and complicated energy projects. Its length will be eventually 4 thousands kilometres. It is supposed to supply 31 billion cubic meters of gas which is three times more than the planned gas pipeline IGTI. The owner

and operator of the gas pipeline is the Nabucco Gas Pipeline. Its shareholders are six corporations (each having the same share of 16.67%): OMV Gas & GmbH (Austria), MOL Hungarian Oil & Gas plc (Hungary), SNTGN Transgaz SA (Romania), Bulgaria Energy Holding EAD (Bulgaria), BOTAS (Turkey), and RWE (Germany). The pipeline starts in two places – at the Turkish-Georgian border (Azerbaijan gas) and Turkish-Iraqi border (Iraqi gas). It is scheduled to go through five countries participating in the project: Turkey (2581 km), Bulgaria (412 km), Romania (469 km), Hungary (384 km) and Austria (47 km). As planned, approximately 30 billion cubic meters of gas are supposed to flow through the Nabucco pipeline. 21 billion cubic meters will come from Azerbaijan gas fields Shah Deniz II and Umid; 6 billion from Azerbaijan fields have been contracted to supply Turkey. The rest of the gas will come from Iraqi Kurdistan. It is estimated that 20 billion cubic meters can be exploited annually in this Iraqi province. Turkmenistan can be an additional source of gas and it could provide 10 billion of gas annually. However, this source has only a potential character until the status of the Caspian Sea is regulated and the Transcaspian gas pipeline is built.

There are few factors of political character which hinder the realization of energy project Nabucco. Firstly, what has already been pointed at is the attitude of the Russian Federation which promotes its own competitive project – the South Stream. This project is competitive not only from economic point of view but also from a political one. The aim of the Kremlin authorities is to persuade its European partners that South Stream investment is more profitable. However, besides economic benefits, Russia would increase its political influence. Monopolization of the energy sources supply puts the European countries in an inconvenient situation. It would decrease its resistance against energy blackmail and political pressure of the Russian authorities. Moreover, as a monopolist Russian exporter could impose its own price policy for a longer period of time.

Taking the capacity of the Nabucco gas pipeline into consideration, it does not pose a threat to the Russian project South Stream capacity of which is estimated to be 63 billion cubic meters annually which is twice than the Nabucco pipeline. Nevertheless, energy security of Europe would decrease significantly if the Nabucco project was abandoned. However, it would increase the dependence on Russian supply. At the present, 25% of gas imported to the EU comes from the Russian Federation. Seven member states are almost entirely dependent on Russian supply. Realization of the next Russian energy projects may increase this

dependence. Russian gas pipeline South Stream is treated as a political project; it is supposed to increase the geopolitical role of Russia in Europe. The Nabucco project should be treated in the same way. Being directed only by economic reasons may seem very short-sighted. The Nabucco project should also be treated as a political project increasing the energy security of the European Union.

What are the costs of the energy security? In 2005 it was estimated that they would amount to less than 8 billion EURO. The project was supposed to be subsidized by the European financial institutions (70%) and the countries which the gas pipeline is to go through (30%). Today these costs seem greatly lowered. Last year the estimations of BP indicated the sum of more than 14 billion EURO necessary to realize this investment. The postponing of the Nabucco project realization increases its costs. At the same time, realization of the scenario created by the Kremlin authorities – that is the construction of the South Stream gas pipeline – seems more realistic.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

If Europeans manage to decide on common strategic aims based on common geopolitical vision, Georgia may play an important role of an energy corridor and a loyal ally of the West, which defines its priorities in foreign affairs policy taking the integration with the Euro-Atlantic structures into consideration. What is extremely significant is the positive attitude of the Georgian society towards Europe and the European Union. The Georgians feel that they are a part of the European family of nations. There are many organizations which work towards the popularization of the European attitudes. Integration of Georgia with the Euro-Atlantic structures can bring mutual benefits. It will give Georgians a greater feeling of geopolitical security; it will ensure the improvement of the quality of life; and further democratization of public environment. In return, citizens of the European Union will get a predictable partner constituting an important link in the European system of energy security.

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# Ethnic Identities and the Issue of Civic Integration in Georgia

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## **Abstract**

Article discuss the perspectives of civic integration in such ethno-culturally fragmented country as Georgia. Authors claims for “integration” model, as relevant frame of further peaceful civic coexistence. They reject as traditional “assimilation” and “differentiation” as contemporary “multicultural” projects as invalid for current Georgian realities.

## **Key words**

*Nation-building, ethnic community, ethnic nationalism, civic integration, democratic building, ethnic accommodation*

Georgia traditionally used to be and remains a poly-confessional and multi-ethnic state. Accordingly, there has always been and it is actual also today the problem of the peaceful coexistence of the different segments of the society within one political space.

After dismantling of the communist system the external facade side of the order that was entirely based on fear and terror, was destroyed. Accordingly, along with the economic and social problems, also arose the problems of ethno-religious character. Typically, in most cases, this kind of tension has its roots not actually in the confessional differences, but is caused of entirely different factors. Often confessional sight is only its outer side, and, at best, has one-sided character. In Georgia, which is characterized by its ethnic and religious diversity is clearly a risk of group mutual incompatibility of different ethnic and religious groups. Still weak democratic institutions cannot ensure the transformation of society as one whole civil society. Accordingly, the level of alienation, which has ethno-religious character, in Georgian reality is quite high.

Based on empirical data, the purpose of the paper is to determine the social and political foundations that have contributed to the origin of ethnic and religious identities in Georgia

and to examine the process of their convergence and integration within the public-political space. Our study does not include all ethnic and religious groups living in Georgia. It is based on data obtained from the survey of the Azerbaijani and Armenian population compact living in Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti region, as well as of the Georgian population living in Mtskheta.

### **a) The ethno-religious fragmentation of contemporary Georgia**

Georgia in the ethno-confessional sense is a diverse and fragmented country. One of the main objectives is to create a public space in which all ethnic and religious groups living in the country will have a sense of loyalty to the given State. And most importantly, if Georgia wants to keep the integrity of the country and become a consolidated democracy - it will necessarily have to solve this problem.

Public political discourse and the space of today's Georgia is different with its multiplicity of ethnic categories and it is difficult to call it a strong political culture based on extensive citizen participation, the basis of which for its part is the overall social and political consensus. The political culture of Georgia largely has fragmented nature in which there are a lot of socio-political elements of the primordial and pre-modern type. They, in turn, do not quite correspond to the processes and goals of the structure of the idea of modern state.

Of course, in creating this situation you can blame the political elite (including ethno-political elites), who are the main actors in determining the fate of the country. It is necessary to take into account the fact that the given elites operate in accordance with the specific historical heritage and the existing socio-political context, which, for its part, does not so promote successful civic integration. In this the Soviet experience played particularly important role. Along with many problems, as the hallmark of the Soviet heritage can be named particularly strong ethnic stigmatization of society, to overcome of which was a difficult task for all multi-ethnic post-Soviet countries.<sup>1</sup> Among these countries, on the outstanding issues of ethnic

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<sup>1</sup> About the Soviet Nationality and Empire-Building project, we can see dozens of literature, but actually, theoretically we mostly focus on: Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper. *Empires in World History*. Princeton University Press 2010, Ronald Suny, *State-building and nation-making / The Russian Revolution*, Roulledge, London and New York, 1989, Svante E. Cornell / *Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus – Cases in* edited by Martin A. Miller, Blackwell Publisher, 2001 p.239-1916, Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet union: Communism and nationalism 1917-1923*, Harvard University Press, 1954 p. 65,



and cultural character stands out Georgia. Among all those stigmas, handed down to us by inheritance from the Soviet Union, comes out that the most complex one was exactly the ethnic stigma. Overcome of ethnic and cultural diversity especially hinder foreign policy factors and socio-economic situation. In Georgia the ethnic minorities have poor communication not only in the cultural and political, but also in economic terms. The acting national economic market is not conducive to an intense relationship, competition and cooperation. Accordingly, it is not surprising that in most cases we actually face isolationism of ethnic minorities and radical change for the better in the future is not expected. Despite the fact that in Georgia the legal framework is provided by any formal civil equality and the country is joined to all of the major international legislations which protect human rights, significant improvement is not felt. We see that only the formal legal equality cannot provide active civic activities and inter-ethnic integration (although without it at all it is unthinkable).

Civil Integration prevents ethno-nationalist trends and myths, which have deep roots in the views of the majority of the population. These myths and perceptions play a crucial role in the formation of national self-determination and identity. Ethno-nationalist tendencies are strong not only within the ethnic Georgians, but also within the ethnic minorities. Creation of ethno-nationalist tendencies in Georgia contributed several factors. These factors, we can call as the historical past and the legacy of Soviet totalitarianism, as well as the current socio-economic situation. In this regard, Soviet past is especially "distinguished". Although, in truth, it has played a huge role, but we should not forget also the situation until the councils. Probably rethinking of these two factors will help us to answer the question: what was the origin of ethno-nationalist tendencies contributed to Georgia and why is the integration of ethnic minorities so difficult? Of course, in the inhibited civic integration an important role plays existing political elite, but as a rule, any political actor, trying to implement a particular political project, tries to give also some legitimacy to their actions. So, very often, these elites are slaves to this reality and, therefore, they are trying to strengthen their political projects with such ideas that are familiar to most people, adopted and approved by them.

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## **b) Historical cartography of ethno-religious communities**

Despite the fact that in the country for centuries side by side live different ethnic and religious groups (about 100), they almost do not know (and if they do, badly) the cultural values and achievements of each other. Given all this, we found it necessary in our study to make a brief historical review and to overview in what historical period and in which conditions the compact settlement of Armenians and Azerbaijanis have appeared in the country. The ethnic minorities are scattered almost all over the territories of Georgia, although ethnic minorities, which we consider within our study, live compactly mainly in two regions - in Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli. Accordingly, based on the theme of our research, the subject of our interest is ethnic minorities who live in these areas - the Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

### ***Samtskhe-Javakheti region and a brief history of Armenian settlement***

Of the 248,929 ethnic Armenians living in Georgia, most of the population lives in Samtskhe-Javakheti region. Ethnic Armenians make up 5.7% of the total population<sup>2</sup>([www.statistics.ge](http://www.statistics.ge), [www.diversity.ge](http://www.diversity.ge)).

According to historical records the settlement of Armenians in Georgia can be attributed to the ancient period. Although inhabited by Armenians compact regions where ethnic Armenians are almost an absolute majority – is more recent phenomenon and dates back to the XIX century, after the conquest of Georgia by the Russian Empire.

The war that began in 1928 between Russia and the Ottoman Empire ended in September 14, 1929 with a peace agreement in Adrianople. In this war Turkey was defeated. On the basis of 13 Article of the peace treaty of Adrianople Georgian Muslims living in Georgia got the right to resettlement in area of similar religious Turkey for 18 months.

On the liberated from Turkish yoke territories of Georgia, as a result of religious policy conducted by Tsarist Russia; most of the local Muslim Georgians were forced to leave their native territories and to move to Turkey (though some Georgian Muslims still remained in the

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<sup>2</sup> According to the latest inventory, conducted in 2002, Georgia's population is 4,351,733 people. According to department statistics, the number of ethnic Georgians is - 3,661,173, representing just a bit over 80% of the total population.

region). (L. Zurabashvili, *Traditions of interethnic relations in Georgia*, „Matcniereba“, Tbilisi, 1989, p.34/5).

In parallel, under leadership of General Paskevich, of Kars, Ardahan, Baiyazeti and Erzerum tens of thousands of ethnic Armenians, of Christian religion, were resettled on the territories of Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti. They inhabited exactly the territories devastated by the Georgian Muslims (L. Zurabashvili, *Traditions of interethnic relations in Georgia*, „Matcniereba“, Tbilisi, 1989, p.37).

### ***Kvemo Kartli region and the history of its settlement of Azeris***

According to the inventory of the population in 2002 in Georgia is living 284,761 Azerbaijanis (6.5% of the whole population), and 78.9% of them live in the Kvemo Kartli region<sup>3</sup>([www.statistics.ge](http://www.statistics.ge), [www.diversity.ge](http://www.diversity.ge)).

Most Azeris migrated to this region in the 16th and 17th centuries, during the migration wave from the Ottoman Empire. Although according to historical sources still in XI - XII centuries there has been a completion of indigenous with nomads in this region.

The most successful and consistent in the politic of settlement with foreign tribes was Shah Abbas I, the Iranian ruler of XVI-XVII centuries. As a result of his policy in some regions of Georgia and especially in Kvemo Kartli there appeared compact settlements of population of central and southern Iran (L. Zurabashvili, *Traditions of interethnic relations in Georgia*, „Matcniereba“, Tbilisi, 1989, p.38-39). Communication between the already fragmented nomad tribes after moving of them to the territory of Georgia was further weakened. Most of them assimilated with Azeris living closer. This bonding is facilitated also by the fact that they share a common language, similar social structure, some customs and, most importantly, religion. Over time, these ties have become stronger. And that is exactly the reason that the Muslim population of the Kvemo Kartli region perceives itself not as the Iranians or the Turks but as ethnic Azeris.( S.Dundua, Z. Abashidze, *Ethnic and Religious Identities and Civic Integration Issues in Georgia*, „Intelekti“, Tbilisi, 2009, p.72/3).

### **c) The main issues of identity formation in the ethno-religious communities**

This chapter presents the data obtained from the survey. These data is one of the main bases of results and recommendations made by us in this article. As a result of this empirical study, we can create a general idea of what the main ethnic minorities living on the territory of Georgia think about the issues of ethnic relations and problems of civic integration.

In order to conduct a quantitative study, we divided the respondents in different local areas. In the regions of Samtskhe-Javakheti, Kvemo Kartli and Mtskheta-Tbilisi 600 citizens were surveyed.

Age of the population surveyed is mostly middle. The majority of respondents live in villages and districts.

If we estimate generally the survey process, it's worth to indicate that different ethnic communities are differently met with questioning process. Ethnic majority, Georgians generally are open to interviewers and relevantly, their answers can be seen as frank and directly valuable. Most of the respondents were open and frank to interviewers and were trying to answer as open as they were able. Moreover, the general level of education, modernization and low degree of internal group level of hierarchy were mostly noticeable among ethnic Georgians.

But such situation is not common for ethnic minorities' case. Armenians relatively are open, but we can observe there some fear to answer openly. Such situation can be explained according to their relatively higher level of education and general modernization trends and traditions. Therefore we have envisaged these inaccuracies and group and check according overall results.

Azerians are on absolutely different positions. Generally the Azeries' community is the most closed and hierarchical in comparison to others. Such closeness and social hierarchy is determined by several factors: a) Big influence of Islamic cultural traditions, b) visible domination men over women and gender inequality and c) very low level of general education. Therefore, some survey results fro Azerians community are suspicious and requires more accurate analysis. That's why we tried to understand Azerians answers by comparing different answers to each other.

According to the survey, 72,5% of Azeries respondents are occupied in non public sector and their economical income is connected to private sphere. In comparison with Azerians, Armenians are relative higher involved in public sector. 23,5% of Muslim Georgians job occupation is public sector. In this case, the Orthodox Georgians are the leaders. Most of the questioned orthodox Georgians turned out involved in public sphere as the resource of economical income and job occupation.

All the respondents determine their identity according to their ethnic affiliations. Only exception are Azerians, who's identity mostly is connected to their religious affiliations, that is an indicator of high influence of Muslim cultural traditions in given community. Therefore, we can conclude, that the principal base of "national identity" among the citizens of Georgia goes to ethnic lines and affiliations.

On the question, "What does it mean to a Citizen of Georgia", with answer "Living in Motherland" with 90,7% of Muslim Georgians occupy the leading positions. Such answers have also big place as in Azerians as in Armenians answers. 83,6% of Azerians and 87, 3% of Armenians regard as Motherland. That means that all questioned ethnic groups consider Georgia as Motherland and principal place of living affiliation. Azerians are mostly weakly involved in public-political sphere. Only 0,7% of them regard themselves as active participants of civic-public living sphere.

The case of marriage issues varies according to ethnic communities. Ethnic Georgians (as Orthodox as Muslims) perefere marriage with their ethnic cobrothers. The same situation is fixed with Azerians. Only big percentage of Armenians are indifferent in marriage issues and do not worry very much about their future fiancées ethnic affiliations.

In inter ethnic communication issues, ethnic minorities are leaders with comparison of ethnic Georgians. 64,4% of Azerians and 86,4% of Armenias are connected in everyday life with people of different ethnic affiliations. Only 37,2% of Georgians are regard themselves to be connected in everyday life with citizens of non-Georgian ethnic originations.

In information getting issues, most of the respondents from ethnic minorities' side are getting the information from the informal way and their trust to informal network is relatively high with comparison of official information sources. Except of Azerians, for most of the re-

spondents, the source of information is the information that is coming from the kins and friends. Among the media sources, for most of the populations TV broadcastings are the principal source of the information. From the journals and newspapers, because of the lack of knowledge of official language, only few part of Azerians use them as the source of the information.

Most of the respondents from the ethnic minorities declare that, they do not use the official language as job language. The reason of such answers from our point of view is that, most of the polled population from the ethnic minorities side do not work in public offices and that's why the knowledge of Georgian as work language dot not have the big importance.

Most of the respondents have positive attitudes toward the official state symbols (Flag, Anthem, Coats of Arms). Surprisingly, only 83,2% of Georgians are positively minded to such symbols with strong Christian background, while 92% of Armenians and 94,3% of Azerians have absolutely positive attitudes to the symbols. It's possible that, ethnic minorities do not express their truly attitudes on symbols. Otherwise, it's not clear, why Muslim Azerians have positive attitudes to Christian symbols, while orthodox Georgians often express their negative perception of the state symbols.

Among the respondents from the ethnic minorities side , the question of character of relationships with other ethnic groups, the neighborhood type of relationships are prevailed (70%). Family type of relationships are relative high among the Armenians (5,9%). Respondents declare that, in most of the case, their ethnic or religious affiliations are not the obstacle to be prompted in civic-public sphere, if the level of knowledge of official language is appropriate.

In case marriage and preferences of elections, ethnic Georgians pay mostly attention to ones ethnic or religious affiliations. 56,4% of them think that ethnic/religious attachments of the future marriage/political candidate is very important. Ethnic minorities did not express their special interest to candidate's ethnic/religious affiliations during elections.

Georgian is the mother tongue only for ethnically Georgians. Most of the representatives of ethnic minorities are homogenous in this case and regard their ethnic tongue as mother one.

Only for few exceptions of Armenians Georgian (4,5%) and the Russian (10%) are the principal tongue of usage.

#### **d) Perspectives of Ethnic Accommodation**

It's can be said, that in post-communist Georgia, State is unable to guarantee its two fundamental functions: provision territorial sovereignty and social contract. That's why Georgian Statehood was unable to consolidate and integrate fragmented social space and transfer it into the vibrant civic space. Ethnic minorities in fact, mostly, are isolated from public-political sphere and exist under the strong internal ethnic hierarchy. Actually, the situation is not satisfactory from the perspectives of civic accommodation. Ethnic minorities live along with Georgian dominant group, but the impulses of cohabitation and cooperation are quite low. In fact we have two parallel societies. Of course there are some degree of cooperation between ethnic majority and minorities, but mostly such relationships are based on vertical lines of mobility and do not stimulate horizontal lines of communications. Ethnic minorities are ill equipped with the instruments (low level of knowledge of official language, low level of information on public life, low level in creation of public goods and etc.) of successful public-political integration, that, in its turn, do not give them chances to convert to active citizens of Georgia. The reality has been more intensified by the compact and rural housing of ethnic minorities with very low level of urbanization. Among the ethnic minorities, who populate the urban areas, the level of civic integration and sense of political loyalty to Georgian Statehood is much higher. Rural populated ethnic minorities, thanks to low level of institutionalization and weak economic performance of the Country in general, mostly are separated from the core pivot of development of Countries development. The fact has been adequately reflected in minorities everyday life. Moreover, the minorities are populated along with borders with their ethnic motherland that give them the additional stimulus to feel themselves more affiliated with their ethnic co-brothers than with their political motherland. The level of loyalty of minorities to the countries of their ethnic origins is much higher. Unfortunately, political motherland is unable to guarantee the strong sense of civic/political loyalty and identity among their non-Georgian citizens.

Accordingly, we can indicate to several factors that stimulate the ethno-confessional alienation process.

a) Low level of modernization and urbanization causes social closeness and too low level of social mobility.

b) Cultural and informative alienation. Because of closeness of cultural developments, one ethnic group is indifferent to its neighbor group's cultural achievements and vice versa.

c) Factual economic alienation and primacy of manorial economy over the modern free market and goods exchange.

d) civic alienation. Weak civic institutional network does not guarantee the vibrant cooperation on nongovernmental level and accordingly articulation of private interests.

e) Alienation on political-institutional level. Weak democratic institution does not guarantee the conversion of ethnic groups into one strong political community.

From our point of view, Georgian State should take several steps to reduce the sense of the ethnic identity and stimulate the civic one as among with Georgian dominant ethnic group as among ethnic minorities:

- 1) Creation of stable democratic environment is the primary task and base for further successful institutional development.
- 2) Improvement the local self-government, in order to stimulate the development of political processes on local level and strengthen the interests to be included into civic-political space.
- 3) Educational system should guarantee the relevant knowledge official language to ethnic minorities and especially the youth part of it.
- 4) Promotion of interethnic cultural projects to encourage the ethnic groups to intercultural exchanges.
- 5) Strengthening the process of urbanization, in order to reduce the primordial affiliations of minorities and gradually replace them with relatively modern ones.

## **Conclusion**

According to the research we can conclude and indicate to several factors, which play decisive role on identity formation process:



- a) Country generally is halfly modernized and primordial types in social and public-political relationships is quite high;
- b) Inter alienation and cleavages principally we have on social level. Therefore, the political interlineations of the minorities can be considered as expression and continuation of social experience;
- c) Weak democratic institutions the obstacle of the successful civic integration;
- d) There is no general agreement (as on formal as on informal level) about the integration policies as among official as ethnic minorities.

As is seen from above, the formation of 'nation' as a community of common solidarity grounded on civic affiliations is a one of the primary task of post – soviet Georgia, where the 'national' loyalty and 'state loyalty' are contradictory phenomena, because of strong ethnic categories presence in politics and public discourse.

But the problem is that, what kind of strategy has to adopt state officially for successful nation-building: "Assimilation", 'Differentiation' or 'Integration'? What kind of strategy would work better in order to construct strong 'national' boundaries? We wrote on spirits of 'Assimilation' and 'Differentiation' strategies, but wrote nothing on 'Integration' strategy, which from our point of view is more workable and realistic then the other two ones. "Integration" is a strategy that provides to bring together under one political loyalty the different segments of the society on one side and to guarantee the minority cultures existence and protection on another.

Therefore, from our point of view firstly, Georgia has to formulate the new governmental strategies to provide the unity of the country under the civility and civil categories. Without it it's really hard to imagine how Georgia will manage to become a consolidated democracy. Such unity surely must be completed with new institutional arrangements, which would be providers of free political participation. Without free participation, strong democratic institutional arrangements and network free market economy, which provide the intensive inter-communication among the different groups, it seems unrealistic to make from Georgia strong, modern nation-state.

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# PROBLEMS OF WORLD AND STATE POLICY

## The USA Foreign Policy Against Russia under G. W. Bush's Administration

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### **Abstract**

This article will focus on the aspects of US foreign policy towards Russia, especially the relation between G. W. Bush's and Putin's administrations. We tried to describe the conflict lines in the policy of these superpowers as NATO Enlargement, missile defence and influence in the Caucasus territory. In some aspects of the foreign policy Russia and United States are cooperating, such as war against the terrorism, in some aspects they act as political rivals, for example in energy policy.

### **Key words**

*US foreign policy, Russia foreign policy, Bush, Putin, NATO enlargement, missile defense, ABM Treaty, Caucasus territory, National Security Strategy, energy policy*

After the Second World War, USA started the Cold war against its ideological and strategic enemy – the Soviet Union [Tökölyová 2006:475]. Development of modern technologies brought the arms race and fears of nuclear war were constantly growing. Under this situation, the USA had come to understanding that a stable military relation with the Soviet Union is possible to be reached only via mutual limitation. Thus, at the beginning of the 70s, the space was open for ABM agreement (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty), SALT and START Treaties. Dissolution of the USSR in 1991 caused that the USA started to feel nearly invulnerable and took over the role of hegemon while this position was not granted only by a significant primacy in military area but also by its economic dynamics [Brzezinski 2004:21-23]. After disso-

lution of the USSR, Russia became a successor state, it took over the position of the UN Security Council permanent member and since 1991 Russia is invited to every G7 meeting. Such condition, under which Russia was seen as an important actor *“armed with nuclear weapons but with untouched thinking of superpower “* [Trenin 2006], was in favour of exertation of the Russian interests. Since then, Russia struggles to retrieve its reputation in any price and asserts itself as a country still having great influence on the international politics. In this sense, it is interesting to focus mainly on that period which is considered by many international relations experts as one of the most interesting in the Moscow –Washington mutual relations development, namely period after G. W. Bush assumed the presidential office until the election of D. Medvedev for president of the Russian Federation. This period is characteristic, though, by two strong personalities, by G. W. Bush and V. Putin whose activities meant many turn-points in the world politics.

In the period when George W. Bush took the office, relations between both countries had already been under tension for a longer time. In Russia since March 2000 Vladimir Putin was official president in the office who tried to make position of Russia stronger at the expense of the US interests. Bush’s forerunner *“president Bill Clinton many times cut cold Russian faults, as for example extensive sell of weapons to Iran and China“*[Cohen 2001] and therefore, Russian representatives could actively participate at extension of sphere of their influence. New American president proved enormous interest in foreign policy which under him led worked on principle of unilateralism being in a sharp contrast to Putin’s multipolarity so vehemently defended. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the world society was characterised by the US dominance. Bush’s goal was exactly to harden this dominance and spread democracy to the most ever number of countries of the world. Putin’s assume of the office meant, on the contrary, return to the authoritarian tradition of Russian tsars. Iron hand of the president should give the country respect which Russia desired so long. Putin’s presidential politics was, after he took the office, characterized by struggle to be included into the western system, but in the second period of his administration *“Russian representatives left the inclusion into the West and started to create their own system centred in Moscow.“* [Trenin 2006]. Putin tried to raise the Russian status by personal meetings with representatives of the most important states of the world (he met President Clinton five times), through visiting not only western countries but also visiting China, Japan, Mongolia, and

communist Cuba and North Korea. Moreover, he did not omit also small countries of Asia which are in the interest centre of Russia as Uzbekistan and others [Cohen 2001]. This strategy brought success to Putin and as an official representative he had established a wide diplomatic net. USA welcomed Putin's election to the office. After the first summit with Russian president G. Bush said: *"I looked into his eyes and I saw his soul."*

<sup>1</sup> During the two electoral terms he strived to make a good personal relation but not always succeeded. Russia also pragmatically refused confrontation with the USA in issues which did not jeopardise its positions. In the domestic policy it focused on enforcement of necessary economic reforms.

The 2002 National Security Strategy was formed under specific conditions, under September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001. A year after these terrorist attacks, G. Bush in the introduction of the doctrine refers to new mortal challenges from rough states and terrorists. Thus, he directly indicates that today's enemy represents a bigger threat for the USA than the Soviet Union in the Cold War times. USA and Russia are not strategic opponents anymore, however, feelings of mutual mistrust are still present in their political elites. Their politics, at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, many times got into situations when they cooperated on the one side, but on the other side there occurred situations when their policies confronted each other. A key to understanding of their mutual relations is the fact that positions of the USA and Russia in some geopolitical areas were overlapping. Such were mainly areas of Central and Eastern Europe, area of Asia –mainly area of Caspian sea and Central Asia. The main difference in the policies of the both countries lies mainly in the fact that the Russian Federation is not in the centre of the US attention and Russia, on the contrary, devotes great attention to USA in all the areas of its interests.

Also Russia, similarly to the USA, started to assert conclusions of the new foreign –policy conception adopted by the Security Council of the Russian Federation called "The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation" of 10<sup>th</sup> January 2000. This document was introduced as re-elaborated version of the 1997 Concept<sup>2</sup> probably to declare continuity of Jelzin's and Putin's politics [Sokov 2004]. The National Security Concept is a document to the

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<sup>1</sup> G.W. Bush's words after his first summit with president Putin on 16<sup>th</sup> June 2001. Later this statement was paraphrased for example by John McCain in his electoral campaign when he said: "If I had looked into Putin's eyes, I would see only three letters there: KGB!" – the author's note.

<sup>2</sup> National Security Concept of the Russian Federation of 17<sup>th</sup> December 1997 – the author's note.

U.S. NSS, its structure as well as the contents are markedly different, however, it gives the information on Putin's foreign policy and on his vision of the international surrounding set-up, as in the Bush's doctrine on the American politics. However, on the other hand, this Concept may not be seen only as Putin's private expression of his ideas and thoughts, because as written by Celeste A. Wallander of Harvard University, *"this is a result of talks and consensus among the substantive part of Russian National security elite."* [Wallander 2000:1].

The Concept summed –up the draft of Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. The new conception dealt with bilateral Russian –American relations, supported assertion of ideology of creation of multipolar world, it defined dominance of the west states led by the USA which prop themselves upon military power and evade principles of international law while enforcing their interests. Moreover, it contains also struggle for extension of military – political blocks by NATO, mainly close to the borders with Russia. Concept, however, refuses all these processes and in relations to them it points the main roles of the domestic and foreign politics of Russia. In the foreign-policy area it focuses mainly on the need to ensure and keep the strategic nuclear stability, on elimination and limitation of the US influence in the global politics [Krejčí 2009:306].

Putin's support of the American fight against terrorism was, inter alia, motivated by presumption of more moderate position of the USA and other western countries towards the activities of Russian armed forces in Chechnya. Vladimír Putin was the first foreign statesman who after September 11<sup>th</sup> offered his sympathies to G. Bush and promised support to him [Krejčí 2009:306]. Russia faced and still is facing innumerable attacks by the terrorist and separatist groups from Chechnya. In the recent period, the most significant ones were terrorist action in Theatre Dubrovka (2002), events in Beslan (2004) and at airport in Moscow (2011). However, the rest of the world sees the situation in Chechnya through adherence to human rights and freedoms, concerning the Chechen terrorists G. Bush said that: *"These people were murderers, like those who came to America. There is the same threat – a every time when some want to scarify innocent lives for so-called thing, it is necessary to settle them recklessly"* [Balabán 2003:18-20]. Russians managed that Chechen terrorists were categorised as "international terrorists", and this helps them to acquire an excuse for "counter-terrorist operation" in Chechnya before the world public.

### *Missile defence*

When the USA released their plan to extend their missile defence shield in Poland and in the Czech Republic, this information evoked big turmoil not only in the touched countries. Russia immediately responded and promised the revenge. The USA marked their worries to be absurd and the reason for their decision should be mainly security as both the military facilities should become a part of integrated inter-continental defence shield against intercontinental ballistic missiles, know as GMD (Ground-Based Midcourse Defence). The GMD program was current just from the beginning of the 90s but the decisive political support was gained just after G. Bush assumed his presidential office. USA returned to the idea of national missile defence under war in Persian Gulf during which Iraq launched Scuds against Israel. Due to this, in 2001 Bush did not hesitate to unilaterally terminate the ABM missile treaty signed with Russia in 1972, while the ABM comprised the base for all disarmament initiatives from the times of the Cold War. Russia expressed its great reservations to the whole matter and claimed that these systems concerned the national security of Russia. The mentioned revenge should represent modernisation of the present Russian rockets to such level not to be hit by any missile system. At the same time, it terminated the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and it planned to deploy its Iskander rockets in Kaliningrad enclave where the U.S. missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic were within the grasp of them. Finally, the whole situation was solved on 17<sup>th</sup> September 2009 by the USA when President B. Obama announced that plans for the missile defence complex were scrapped. Thus he maybe restrained from restoring the Cold War.

### *The Caucasus and the post-Soviet states*

Transcaucasia is a territory of contention and collision of a number of nations. New states which were established after dissolution of the Soviet Union are the UN and OBSE member states but activities of these organisations loose their effects there. Russia is still superior power there. Russians, through their politics, watch maintenance of their military –political dominance in this area struggling to avoid penetration of the American influence there. However, Turkey does not hide its interest in Azerbaijan, and also influence of Iran may not be excluded. Moreover, also USA has its strategic interests here. These are concentrated mainly in the area of Caspian Sea where great sources of oil and natural gas are located. Just the legal chaos at defining the Caspian Sea status is like a burning fuse as anyone who en-

sures majority in the oil pipeline system for himself gains then an influence not only in the Caucasus and in the Central Asia but also in the global political sphere [Dick-Dick 2000:163-165].

In 2001, document called “National Energy Policy” was adopted in the USA which states that: *“concentration of the world oil production into any region of the world is a potential threat for market stability which is not favourable for the producers nor to the consumers”* [Krejčí 2009:311-312]. Thus, Transcaucasia falls into sphere of preferred interests of Russia as well as of the USA but also of Turkey and Iran.

### **NATO ENLARGEMENT**

Another source of fears for Russia comprises NATO enlargement which is perceived as a stroke to position of Russia as a superpower. Russians see the enlargement as an attempt for its isolation. *“The first wave of enlargement itself did not present a problem. Majority of Russians was prepared to accept NATO enlargement as unlucky but inoffensive change – until crisis in Kosovo in 1999”*[Simes 2007]. *“Putin, who in March 2000 outlined that Russia may be once interested in entering NATO alliance, later the disavowed this possibility”* [Cohen 2001]. and Russia retained its status as pertained since 1997<sup>3</sup>.

Notwithstanding that Moscow accepted the first wave of accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999, much more turmoil in the Russian political sphere was evoked by another wave of enlargement in 2004. Eastern Europe countries which were to become NATO member countries represented a natural border between Russia and American sphere of influence. From the Western point of view, this enlargement was a positive asset for all the countries as the enlargement of the Alliance to the East meant that in the future Russia would have to consider every threat and use of power in this region, and on the other side countries, as Poland, may not abuse any weakness of Russia and thus provoke instability in the region [Jackson-Sorensen 2007:82-83]. It was partially reduced by the fact that Russia became a member of the “Partnership for Peace” and a member of the Permanent NATO – Russia Council that was established in 2002 at Rome summit in and substituted the former Permanent Joint Council. This body was given a number of decision-making and consultation

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<sup>3</sup> On 27<sup>th</sup> May 1997 the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed, there was adopted principle 16+1 (later as 19+1) upon which Russia was informed about every security challenge as well as about every decision made by NATO –the author’s note.



powers that managed to satisfy the Russian representatives. Establishment of the Council represented the beginning of friendly relations based on harmonisation of the security programs. However, according to Dmitrij Trenin, director of the Moscow Carnegie Centre, *“the Council is only a silent course (seminar) of technical cooperation working on the NATO’s side”* [Trenin 2006].

The Russians realised that they do not have such economic potential that would prevent from the enlargement process as the enlargement is not targeted at Russia with any impulse given by Russia. The core problem, however, is enlargement of this alliance in states of the former Soviet Union, mainly Georgia and Ukraine. NATO has already been taking dialogue with Georgia about its NATO membership, Americans train Georgian army and act in state institutions, cooperation at realisation of reforms and modernisation of the army, they support Georgia militarily. Until 2005, two last Russian bases were in Georgia, in Batumi and Achalkalaki. However, the domination of Russia at the territory of the former soviet republics is the past, Russia still enjoys significant influence and close ties. In opinion of Moscow, Russia has the right – even obligation – to protect interests of the ethnic Russians there. Putin even identified the protection of the fellow –countrymen’ rights to be the “national priority” [Tarasovič 2005:384-386]. After military intervention of Russia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the US - Russia relations got to the lowest level in the last 25 years. Situation is similar also in Ukraine. The USA presupposed that Russia would accept that its former republics would get -out of its sphere of influence and would not interfere into the politics in the region anymore. But it did not happen so, Moscow fights by other instruments; it uses oil and gas as weapons. Ukraine is pretty dependent on energetic sources from Russia, and a matter of Ukraine’s integration remains a sharp sketch of the Central –European politics and Russia-American relations.

Russia, when Putin assumed the president office, managed in crisis moments convince the USA that it is able to act as a reliable partner. It was proved mainly in the fight against the common enemy – terrorism. The Russian president, after having assumed the office, had influenced the Russian politics in the manner to make the relations towards the USA acceptable, however, not always called trouble-free. Russian politics has become more predictable and acceptable due to the president. The Obama’s administration declared that is wishing to find a new way of relations with Russia. The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton gave a

symbolic “reset” push-button to Sergey Lavrov, Russian foreign affairs minister that should be an indication of a new beginning. Russia has lost its position of the global superpower and has too low potential to recover its former position in the world [USA-Rusko. CTRL-ALT-DEL 2009]. Geopolitical strategists, however, see Russia as the country which always will influence the international politics. Return of Russia to the top superpower position is possible only in case Russia becomes an economic superpower, too.

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# INFLUENCE OF MASS MEDIA ON POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

## Role of Mass Media in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

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### **Abstract**

The presented paper is to analyse and think little bit about role of mass media (i.e. role of media with wide public effects) on decision-making in foreign policy. We choose CNN as a case study under analysing so called CNN effect with chosen aspects of its real power and influence of the decision – making.

### **Key words:**

*foreign policy, decision making, broadcasting, mass media, international system*

### **INTRODUCTION**

Issue and research of CNN effect is multidisciplinary being well discussed mostly since 90s of 20<sup>th</sup> century, after the Gulf War in the context of war propaganda. There are many theoreticians and experts analysing and trying to prove its existence, i.e. to prove real effects of TV broadcasting on political decisions. However, empirical verification is not easy, and therefore the results of the research may (and do) vary also depending on the branch of science (e.g. public opinion theories, theories of international relations, war-time propaganda or communication theories [Robinson 1999: 4-7]). Therefore, as given in this paper, we can distinguish more types of the CNN effect because, as mentioned above, this issue comprises all the relevant aspects identifying a degree of mass media influence on political representatives and

the public. In general, all these approaches seek and analyse how 24/7 news broadcasting can have (and whether really has) any impact on political decisions of the top levels. The main argumentation is that this effect can “happen” mainly in foreign reporting when such media choose the event from one aspect, i.e. from very narrow aspect, and thus push the audience (public as well as the top representatives) to feel, think and decide from a very narrow aspect, being too oppressed many times by scenes full of emotions or just evoking negative emotions [available at: <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cnneffect.asp>].

### **MEDIA AS ONE OF PILLARS IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING**

Since the post-war period role of mass media and its influence on international surrounding has been constantly growing also in the international relations between states and other international actors (governmental and non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations). Originally the radio, then TV broadcasting and now predominantly Internet enable direct communication with a public of another state/states, they became channels of international communication as well as a tool of influence on decision makers. Therefore, mass media, in any of its forms, can be considered as one of the pillars in foreign policy decision-making, mainly in propaganda if understood as a systemic activity of one state targeted at the public of another state. This must be considered as a pure political activity not breaching law of such targeted country [Krejčí 2010: 419].

Naturally, however some scholars and experts distinguish between objective and virtual reality as under influence of globalization in all its aspects, it may be seen for the first sight that mass media cannot have any direct and deep influence on foreign policy decision-making – they are not formalised and institutionalised anyhow in political systems (as bodies of state administration or statesmen at all). Therefore, keeping the argumentation line that mass media definitely have power and instruments to influence FP decision-making, we are to argue in this paper that this must be seen from the target point of view. It means who the propaganda (in any of its forms – white, grey or black) is targeted at. The answer is – to the public of the given country, of course. Wide public, ordinary people, i.e. those who elect their representatives to make critical decisions in foreign policy. And in this line, this paper is to prove, that CNN can be taken as an example of how the mass media with a well set strat-

egy may influence statesmen and formal institutions in their decisions, not a decision-making process as a set of rules.

The people, i.e. those who elect their representatives to sit in the formal bodies and institutions and their relation to the mass media comprise, in our opinion, a critical point in relation of media and public as they are crucial for relation of public and politics, and thus public and media in the globalised era. This relation is mirrored into situation and conditions called **medial imperialism** defined especially by an export of TV programs, foreign ownership and control over medial branches, medial commercialism under so called public interest. This shows that media are controlled and governed by profit (thus by ownership) putting emphasis rather on emotions, drama of situations shown than to true and full information on the case. This could be seen recently in broadcasting during the “Arab spring” when a claim that “foreign policy propaganda is the most successful only if it sensitively reacts on the existing internal problems of the state” was proved [Krejčí 2010: 422].

However being weak in proves, it can be stated that media dispose with a great power over the public and they gradually became one of the instruments of political socialisation of people, i.e. giving them exemplary situations with exemplary reactions and effects. The only way how to indirectly verify this claim is a public opinion survey.

However, politicians who make critical FP decisions are also targeted and exposed to media of any kind, and thus we may claim them to be influenced in their decisions, more-less. As proved by the last development in the USA in relation to Syria and Obama’s decision on invasion, the mass media enhanced (or still enhancing) by the public pushed Obama to wait for Congress to decide. This can be illustrated by Kennan’s words:

*But if American policy from here on out, particularly policy involving the uses of our armed forces abroad, is to be controlled by popular emotional impulses, and particularly ones provoked by the commercial television industry, then there is no place - not only for myself, but for what have traditionally been regarded as the responsible deliberative organs of our government, in both executive and legislative branches” [Kennan 1993].*

Mass media provide the governments to use propaganda as “politically targeted activity possibly aimed mainly at pressure to change the government policy orientation through public, eventually to reach change of its political elites or the state regime” [Krejčí 2010: 419].

So, it can be stated that propaganda using the strong power of modern mass media has changed into instrument of foreign policy - making, besides soft and hard powers, trade including. For example, Nye considers more impacts of 24/7 broadcasting giving 24/7 information on public opinion while putting it into one line with foreign policy and diplomacy [Nye 1999], contrasting in some aspects with Robinson saying:

*This perception was in turn reinforced by the end of the bipolar order and what many viewed as the collapse of the old anti-communist consensus which—it was argued—had led to the creation of an ideological bond uniting policy makers and journalists. Released from the ‘prism of the Cold War’ 4 journalists were, it was presumed, freer not just to cover the stories they wanted but to criticise US foreign policy as well [Robinson 1999: 301].*

Undoubtedly, mass media comprise a key communication and information channel nowadays as they provide the citizens with information all over the world to their living rooms with no travelling needed. They are channels of communication as they also give a room for discussion by inviting experts, politicians, victims, and the others giving time to an impersonal “face- to –face” discussions and communication. Here, it is necessary to note, that the main role of media – to inform and call a discussion – has two sides. One is comprised by the public, and another by elites of the given country. It is their image, their visions that are many times spread among the people just by the media of any kind (the most effective is TV broadcasting because of best emotional effects through pictures used [Bahador 2008]). Therefore, we can state that mass media has developed into an unofficial instrument of FP policy- making [McQuile 2010: 539-540]. One of the well – known stories confirming an enormous power of TV broadcasting is that of Tariq Aziz, former Iraqi minister of Foreign Affairs, who after being questioned on the latest development in Bush’s decisions, answered that he had also watched CNN.

As given by Krejčí, the second half of the past century meant a sharp bipolar confrontation enhanced by development of telecommunications leading to interstate propaganda marked by growth of systemic ideological confrontation mirrored in more targeted and complex

campaigns, realistic targets using knowledge from psychology, social psychology and other related sciences [2010: 419]. Due to spread of influence of mass media, propaganda got typical features of a fight, i.e. strategy, tactics and logistics. This is because the “moving information” makes the recipient (i.e. an ordinary man sitting in his living room) directly pulled into the action, situation, reality and is confronted with his own feelings [Thussu, Freedman 2003: 118]. Therefore, another critical parameter must be seen, in this context, in the role of mass media (in this case a TV broadcasting media) to select the “hot” topics to show, to bring and thus to make them talking about. Naturally, there are many events in the world every day and no media is able to show them all. This “imperfection” gives the media another power, power to choose which topics will be discussed as concerned to be important. As provided by McQuail [2010], agenda-setting is one of the most important roles of mass media. They follow various criteria considering attractiveness of the topic or geographical distance of the “hot” place from their recipients.

Modern kinds of mass media having critical effects of foreign policy decision- making are not only TV stations (as CNN, Al-Jazeera, BBC News, British United Press, etc.) but also press agencies (as Agence-France-Presse, Reuters, Associated Press, etc.) as well as internet which allows breaking through information embargo. However, this moment is closely interlinked with a fact that this causes also that the power of the government to manipulate this net is growing too (e.g. in China or Wikileaks in USA). Piers Robinson in his study *The CNN effect: can the news media drive foreign policy?* says that

*The phrase ‘CNN effect’ encapsulated the idea that real-time communications technology could provoke major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to global events* [Robinson 1999: 301]

So, he considers the CNN effect, one of the critical aspects in foreign policy decision-making (in this case on humanitarian intervention) is taken as a mean for getting support of the public opinion. However, CNN effect needs for its occurrence various aspects, as willingness of the political elites to use mass media as one of the tools for influencing the public opinion and thus the decision making as well as willingness of mass media to “process” the reality to influence the public opinion [Edwards 2001: 60-62].




We analyze global mass media as a part of international system, where they take central position as channels of information, communication as well as of influence on other international actors, especially countries, governmental organizations and global corporations. But we should remember that these relations are mutual. Mass media need financial support and profits which are given by economic corporations, and not rarely by the governments. Mass media comprise part of a free market. They have rather commercial and not social character, except social media, especially internet. That is why they also represent economic interests of their owners and sponsors or present political strategy of their political principals.

So, their activity at either local or international scenes is not selfless. Ewa Polak noticed that in the globalization era “owners of concentrated mass media have huge power over the electors’ choices as well as decisions of politicians. In the place of reveal of propaganda, they became channels of propaganda. And most of them instead of informing, just try to justify and convince people for politics of elites. Diversity of mass media is only illusion because most of them are owned by various owners” [Polak 2009: 184-185]. In the current world the one who has media has also a power. If you have global mass media or at least if you can influence them, you have access to global power.

Global media comprise an efficient factor of changes in international system. They are able to force decision-makers to make the expected decision. Good example of influence of global mass media on governments was a hysteria accomplishing appearance of the alleged pandemic of virus A/H1 N1 co-called *swine influenza*. These interactions concerned the following five types of international actors as illustrated by Graph 1 below: (1) global mass media which inform about the pandemic, and fanned the flame of global hysteria and indirectly forced (2) governments activity what in general meant a purchase of vaccine, (3) governmental organization (WHO) which monitored situation and gave some recommendations, (4) non-governmental organizations which presented role of independent experts as well as (5) pharmaceutical companies which thought out and sold the vaccine. This example pictures two things. Firstly, mutual relations, and secondly, the power of global mass media. If no such element present, the governments probably would not buy the vaccine which was expensive, prepared very quickly without any proper clinical researches and with unknown effectiveness and side effects. Governments of many countries, e.g.

German (50 million ampoules), French (94 million ampoules), British (130 million ampoules) paid billions dollars for them [available at: <http://www.rp.pl/artykul/33,414528-Kto-skorzystal-na-grypowej-histerii.html>]. The only winner - pharmaceutical companies. But they would not fulfil their aims – to sell the vaccine – without global mass media and their influence on public and governments. But media can do more. Currently, in the world where information over-crossing the state borders, media can change political regimes, initiate revolutions or destabilize political systems.

**Graph 1. Global mass media in international system.**



Source: authors.

**CNN EFFECT AS INFLUENCING DECISION- MAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY**

However, being not the only news TV in the USA even world-wide, CNN still enjoys specific position in news broadcasting as proven by having impact on the world decision-making speeding up the governments’ decisions [available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UMd4AHZ46-k>], called CNN effect. They reported on Challenger space shuttle, fall of the Berlin wall or attempt on John Paul’s II. life, ...keeping Ted Turner’s motto “be always first on the scene” when one picture earns more than

thousands words.

As provided by Robinson, *the new technologies appeared to reduce the scope for calm deliberation over policy, forcing policy-makers to respond to whatever issue journalists focused on* [Robinson 1999: 302] proving that spread of non-stop broadcasting from the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century gradually brought influence of mass media over foreign policy, especially in the pre-war times or war-times (e.g. decision on intervention to “solve” a conflict in another country, see examples as Vietnam, Somalia, Iraq or Syria recently). Such medial influence on policy making is present not only in case of starting the intervention, but as in the Iraqi case also to stop deployment of the forces or to stop the intervention at all.

Events that made CNN world- known to most viewers was undoubtedly the Gulf War in 1991 when CNN reporters brought “live” war to the living rooms around the world conveyed from Baghdad. People could watch the fighter planes launching from aircraft carriers and how they attack the Iraqi missile targets or how their reporters interview Saddam Hussein.

One of the best examples for providing spread of mass media role in decision- making the example of Gulf war in 1991 can be used. This war made CNN more famous as this was the very first TV new station bringing “live” scenes from the battlefield from the very first day. Therefore, this war is said many times to be “**the very first live war ever**”. It was CNN broadcasting worldwide after other Iraqi transceivers were destroyed by US forces. Thus, the CNN station having its own technical support stayed in the country and changed its war coverage into 24/7 and “wars came to our living rooms”.

This new phenomenon, a non-stop war reporting started by CNN, opened a discussion on involvement of media. One of the “opening” pieces in this discussion was article by George F. Kennan: *Somalia, Through a Glass Darkly* in The New York Times in 1993 discussing the role and responsibility of media and their involvement in the current foreign policy as a reaction on humanitarian intervention in Somalia. Saying that *I regard this move as a dreadful error of American policy* [Kenan 1993; see also: Krejčí 2010: 419] was later commented by Robinson saying that *media coverage of suffering people in Somalia had usurped traditional policy making channels triggering an ill thought out intervention* [Robinson 1999: 303]. These words finally open discussion on the matter and gave a rise to CNN effect theory.

Term CNN effect was coined by Pentagon as it began referring to the pressure of continuous coverage on foreign policy. However, the aim of the fastest news to CNN for any cost has earned many a criticism pointing at particular bias and inaccuracy of the information provided. Anyhow, CNN is generally considered as pioneer in non-stop (24/7) coverage as it literally brought war and crucial world moments to the households.

As stated above, there are various types and models provided in CNN effect area. For example, Freedman in his study called *Victims and victors: Reflections on the Kosovo war* [Freedman 2000: 339] setting the CNN to war surrounding provides three types of CNN effect, *classical CNN effect*, *bodybags effect*<sup>1</sup> and *bullying effect* leading to loss of public support because of great violence happened in the conflict shown [Gilboa 2005: 30].

Robinson in his book *The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention* provides model of media-policy interaction which requires various conditions to arise, mainly emotional framing interlinked with critical view of the governmental politics in the conditions of political uncertainty [2002]. As provided by Waters in this context, summarising Robinson's approach [...] *the CNN effect is less prominent than a more dynamic intersection of factors that come into play in the policy process. Six case studies of humanitarian interventions .....(in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda)....lead him to conclude that the effects of media coverage are only one of a series of factors contributing to policy decisions, and are likely to be related to the type of policy and context within which it is introduced* [2004].

Another approach and systemisation is given by Livingstone in his study when providing the following three types: *accelerant effect*, *the above mentioned agenda-setting effect*, and *an impediment effect* [1997: 2]. These approaches were later developed by various theoreticians (e.g. Gilboa). They vary in their impact on the decision-making process in foreign policy itself whilst the accelerant effect can be considered to effect the decision-making process primarily putting into a sharp contrast fundamental features of the decision-making process and news reporting - time, i.e. FP decision-making process requires well enough time to take decision whilst 24/7 news broadcasting on the given issue struggles for maximal short-

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<sup>1</sup> The so-called body-bag effect assumes a causal link between rising military casualties and declining public opinion support. It is widely believed to have contributed to US withdrawals from Vietnam, Beirut and Somalia, by pressuring government decision makers to change policy. See at: [http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p\\_mla\\_apa\\_research\\_citation/0/7/0/2/3/p70236\\_index.html](http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/0/2/3/p70236_index.html)

ening of the time when bringing fresh and newest information, and thus pushing the politicians into quick acts by interviewing them all the time. This is disabling the politician – and we consider this as the most significant “media” effect on FP decision-making – to act and decide just after considering all the information and data and considering all the impacts and effects of such decision being under pressure of the awaiting public. A failure in prompt reaction thus may evoke in the politicians a failure in opinion polls, or even in elections. However, we can state that this may lead not only to “not well thought-out” decision but sometimes eventually can push the conflict parties to one table to negotiate.

This feature is interlinked with agenda setting, i.e. ability of mass media to set the agenda and thus to change the priority of the event, i.e. to set what is necessary to be spoken out opening also TV debates in some cases also involving the public directly in TV shows.

## **CONCLUSION**

Undoubtedly, media have profound influence on all the aspects of decision-making in politics, economy and military. It is impossible to exactly state what is more important in this relation – politics or mass media. In these globalized times when also new forms of media are widely spread (as internet) it is impossible for official representatives not to react on any public pressure. And this is the role of media – to evoke and also calm down the emotion risen up under some events happened. As this paper showed, there are many approaches on role of media on decision-making process, on the politics at all. However, it is clear that Vietnam war started and then the Gulf war pushed role of media to a new age while it is needed to say that a great size of risk can be seen in moment of media ownership opening the room for “abusing” the public providing the selected and purposeful information. Therefore, it is highly welcomed that there are more influential TV broadcasting channels worldwide providing balance among the opinions.

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# THE PARTY OF THE PEOPLE WITH THE ORIGIN IN THE TELEVISION OF THE PEOPLE

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## **Abstract:**

Romania is going through a process of excessive politicization of the media: TV journalists do not hide their own political views anymore; a large number of TV celebrities joined political parties or even founded their own party. Dan Diaconescu is the media owner who transformed his television into his own political party: People's Party - Dan Diaconescu (PPDD). In this article I will show how populist leaders are born with the help of media trusts and I will underline the way Romanian journalists take advantages of their image and trust capital in order to become politicians. Print media, television and, most recently, blogs and social media are the new origins of the political parties in a more and more polarized society.

## **Key words:**

*populism, new media, blogs, personalization, television*

## **Introduction**

In a time of international financial crisis combined with a Parliament legitimacy crisis, Romania, as many other countries in its region, is going through a process of increasing personalization of the political power. The citizens have lost their trust both in the representative democracy, as well as in a political class stained by continuous corruption scandals. The citizens are asking the political leaders to solve the economic and social issues, not their democratic institutions (the Government or the Parliament). This generates populist actions, which is in the interest of the populist leaders, who pose into Saviour leaders.

The political communication is overwhelmingly present on the Romanian TV stations. According to an IRES study [Petrisor 2012], in 2011 most of the Romanians got informed regarding politics from TV – 81,8% –, while only 7% took their political information from the internet. The printed newspapers were preferred as source of political information by 6,2%

of the Romanians, while 2,1% used the radio as the main information source on politics. Insignificant percentages below 1% have pointed the discussions with family, friends, colleagues, or other sources as main political information source.

The high TV consumption is one of the reasons that determined many politicians to purchase TV licenses or private news TV stations. Some TV owners like Dan Diaconescu have transformed themselves into party leaders and created political parties based on the TV stations they owned: Dan Diaconescu's OTV became the party called PPDD.

Other Romanian politicians use the TV stations where they are owners or shareholders for their private interest (the case of Dan Voiculescu and Intact Media Group). In 2012 an increasing number of journalists have entered politics and have run for general elections using the image and trust capital they had earned in their journalistic career: Dan Diaconescu, Cristina Țopescu, or Gabriela Vranceanu-Firea, to name a few.

As I have already showed in the chapter *Romania, tara userilor fericiti (Romania, the country of happy internet users)* in Sandru & Bocancea's book *Mass-media si democratia in Romania postcomunista (Mass-media and democracy in post-communist Romania)* in Romania, the presidentialization of democracy led to polarizing the society and the mass-media political-wise. The presidentialization of the parliamentary regime occurred during President Traian Basescu's two mandates between 2004 - 2012. The Opposition unsuccessfully tried to suspend him twice through the 2007 and 2012 referendums.

Since the referendum for suspending President Traian Basescu on July 29<sup>th</sup> 2012, the Romanian society seems to have divided in two sides: those who support Traian Basescu and those who want him to resign. Certainly, there are also those who act indifferent or neutral regarding this dispute. The public space polarization is visible through the process of concentrating mass-media in the hands of the two sides: pro and against the President. The audiences (especially people who usually consume political information) have been reallocated between the two antagonistic sides.

### **Mass-media landscape and the political owners**

The media trusts in Romania have been functioning based on the polarizing logic in the past years. A human rights organization – ActiveWatch - observes in its 2012 FreeEx Report that “the extreme polarization of the press around the political factions was transparently undertaken by certain journalists who played the role of party propagandists, rather than that of



critical observers of the power structures. The <<incestuous>> relationship between press and politics has become such a commonplace phenomenon that no one was surprised by the fact that an enormous number of media people ran in the 2012 parliamentary elections on behalf of political parties. The situation confirms the excessive politicization that infested the media industry and merely contributes to a decrease in the credibility of the press.

In the new legislature, we encounter a number of former journalists or media owners in the Parliament, including: Sorin Rosca Stanescu (National Liberal Party, PNL senator, former manager and shareholder of the Ziuva daily and other publications), Gabriela Vranceanu-Firea (Conservatory Party, PC senator, former National Romanian TV news anchor and moderator at Antena1 and Antena3 TV), Tudor Barbu (PPDD deputy, former OTV journalist), Sebastian Ghita (Social Democratic Party, PSD deputy, owner of Romania TV and other local publications), Dan Voiculescu (Conservatory Party (PC) senator, owner of the Intact Media Group through his family)" [Genea et al. 2011].

The polarization of media translated into a competition between partisan media trusts that have attracted the biggest audience share. Only minor audience segments get informed nowadays from media channels that are relatively independent economic and political-wise, and that are professional and equidistant.

Intact Media Group is the most criticizing trust when it comes to President Traian Basescu, and it is owned by Dan Voiculescu, founder of the Conservatory Party (PC). According to CNSAS (National Council for Studying the Security Archives), Voiculescu used to collaborate with the Security (communist secret political police). The content of the news that is broadcasted by Intact Media favours the Social Liberal Union (USL), formed by PSD (ex-Romanian Communist Party), PNL and PC. The Intact Media Group trust includes the generic and entertainment TV – Antena 1 (cable & satellite), the news TV – Antena 3 (cable & satellite), the female focused TV – Euforia TV (cable & satellite), a quality newspaper – Jurnalul National, a sports newspaper – Gazeta Sporturilor, and the Radio Zu and Romantic FM radio stations. In May 2013, the general manager of Antena 1, Sorin Alexandrescu, was taken to the National Anti-Corruption Direction (DNA) and investigated for the criminal offence of blackmailing the administrator of a firm. The news about the arrest was initially ignored by the Intact Group TV stations. Two days later, Antena 3 complained the case was a set-up.

The press trust that favours Traian Basescu and the Liberal Democratic Party (PDL) is owned by businessman Bobby Paunescu and it is composed by B1 TV (cable & satellite), Vox News

TV, a quality newspaper – Evenimentul Zilei (EVZ), and a financial magazine – Capital. This is the only trust where the Romanian President accepted to attend TV talk-shows in tough times, like when he had to go through the people’s test during the Referendum where he risked being suspended.

The independent trust of RCS-RDS and also called Digi owns the following TV stations: Digi 24, Digi Sport, Digi Film, Digi World, Digi Life, Digi Animal World. The Digi trust was founded on the TV cable network RCS-RDS. The TV stations ratings are not measured and the income source is the cable fee paid by the RCS-RDS subscribers, as opposed to the press groups owned by Voiculescu and Paunescu, which get their revenue from their advertising sales.

The most important trust in terms of rating and advertising volumes is MediaPro Group, founded by Adrian Sarbu. MediaPro Group is part of Central European Media Enterprises. Media Pro Romania has generic or niche TV and radio channels that are focused on entertainment. The content almost never refers to parties or political events. Media Pro includes the following TV stations: Pro TV – national terrestrial, Pro Cinema – cable & satellite, Pro TV Internațional – cable & satellite, Acasa – cable & satellite, Acasa Gold – cable & satellite, MTV Romania – cable & satellite, Sport.ro – cable & satellite; and a few radio stations: Pro FM – national, Pro FM Dance – Bucharest only, Music FM – Bucharest and Cluj.

Realitatea-Cașavencu is another Romanian private media group, that owns: Realitatea TV – news channel; The Money Channel – the first Romanian business channel; Academia Cașavencu – weekly pamphlet political newspaper; and Radio Guerrilla, Realitatea FM and Gold FM radio stations. Realitatea TV was once the best news TV and it was owned by Sorin Ovidiu Vintu, who supported Traian Basescu when he was first elected President in 2004. After businessman Sebastian Ghita took over the Realitatea TV management, as Ghita was close to the prime-minister’s family (Victor Ponta of USL), the trust became critical against President Traian Basescu. Meanwhile, the relationship between Vantu and Basescu got distant and Sebastian Ghita was sentenced to prison.

The Romanian press institutions are free, but not independent. Each journalist has the option to choose the station where he/she wants to work, but journalists know that they have to adopt the editorial policy of their economic or political owners, not the policy of their chief editors. No Romanian TV station criticizes its owners.

A well-known case is of journalists Adrian Ursu and Oana Stancu, who left Realitatea TV (close to President Traian Basescu, back then) because they were too critical against the

President's Party, PDL. The two journalists went to work for Antena 3, the news TV of Intact Group, which is very critical regarding the President and is owned by Dan Voiculescu, one of Traian Basescu's biggest political enemies.

The Romanian press is partially free, because all the voices are heard and all the parties are criticized. At least, the mainstream ones. Depending on its owner, each TV station criticizes the other parliamentary parties. But not all parties have their own TV, especially not the young or small parties. Obviously, the dominant parties (especially the successors of the Romanian Communist Party and of the National Salvation Front FSN – PSD and PDL) are favoured.

The National Audiovisual Council (CNA) has the mission to watch over how the Audiovisual Law is respected and how neutral the mass-media content is. The independence of mass-media content is faked by the private TV stations, but every viewer knows that when he/she watches a TV station, he/she actually watches the communication channel of party that represents the power or the opposition.

In the case of the Romanian public television (TVR), this institution is partly fulfilling its public service role, but it is the speaking-tube of the government parties. It does not provide community journalism and rarely functions in the public interest. The explanation for this resides in the fact that public TV is financed through three sources in Romania: subsidies from the state budget approved by the Parliament, the radio-TV tax paid by everyone who owns a radio or TV device, as well as advertising. By law, the Romanian public TV and radio are under the Parliament control through a Board of Directors formed by members who are named by the parties holding the power. According to 2012 FreeEx Report (ActiveWatch) "TVR administration is dominated by the current political majority". The Romanian Radio-broadcasting Society is also controlled by the parties that hold the majority in the Parliament. Hence, depending on what party is governing, the content broadcasted on the public TV and radio will rather be in favour than against the political power.

The lack of credibility of traditional mass-media overall determines an increasing number of young people to opt for alternative information sources: blogs, social-networks, user generated content sites. As I mentioned, Internet is the second public information source after TV. Many journalists have left traditional media refusing the logic of polarization. Some of them have chosen internet as environment for transmitting information and have initiated successful websites, such as the independent media watchdog website [paginademedia.ro](http://paginademedia.ro). More

and more journalists prefer to express themselves on their personal blog or initiate news websites on their own (entrepreneurial journalism).

### **The origin of the political parties**

Starting from Maurice Duverger's theory [1976] on the exterior origin of the political parties, we observe that in Romania there are political parties born in the online environment (social media) or in television (traditional media), having their origin outside the Parliament. Duverger distinguished between the political parties which originate outside the parliament (the exterior origin) and the political parties which originate inside the parliament (the interior origin): these are the parties formed by splitting of the parliamentary political parties and via the emergence of a new parliamentary group.

In Romania parties with the exterior origin were: a) the party with the trade union origin like Social Solidarity Party founded in 1992. SSP was conducted by syndicate leader Miron Mitrea until its merge with Social Democratic Party of Romanian, now called SDP.

b) The party with its origin in a think-tank group: The Group for Social Dialog founded the Civic Alliance Party (PAC). PAC was assimilated by National Liberal Party.

c) The party with its origin in social media or in blogs: like 5 Stars Movement in Italy (Beppe Grillo's Movimento 5 stelle), in Romania a former leader of a non-governmental organization started his own party on the basis of his blog and Facebook account: Remus Cernea founded The Green Movement, which merged with the Romanian Green Party last year.

d) The party with its origin in a media trust: Great Romania Party was founded in 1991 based on the „Romania Mare” Journal. Oglinda TV (Mirror TV) is the media institution that generated the People's Party- Dan Diaconescu (PP-DD).

### **Dan Diaconescu: From a private television to a parliamentarian political party**

One of the most interesting recent cases of political interference into the journalistic content is the case of Oglinda TV (OTV) - Mirror TV and also named the People's TV by its founder, Dan Diaconescu. OTV was a TV station launched in 2001 that has later on associated with DDTV (Dan Diaconescu TV). OTV lost its license in 2013, after having its license time reduced for a while in 2012 for doing political propaganda.

The editorial policy of this TV was to go for the sensational, scandalous, tabloid news. From the beginning, the main show of the station was Dan Diaconescu Direct (Dan Diaconescu Live – DDD), a tabloid talk-show lasting several hours, featuring obscure guests, such as fortune telling witches, local petty criminals, porn actresses, or eccentric politicians.

A former print journalist, Dan Diaconescu, turned OTV into a tabloid TV by displaying scandalous titles on screen, which he extracted from the gutter press newspapers. It was the first Romanian TV that allocated huge media space for live transmissions regarding funerals or the disappearance of certain persons, like the story that brought Dan Diaconescu the ultimate celebrity: Elodia Ghinescu, a missing woman supposedly assassinated by her husband, a policeman; her dead body was never found.

The National Audiovisual Council (CNA) granted the satellite transmission license for OTV in March 2001. In October 2001, OTV was already receiving a warning from CNA regarding advertising rules and the minors' protection. In February 2002, OTV filled its transmission time with images from the personal tapes of Laura Andresan, an adult movies actress who was disclosing spicy details about her intimate relations with politicians. In February, the nationalist politician Gigi Becali from the New Generation Party (PNG) attacked live on OTV a series of journalists and media owners. CNA also penalized OTV for breaching the law against broadcasting tobacco commercials, and for transmitting a night-time program in which the politicians were insulted and called "gypsies and thieves". (EVZ, 14<sup>th</sup> September 2002)

After a show on September 10<sup>th</sup> 2002 when Dan Diaconescu had a nationalist politician as guest – Corneliu Vadim Tudor from the Great Romania Party (PRM) –, CNA decided to withdraw the transmission license of OTV. During the 6 hours of that DDD TV show, Vadim Tudor has promoted racist and anti-Semite attitudes, which contradicted Article 40 of the Audiovisual Law: "It is forbidden to broadcast programs that include any type of call to hatred based on race, religion, nationality, sex or sexual orientation".

OTV restarted its broadcast in 2004, after the ban was lifted. The topics debated on Dan Diaconescu's talk show maintained their tabloid style and included investigations of "mystery deaths", revelations of religious characters, and scandals among Romanian celebrities.

In 2010, Dan Diaconescu was arrested for having blackmailed a Romanian mayor. Ion Moț, the mayor of a town called Zarand from Arad County, was blackmailed by Diaconescu through the telephone. The TV journalist warned Ion Moț that, in case he does not pay, OTV

will broadcast images that will compromise him. Diaconescu obtained 30.000 euro through blackmail, out of the 200.000 euro he requested.

As soon as he was released after 29 days of preventive arrest, Diaconescu announced he will enter politics and set up his own political party. His political objective, once he was out of prison, was to become the President of Romania. He confessed that one of the reasons which determined him to aim for this was that in Romania politician has immunity in front of justice. The OTV journalistic approach became anti-system, strongly criticizing the establishment and the overall system of parties.

As I already showed in another study [Momoc 2012: 205-214], a political speech may be considered populist if it includes at least one of the key-features identified by the theoreticians of populism while analyzing the populists' language: invoking the people very often, permanent references to the personal attachment to the people; anti-system position and criticizing the leading elites; the people vs. the corrupt elite; anti-political rhetoric; and anti-parliamentary attitude [Hermet 2007: 323; 340]. All these key-features are used in Dan Diaconescu's public speech.

Dan Diaconescu managed to transform a private TV station into a political party over night. The People's Party was created on the September 19<sup>th</sup> 2011 under the name of PP-DD: People's Party Dan Diaconescu. From drivers, secretaries, technicians, cameramen, to TV journalists and presenters, all OTV employees became party members.

Due to the fact that the Audiovisual Law does not allow a party leader to have his/her own TV show, Dan Diaconescu chose to be just a member of the party that has his name, and not the president. This way, Diaconescu tried to protect his TV station from potential CNA restrictions. The night-time programs turned from sensational shows into party sessions. Each day and night, the debates were focused on Diaconescu's goal of becoming the country's President, of saving Romania from the rich and corrupted politicians who were leading the country, of attracting new members into the People's Party. The first point on the PP-DD measures plan was that every citizen would be given 20.000 euro upon turning 18 years old, which could be invested as the receiver wished.

One of the characteristics of the populist leaders is the fact that "the figure of the populist demagogue gains power precisely by making a spectacle of him" [Abst et al. 2007: 405-424] In their study *Populism versus Democracy* [Sutherland 2012: 330-345], Koen Abts and Stefan Rummens showed that populism was described both as a strategy of political mobilization

using a typical style of political rhetoric, as well as a style of politics. On the one hand, populist parties and leaders appeal to the power of the common people in order to challenge the legitimacy of the current political establishment, and on the other hand populism refers to a mobilization characterized by a politics of personality, centred on a charismatic leader who is said to embody the will of the common people.

But Abts and Rummens suggested that, since populism mainly focuses on concepts such as 'the people' or 'democracy', "populism provides a thin-centred ideology concerning the structure of power in society" [Abst et al. 2007: 405-424]. The populist ideology focuses on three elements: 1) a central antagonistic relationship between 'the people' and 'the elite'; 2) populism tries to give the power back to the people; 3) the transparency of the people's will is possible because populism conceptualizes the people as a homogeneous unity.

Following repeated violations of the transmission rules, most significantly broadcasting populist propaganda for Diaconescu's political party, CNA decided to reduce by half the broadcast time of OTV license. CNA applied its most drastic sanction three times in one year, cutting OTV license to half each time because the TV was continuously broadcasting political advertising for PP-DD outside the electoral campaign period – and political propaganda outside the elections is allowed only in print and online in Romania.

At the elections on December 9<sup>th</sup> 2012, PPDD received 13,99% of the votes for the Deputies Chamber and 14,65% of the votes for the Senats. It is now the fourth party in the Parliament terms of parliamentarians' number. On these elections, Dan Diaconescu competed against the current prime-minister, Victor Ponta (from PSD), and did not become a deputy representing Targu-Jiu County solely because of the electoral system that favours big parties.

In January 2013, OTV ceased its cable transmission: its license was withdrawn by CNA for not having paid a large sum of money representing the fines OTV has been receiving for repeatedly violating the Romanian audiovisual legislation. Today, OTC is still broadcasting online. Dan Diaconescu continues to promote himself on old media and on new media as the next President of Romania.

### **Conclusions:**

Freedoms of the press and media independence are some of the most important criteria for a constitutional democracy to function. The more media content is influenced by politicians or by media owners, the less freedom and equality have the political actors and the citizens.

In the past years, Romanian press has been more and more polarized, and a large number of journalists became politicians. The main risk for Romania is to delay the democratization of its society and modernization of its own institutions.

The case of Dan Diaconescu's Party (People's Party) is an example of interference of politics into journalism: a private television was turned into a political party with the declared objective of his owner to become the next Romanian president. The spectacular within populism is based on this metamorphose of the journalists into politicians.

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# PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

## Hannah Arendt – Critic of the Totalitarianism

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„The originality of totalitarianism is horrible, not because some new ‘idea’ came into the world, but because its very actions constitute a break with all our traditions; they have clearly exploded our categories of political thought and our standards for moral judgment” [Arendt 2005: 309-10]

### **Abstract**

In this article the author will present the philosophical opinions of one of the most influential thinkers of the 20th century – Hannah Arendt (1906-1975). In her works the Jewish philosopher raised the issues of inter alia: totalitarianism, anti-Semitism, thinking and acting, power and violence, relation of philosophy towards politics, politics and religion, ability to distinguish the good from the evil, responsibility, morality, forgiveness. Moreover, the author will indicate the convergence of opinions of this philosopher with the teaching of the Pope John Paul II.

### **Key words**

*Hannah Arendt, John Paul II, totalitarianism, anti-Semitism, revolution, politics*

Hannah Arendt (born on 14.10.1906 in Kaliningrad, died on 4.12.1975 in New York) was a Jewish philosopher, theoretician of culture and politics, co-founder of the theory of totalitarianism [Nowak 2000: 303]. Her parents were non-practicing Jews. She owed frequent visits to synagogue to her grandfather Max [Heller 2000: 18]. She attended three universities: in

Marburg, in Freiburg im Breisgau and in Heidelberg. She was a student of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) as well as Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) [Bernacki 2001: 261].

She undertook the issue of her own political consciousness due to “life itself”, but her first challenge was the issue of her own Jewishness [Heller 2000: 22]. The Jewish origin was a puzzle for her and the source of anxiety [Ettinger 1998: 10]. Accidental encounter with the correspondence of Rahel Varnhagen enabled her to undertake this issue seriously. Ultimately in 1938 a biography entitled “Rahel Varnhagen” was created [see Arendt 1998a]. Rahel was a German Jewess, between 1790 and 1806 she ran a famous literary saloon in Berlin. She lived with the feeling of lower value and had a complex of “infamous origins” [Arendt 2006a: 13].

The issue of totalitarianism has a central place in Arendt’s philosophy [Judt 2002: 58]. She became a famous political philosopher owing to her “Origins of totalitarianism” [Canovan 2002: 146]. She followed its origins, the history of ideas which comprised the totalitarian ideology. She was showing how totalitarianism as a system of political violence is different from despotism, dictatorship and tyranny [Tischner 2002: 35]. She described totalitarianism as a system which deepens the isolation of man, his solitude, at the same time destroying social contacts and the sphere open to public activity of man [Kawalec 2000: 316]. She asked about “the origins of totalitarianism” so about the past which was supposed to provide the explanations for the totalitarian present [Tischner 2002: 36].

During one of her lectures entitled “Concern with politics in the recent European philosophical thought” originally given at American Association of Political Sciences in 1954 she emphasized that: “Like any political philosophy, contemporary concern with politics in Europe can be traced back until shocking experience of two world wars, totalitarian regimes and horrible perspective of nuclear war. In one respect these events encountered philosophy well prepared to recognize the importance of political events, and philosophers more willing to do something than they were in the past [Arendt 2008b: 115]. She stressed that it was necessary to examine the relations occurring between religion and politics: “One of the most surprising by-products of the fight between the free world and totalitarian world is a strong tendency to interpret this conflict in religious categories. We are told that communism is a new «secular religion» for which the free world is defending its own, transcendental «reli-

gious system». The implications of this notion are broader than its direct application; it brings back «religion» to the world of public and political matters from which religion was excluded together with the separation of the Church from the state. Therefore, this notion, although her supporters often do not realize, poses a forgotten issue of relation between religion and politics” [Ibid.: 169].

She emphasized the significance of anti-Semitism in the formation of a totalitarian country and paid attention to the fact of creating totalitarianism by destroying first the political sphere and then the private one [Bernacki 2001: 261]. A historian and sociologist Jan Tomasz Gross emphasized the words of Arendt that “anti-Semitism is such a banal and common prejudice in our times that we do not pay much attention to it [Gross 2008: 84]. She stressed that “many people still think that the origins of Nazi ideology was anti-Semitism, that the politics of the Nazis consequently and uncompromisingly aimed at persecution and the Holocaust. Only the horror at the sight of the scope of the catastrophe, and what is more its homelessness and the feeling of extermination of those who survived, caused” that «Jewish issue» became so noticeable in political life” [Arendt 2008a: 24].

In “The Human Condition” [Arendt 2000] she was proving that the highest achievement of man is not his thought but an active life [Crittenden 1998: 33]. This book is devoted to three types of activities: work, production (manufacture) and action. Man works because of life necessity – biological needs. Because of work he can survive as species not as an individual. Man produces, that is manufactures, “artificial” world of things which can be potentially more permanent than man [Pawelec 2001: 143]. According to Arendt this form of activity is an answer to “worldliness” of man. Man also acts with other people without the mediation of things, that is he participates in politics [Ibid.]. She gave emphasis to the fact that “Human condition includes something more than only the conditions on which life was given to man. People are conditioned beings because whatever they encounter instantly changes into some kind of conditioning of their existence. (...) Besides the conditions (and partially beyond them) on which life on earth was given to man, people constantly create their own conditions which, despite their human origin and changeability, have the some conditioning power as natural things. (...) human condition is not the same as human nature, and a whole sum of human activities and abilities corresponding to human condition, does not take the form of human nature (...) these conditions (S.G. added) do not constitute essential charac-

teristics of human existence in this sense that without them this existence would not be human any more [Arendt 2000: 13-14].

Arendt thought that owing to action, speech, so owing to politics, we may become individuals different from other. Neither work will give us such a possibility because it is a natural, animal activity nor production which displays all individuality in things [Środa 2000: 22]. Action is the only activity requiring the presence of other people. It can only take place in public space which enables interpersonal contacts [Brzechczyn 1998: 93]. For example femininity, love, suffering, fight belonged to privacy and politics, freedom, dialogue and reason belonged to the public sphere. According to Arendt public is everything which can be seen, heard and understood by everyone [Środa 2000: 22]. The sphere in which freedom can realize itself to the fullest is politics [Brzechczyn 1998: 93].

Politics is the highest form of realization of human community and therefore doing politics requires unselfishness. Excessive ambition is a form of evil, thoughtlessness and therefore politics can only be done by thinking people. Her advice concerning a mutual activity is to meet in a pluralistic world by doing something together and take delight in it [Król 2006: 15].

Arendt distinguished two ways of life: *vita contemplativa* (life in contemplation) and *vita activa* (active life). Life in contemplation is alone. Its aim is to experience the Truth and "watching/observing God". Active life is a public life, in the presence of things and people [Brzechczyn 1998: 94].

According to this philosopher all the evil originated from the mixing of history with politics. There was nothing more fragile and transitory than human action. She often indicated the degradation of politics as a result of the intervention of history [Bertherat et al. 1991: 61-62].

In the book entitled „Between Past and Future” [see Arendt 1994] she stressed that the crisis of contemporary world has an especially political character. This crisis is expressed by means of the collapse of tradition, religion and authority [Kowalewska 1994: 254]. This Roman triad was the foundation giving durability to the republican system [Bernacki 2001: 261]. The authority is a guarantor of durability and stability of the world. People need it because of their fragility and mortality. It requires obedience and therefore it is often confused with various forms of violence and power [Kowalewska 1997: 254].

Three fundamental statements concerning the basic principles of political ontology of Arendt are: 1) only action shows the fundamental dimension of human existence and pluralism; 2) human condition is defined by birth and death; 3) uniqueness, instability and openness are a fundamental feature of human relations [Śpiewak 1986: 32-33].

In her next book "On revolution" [see Arendt 1991a] Arendt stated that the thread of tradition was broken by totalitarianism. The presence of a brutal game of interests and unrestrained ambitions can only be minimized by means of the effort of reflections and dialogue [Król 2006: 13]. Every revolution which belonged to the category of actions is the birth and the beginning of something new [Brzechczyn 1998: 95]. She emphasized that in order to "understand the essence of modern revolutions one must bear in mind that the idea of freedom converges in it with the experience of new beginning" [Arendt 1991a: 27]. At the same time she indicated that "freedom happens to be better protected in the countries in which there has not been a revolution (although scandalous economic and political conditions could prevail there) and that in the countries where the revolution lost, there are more civil liberties than in the countries where the revolution would win" [Ibid.: 116].

She believed that one cannot overlook the fact that "war as well as revolution are unthinkable without the use of violence. It is hard to deny that one of the reasons due to which wars change into revolutions so easily, and revolutions display this dangerous tendency to start wars is the fact that violence and violation constitute a common denominator for both of these forms. The amount of violation during the World War I could be enough to trigger a series of revolutions after the end of the war without any revolutionary tradition and even if there had not been any revolution previously" [Arendt 1991a: 16-17].

She perceived a revolution as the only chance to recreate the public sphere in which action would be possible. The revolution itself constituted only the first stage, whilst the second stage would have to be constituting freedom *constitutio liberatis*: „If the ultimate aim of revolutionary aspirations was freedom and *constitutio liberatis* – that is the establishment of public sphere, in which freedom might become an evident fact – then elementary republics, the only tangible place, in which everybody could be free, in fact constituted the foundation of a great republic in which the main aim in the field of internal affairs would be provision of such places of freedom to citizens and protecting them" [Ibid.: 258].

None of her books but “Eichmann in Jerusalem. A report on Banality of Evil” [Arendt 1998b] stirred such a heated discussion [Benhabib 2002: 180]. The trial of this war criminal took place in Jerusalem in 1961 where Arendt went as a “New Yorker” correspondent. She decided to believe Eichmann that he had nothing to do with the extermination of the Jews [Saner 2002: 178]. According to Arendt, Eichmann was not a demon but an average diligent clerk who was commissioned to kill several million of people and he performed this task as well as he could [Wojna 2000: 259].

Marin Buber (1878-1965), the father of philosophy of dialogue, called Eichmann’s execution „the mistake of historical dimension” because, as he claimed, this situation could “cause to erase the guilt felt by many young people in Germany” [Szcześniak 2001: 228].

According to Arendt people do evil things because they cannot think. Therefore, we should attach great importance to philosophy and a philosopher who is “devoted to thinking” [Król 2006: 14]. Man has an identity when he conducts an internal dialogue with himself or he is in constant move, always asks, searches and thinks. She clearly emphasized the role of internal dialogue of thoughts, which she called “the conversation between me and myself” [Young-Buehl 2002: 67]. And it was not about the fact that the crimes in which Eichmann participated were banal or that the extermination of the Jews was banal [Benhabib 2002: 185]. She later admitted that the style and some slogans in before mentioned book were a mistake and she regretted the use of the expression “banality of evil” [Elon 2002: 166].

She faced the issue of the relation of thought and the world in her last fully edited book entitled “Thinking”. The essence of Arendt’s philosophy is possible only in man the reconciliation of thought and the world. Her interest in mental activity had two distinct sources: the participation in the abovementioned trial of Eichmann in Jerusalem and the issue of action, especially the term *vita activa* [Arendt 1991b: 33-38]. The reconciliation is possible on the grounds of constantly moving structure „2 in 1”, which allows for the reconciliation, or not, of two passions in man – thinking and action [Szczeptański 2004: 73, 100]. “Thinking, taking it existentially, is a solitude but not abandonment; solitude is a human situation, in which man is alone with himself. Abandonment comes when we lose the ability to separate into 2 in 1, when we cannot be alone with ourselves, keep us company” [Arendt 1991b: 253].

In the collections of so far unpublished texts of Arendt from the last decade of her life entitled “Responsibility and judgment” she put our ability to distinguish between good and evil

under critical scrutiny. She summarized the issue of relation of philosophy and politics, theory and practice, thinking and action in such words: “Specific questions must wait for specific answers, and if next crises which we have experienced since the beginning of this century can teach us anything then I believe that there are no general criteria allowing us to formulate judgments reliably and no general rules which could be applied to specific cases” [Arendt 2006b: 7]. She indicated the basic difference between thinking and action, in a political sense, which in her opinion “depends on the fact that when I think, I am only with my «I» or other «I», but when I start to act, I am accompanied by others” [Ibid.: 134].

She considered the issue of personal responsibility in the conditions of dictatorship. She stressed that “even relatively small number of people making decisions, who in a normal system can be known by name and surname, in any dictatorship, not to mention totalitarianism, is reduced to unity, and all the institutions which have some control over the decisions and may verify them, are abolished. In the Third Reich there was only one man (Adolf Hitler – S.G. added) entitled to take decisions and therefore he took the full political responsibility” [Ibid.: 62]. She indicated two conditions necessary for the collective responsibility to occur: “I must be held responsible for something I did not do, and the reason for this responsibility must be my membership in a group (community), which no act of my will is able to invalidate – it means a completely different membership, for example from partnership in business, from which if I wish I may withdraw” [Ibid.: 178].

She raised the issue of morality, which in her opinion “concerns man as an individual. Criterion of good and evil, an answer to a question: «How should I behave?»” in the ultimate calculation depends neither on the customs or habits, which are common for me and people who surround me, nor on the commandments of divine or human origin, but on what I decide myself. In other words, I cannot do certain things because if I did them, I would not be able to live with myself” [Ibid.: 126].

In her work entitled “On violence. Civil disobedience” she stressed that “The more doubtful and uncertain tool violence has become in international relations, the greater publicity and attractiveness in internal affairs, especially in relation to revolution it has gained ” [Arendt 1999: 17]. She indicated that “Everybody, who is engaged in historical and political thought, must realize how great role violence has always played in human matters” [Ibid.: 14]. She believed that violence “is phenomenologically close to power due to the fact that means of



violence, similarly to all the other tools, are designated and used to increase the natural power before, in the final stage of development, will replace it" [Ibid.: 59], while "it appears where power is endangered, but violence which is left to its own fate leads to the disappearance of power" [Ibid.: 72]. Furthermore, she stressed that "(...) the greater the bureaucratization of public life is, the more attractive violence is. In an advanced bureaucracy there is nobody with whom one can have an argument, to whom one can complain, with whom one can put pressure on the authority. Bureaucracy is a form of government, which deprives everybody of political freedom, authority of action; because government by Nobody is not identical with lack of government and everybody is equally helpless, we have a tyranny without a tyrant [Ibid.: 103-104].

The views of Hannah Arendt clearly correspond with the thought of the blessed John Paul II (pontificate from 1978 to 2005). In his encyclical *Centesimus annus* (Rome, 1 May 1991) the Pope underlined that „it is necessary to notice that in a situation when there is no ultimate truth being a guide for political activity and indicating the direction, it is easy to have the instrumentalization of ideas and convictions for aims which the authority sets for itself [Modrzejewski 2006: 189-190]. History teaches us that democracy without values easily transforms into explicit or camouflaged totalitarianism" (nr 46). The Pope defended the democratic state against totalitarian ideologies [Ballestrem 2002: 296]. Similarly to Arendt he opposed every totalitarian system which deprived man of his right to freedom of thought and religion [Ibid.], he was fighting for man, for his dignity and the right to a full quality of life [Skrzypczak 2006: 119].

The Pope emphasized that a dialogue must be conducted and prejudices must be overcome. Specific indications of John Paul II, how to gradually overcome any manifestations of intolerance, discrimination, anti-Semitism are: speak openly with one another about competition and conflicts of the past, try to recognize their historical conditioning and overcome it by means of mutual care for peace, for consequent testimony of faith and development of moral values [Urban 1997: 63].

In his speech to the representatives of American Jewish Committee (Vatican, 15.02.1985) the Pope emphasized that "Anti-Semitism, which unfortunately still remains an issue in various parts of the world, was condemned many times by Catholic tradition as an approach which is impossible to reconcile with the teaching of Christ and the feeling of due respect for

men and women created in the image and likeness of God. Once again I would like to express the view of the Catholic Church which rejects any form of oppression and persecution, any discrimination of people – regardless of reasons for which it could occur (...)” [Jan Paweł II 1985: 63].

Hannah Arendt stressed that „Jesus from Nazareth was the discoverer of the role of forgiveness in the field of human matters. The fact that he made this discovery in the religious context and expressed it in the religious language is not a reason to treat its secular sense with a lesser seriousness” [Mazurkiewicz 2005: 207]. She believed that the power of forgiveness, according to the teaching of Jesus, is not reserved to God, is also in the power of man: “This authority does not come from God – then it would be so that if man did not forgive but God by means of human beings – but on the contrary, people must activate it in relation to one another mutually and only then they can hope that God will forgive them too” [Ibid.: 212, fn. 23]. Also John Paul II put emphasis to the forgiveness, which concerns the past, but reconciliation – the future. In order to reach permanent peace, the differences between communities discovered by means of appropriate readings of history and acquired owing to new sensitivity, should be respected and accepted [Ibid.: 215].

To sum up, it is worth emphasizing that Arendt was more engaged in the moral issue of evil than the structure of any existing political system [Judt 2002: 60]. She believed in the power of Socratic dialogue (politics as its most perfect form) and in this that man must be conscious of the consequences of his actions [Duda and Śpiewak 2002: 43]. She was never afraid of passing judgments and sticking to them [Judt 2002: 64]. She tried to build new image of political space indicating new perspectives, notions and definitions [Heller 2000: 27]. She was a woman who expressed strong and firm opinions, she was not hiding her elitist prejudices taken from German grammar school [Young-Bruehl 2002: 66]. She reached the conclusion that man who is blind to reality, confused and uprooted, cannot resist totalitarian temptations and the charm of utopia [Ballestrem 2002: 295].

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